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“Erica Baffelli’s book breaks new ground by providing us with the first 
comprehensive analysis of the ways in which Japanese new religions use 
media forms to create marketable images of themselves and to construct 
images of their leaders and to transmit their teachings. Her study shows how 
the charismatic standing of leaders may be constructed and reinforced via 
media-ised processes, publications and rituals, and how new religions make 
use of spectacular, media-oriented rituals to attract new audiences. Yet she 
also shows that new religions at times have problems with new media, as 
her account of the ways in which they may struggle with the potentialities of 
the Internet shows. As such, this is a valuable study of importance to anyone 
interested in Japanese religions, new religions, and the media.”
—Ian Reader, University of Manchester, UK
Japanese “new religions” (shinshūkyō) have used various media forms for 
training, communicating with members, presenting their messages, reinforc-
ing or protecting the image of the leader and potentially attracting converts. 
In this book, the complex and dual relationship between the media and new 
religions is investigated by looking at the tensions groups face between the 
need for visibility and the risks of facing attacks and criticism through the 
media. Indeed, media and new technologies have been extensively used by 
religious groups not only to spread their messages and to try to reach a wider 
audience, but also to promote themselves as a highly modern and up-to-date 
form of religion appropriate for a modern technological age. In the 1980s and 
early 1990s, some movements, such as Agonshū, Kōfuku no Kagaku and Aum 
Shinrikyō, came into prominence especially via the use of media (initially pub-
lications, but also ritual broadcasts, advertising campaigns and public media 
events). This created new modes of ritual engagement and new ways of inter-
actions between leaders and members. The aim of this book is to develop and 
illustrate particular key issues in the wider new religions and media nexus by 
using specific movements as examples. In particular, the analysis of the inter-
action between media and new religions will focus primarily on three case 
studies predominantly during the first period of development of the groups.
Erica Baffelli is currently a Senior Lecturer in Japanese Studies at the Univer-
sity of Manchester, UK. She is interested in religion in contemporary Japan, 
with a focus on groups founded from the 1970s onwards. Currently, she is 
examining the interactions between media and “new religions” (shinshūkyō) 
in the 1980s and 1990s and the changes in the use of media by religious 
institutions after the 1995 Tokyo subway attack.
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What Is This Book About?
One night, during one of my first visits to Tokyo, I was waiting for the green 
light at the Shibuya pedestrian crossing. One of the busiest intersections 
in the world, it is surrounded by advertising signs and large video screens 
mounted on buildings overlooking the crossing, often showing the latest 
pop stars’ music videos or advertising. One of these screens was showing 
rapidly moving images of young people playing different sports. I assumed 
this was the new advertisement of some well-known sport clothes brand, 
but at the end of the short video, the message “Possibilities are endless, 
Sōka Gakkai” (kanōsei wa mugendai, Sōka Gakkai) appeared on the screen. 
Sōka Gakkai is the largest new Buddhist organisation in Japan and adver-
tisements of its publications frequently appear in newspapers and on tele-
vision1 and trains.
However, Sōka Gakkai’s engagement with media and advertising is not 
unique among Japanese (new) religious organisations. In fact, it is just one 
example of the ways in which such movements seek to attract attention 
and get their messages across by using mass media strategies and advertis-
ing activities. For example, in July 1991, several thousand people gathered 
in the Tokyo Dome, a large baseball stadium in central Tokyo, to attend 
the “transformation” of Ōkawa Ryūhō, the leader of a religious movement 
called Kōfuku no Kagaku (literally, Science of Happiness, but now officially 
calling itself Happy Science in English), who proclaimed his true identity 
as a supreme deity called El Cantāre during a spectacular event and perfor-
mance. In the months before the event, the group coordinated an intensive 
and expensive advertising campaign that prophesied the arrival of a new 
era with the slogan, “Now is the Age of Kōfuku no Kagaku” (Jidai wa ima, 
Kōfuku no Kagaku). Around the same period, Asahara Shōkō, the leader of 
Aum Shinrikyō, the group that later became notorious for committing the 
sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995 and other atrocious crimes, 
was invited as a guest on TV talk shows, and his group, although sharply 
critical of modern society and media, was one of the first groups in Japan to 
engage with computer-based communication.
These are just a few examples of how Japanese “new religions” (shin-
shūkyō) have in recent times used various mass media forms to publicise 
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themselves and get their messages across. This is not something that has 
only happened in the current era: since their emergence in the nineteenth 
century, Japanese new religions have been noted for their ability to use var-
ious media forms in such ways. While the movements that emerged in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were adept at using the printed 
page—often in the form of books, pamphlets and newsletters—in more 
recent times, as the above examples indicate, new religions have adopted 
newer media forms and technologies.2 In such ways, Japanese new religions 
appear to have kept pace with the times and with media developments and 
technologies. As this book will show, they have adjusted their strategies of 
self-promotion as media technologies have changed and developed in Japan. 
Lynch, Mitchell and Strahan have noted that “[. . .] it is increasingly difficult 
to think about religious phenomena in contemporary society without think-
ing about how these are implied with various form of media and cultural 
practices” (2011, 1) and studies of contemporary religion have argued that 
religious institutions have been implementing media logic to appeal to their 
audiences (Hors field 2004). Although religion can always be seen as a part 
of mediated practices (De V ries 2001; Meye r and Moors 2005; Plat e 2003; 
Stol ow 2005), for some scholars, religion is progressively being subdued 
under the logic of media through the process of “mediatization” (Hjar vard 
2008),3 that is, a process by which institutions and society are shaped by 
and dependent on media technologies and organisations.4 While the term 
“mediatization” has become widely employed by media and communica-
tion scholars, there has also been criticism of it and of the ways it has been 
used to suggest that religion in the present age is not only being affected, 
but deeply transformed or structured by mass media. In particular, critics 
have argued that mediatization is not necessarily a universal phenomenon 
(Hoov er 2009, 136), nor necessarily a new and contemporary one (Morg an 
2011, 138). Other scholars argue for a “mediation of religion” approach, 
asserting that the media have shaped religious practices in pre-modern con-
texts as well and that media and religion are interdependent. Stol ow (2005) 
defines this approach as “religion as media”:
Throughout history, in myriad forms, communication with and about 
‘the sacred’ has always been enacted through written texts, ritual ges-
tures, images and icons, architecture, music, incense, special garments, 
saintly relics and other objects of veneration, markings upon flesh, wag-
ging tongues and other body parts. It is only through such media that it 
is at all possible to proclaim one’s faith, mark one’s affiliation, receive 
spiritual gifts, or participate in any of the countless local idioms for mak-
ing the sacred present to mind and body. In other words, religion always 
encompasses techniques and technologies that we think of as ‘media’ [. . .].
As Carneiro ( 2015) has argued, according to the mediation approach, 
technology is not necessarily seen as modern media developed since the 
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nineteenth century, but it is defined in a broader sense to denote “any human 
action that employs artefacts or techniques to attain some result within the 
environment or the human body itself” (Carneiro 2 015, 9).
This book takes up these points, in particular the importance of consider-
ing the historical and cultural contexts, by discussing the key issues related 
to the media-religion nexus in the Japanese context.
In particular, my interest in this book is not on how new religions gener-
ally use media, but on how as new religions develop their media strategies in 
order to get their messages across to the wider populace, the strategies they 
adopt in turn impact the ways the movements develop. In particular, I will 
pay attention to such issues in the early stages of the formation of religious 
groups, since, as has been widely recognised, it is in their early periods of 
development that movements are at their most volatile. Therefore, the aim 
of this book is not to offer a comprehensive history of the use of media by 
Japanese new religions, but to identify key issues in the creation of media 
narratives by religious organisations in order to proselytise, communicate 
with members and create (and, at times, recreate or reshape) their image and 
in the relationship between those groups and the media. Thus far, there has 
been relatively little work done on how Japanese new religions use media 
communications or that considers the impact of media communications on 
new religions’ practices, structures and belief systems.5 This book is intended 
to address this gap by using specific new religions as examples to develop 
and illustrate particular key issues in the wider new religions and media 
nexus.
Although this book is on Japanese new religions, it does not intend to 
claim that the Japanese case is unique. On the contrary, although recognis-
ing the specificities of the historical context and of each group, I identify 
key issues that are applicable to other groups and contexts where similar 
dynamics related to the ambivalent relationship between media and new 
religions occur. Indeed, media impacts on the definition of new religions 
and tensions in religious organisations between the use of media for achiev-
ing visibility and the negative consequences of media exposure have been 
discussed in other contexts, especially in relation to journalistic treatments 
of new religions (Beckford 19 85, 1999; McClo ud 200 7; van Driel and 
Richardson 1988, 1997). Therefore, the selected themes: the importance of 
using media for increasing profile, improving image and recruitment; the 
impact on religious authority and on practices and ritual; the importance of 
branding, repackaging and regenerating media images, and finally, the risks 
connected to visibility, can contribute to discussions on the topic and pro-
vide a framework for the analysis of new religions-media dynamics in the 
larger context of the study of new religious movements. Religion and media, 
according to Hoover, are more and more connected (2006, 1), and to under-
stand the processes of interactions between them, the historical context of 
these dynamics and the complexities of contemporary religions should be 
understood.
4  Introduction
The term “media” commonly also refers to various forms (e.g., newspa-
pers, radio, television, the Internet) through which information and views 
are expressed, generated and distributed, and in Japan, these forms have 
been highly important in the modern era.6 In the context of this book, I 
am also using the term “media” to refer specifically to media forms used 
by new religions. These include different media texts produced and distrib-
uted by new religions both internally, such as books published by in-house 
publishers (Chapter Four) and externally, that is, the use of industrial media 
by groups, such as, for example, the use of private satellite broadcasting 
companies (Chapter Three), the use of advertising agencies (Chapter Four) 
or the Internet and social media (Chapter Five). I will consider some media 
texts in detail in the context of the groups I use for my case studies, because 
they are particularly illustrative of the media technologies and image strat-
egies those groups adopted in the early period of their formation. How-
ever, it would be problematic to focus just on one particular media form, as 
often groups implement a multimedia strategy, while the interconnections 
between different media are also important. For example, advertising cam-
paigns are used to promote books that are used to advertise public media 
events, satellite broadcastings are advertised in magazines and on TV and 
new publications are advertised during the broadcasts and so on. Indeed, 
in the polymedia environment (Lynch, Mitc hell, and Strhan 2011, 3), char-
acterising contemporary Japanese society and making distinctions between 
different media (such as differentiated targets for specific publications or for 
animated movies, for example) is as important as interconnections and the 
overlap between them.
Finally, the role played by the media in both shaping public discourse on 
religion and in affecting how these movements are perceived and evaluated 
is also very relevant to the discussion. Although the focus of this book is 
more on the media texts produced and circulated by religious organisations, 
to the extent that an analysis of media representations of new religions7 is 
beyond the scope of this book, Chapter Four discusses media reactions to 
advertising campaigns and events organised by new religions, and the Con-
clusion analyses the reappropriation by online users of the materials created 
and distributed by a religious group.
Before introducing the structure of the book, some clarification regarding 
the term “new religions” is needed.
NEW RELIGIONS
The complex religious panorama in contemporary Japan includes numer-
ous8 groups that emerged from the nineteenth century and that have been 
labelled—according to the period of their development and the classifica-
tion criteria adopted—with several terms, of which the most used by schol-
ars are shinshūkyō9 (new religions), shin-shinshūkyō10 (new-new religions), 
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and shinreisei undō11 (new spiritual movements).12 Scholars have proposed 
different classifications and terminology for these groups over the last few 
decades in order to distinguish newly formed religious organisations from 
the so-called kisei shūkyō (institutionalised religions) or dentō shūkyō (tradi-
tional religions) (Inoue 1992; S himazono 199 2b; 2004), namely Buddhism 
and its various sects and Shinto. New religions developed in conjunction 
with the processes of modernisation and urbanisation, and in a recently pub-
lished overview on these groups, Reader defines them as “the most signifi-
cant organisational development in the Japanese religious context in modern 
times”, and has noted that they are able to attract considerable numbers of 
members.13
The definition of new religions and their characteristics is rendered prob-
lematic by the fluidity and complexity of various groups and their affilia-
tions (or lack of), and different phases of their development, formation and 
expansion. Just as the term shūkyō (religion) has been at the centre of several 
scholarly debates regarding the formation of the conceptual category of reli-
gion in Japan and its application to the Japanese context,14 so have the terms 
shinshūkyō and new religions been controversial, as the former was also 
used apologetically in the postwar period in order to grant new movements 
legitimacy (Thomas 2014), and the definition of “new religions” in other 
contexts does not necessary fit Japanese groups.15 Despite these limitations, 
however, the term new religions as a chronological category is used in this 
book because it remains the most viable English-language term to denote 
what we are focusing on.16
As has been previously mentioned, germinal forms of new religions 
appeared in the late Tokugawa period (1603–1867), and several phases of 
their development have been identified by scholars. Although there is no con-
sensus about the exact dates of each phase, generally, the key periods are: the 
end of Tokugawa period and the beginning of the Meiji era (1868–1912), the 
1920s and 1930s, the postwar period, the post “oil shock” period (post 1973) 
and finally, the post-1995 period (after the sarin gas attack).17 These phases 
of development also indicate that in the Japanese context, “new” does not 
necessary refers to first-generation new religions; some of these groups were 
established almost two centuries ago. The specific character of the “newness” 
in these religious groups lies in a combination of their historical period of 
formation, changes in relationships between members and in their organisa-
tional structure and in innovations regarding practices and doctrines. These 
changes must be understood in relation both with tradition—that is the main 
reference point for the doctrine of most groups—and with the specific histor-
ical context in which each of the groups developed.
Early studies (such as, for example, Thomsen 1963) lis ted a series of char-
acteristics that were supposedly shared by new religions. Later studies crit-
icised this approach and stressed significant differences in history, doctrine 
and practices and how the combination of these elements created different 
worldviews (Hardacre 1984). T here are, however, some organisational and 
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structural elements that could be identified and that are particularly relevant 
for the discussion of the relationship between media and new religions. First 
of all, there is the role of a charismatic leader who offers new teachings and 
practices, or a new interpretation of already existing ones, and a new path. 
The importance of the leader raises important issues related to the process 
of the legitimisation of leadership, which, depending on groups, could be 
founded in previous traditions (the new leader as the legitimate heir of a 
specific Buddhist school, for example) or through spirit possession18 and 
the channelling of deities and spirits. In some cases, the new leader claims to 
have received legitimation from the leader of another new religion, as, for 
example, Ōkawa Ryūhō (born 1956), the leader of Kōfuku no Kagaku, and 
Chino Yuko (1934–2006), the founder of Chino Shōkō (Chino True Law, 
also known as Panawēbu Kenkyūjo or the Pana Wave Laboratory), who 
both see themselves as legitimate heirs of Takahashi Shinji (1921–1976), 
founder of the GLA (God Light Association). Secondly, new religions have 
been defined as eclectic and dynamic, able to draw from different religious 
and philosophical traditions, and their affiliation can change over time. For 
new religions, it is often vital to demonstrate connections with an older, 
established tradition (such as a supposedly “true, original” Buddhism) while 
at the same time asserting that the previous teachings have been updated in 
order to fit contemporary society. Whelan calls the ability of new religions 
to incorporate different features into their own system as “survival syncre-
tism”, that is, “a self-conscious syncretism in which a religion assesses all 
of its potential competitive threats and attempts an energetic co-optation” 
(2007a, 389). This ability also allows groups to provide a plethora of prac-
tices and teachings for their members to choose from. They are also highly 
dynamic and can change quite radically over a short period of time, espe-
cially in the early stages of their formation. Their focus on this-worldly 
benefits has also been seen as an important characteristic of new religions, 
although this attention to practical benefits (genze riyaku) can be traced to 
other religious traditions and practices in Japan (Reader and Tanabe 1 998).
Finally, from an organisational point of view, new religions are seen as 
particularly focused on proselytism efforts, also using the media and public 
events to promote their messages. The organisational structure of the new 
religions frequently includes teams specialising in public relations or media 
programming. Many groups have their own publishing houses that distrib-
ute their texts to ordinary retail bookshops, the latter often having special 
sections for groups with large numbers of publications (Ishii 1994). The us e 
of media will be extensively discussed in the following chapters, but just 
to provide a couple of examples, Oomoto, a new religion founded in 1892 
by Deguchi Nao, between 1908 and 1929 published 13 magazines and in 
1920, bought a newspaper that enabled it to get its message across to a 
larger national audience. Seichō no Ie, a group founded in 1930 by Taniguchi 
Masaharu, used the press as the main tool for proselytism, and its strategy of 
the publication and diffusion of its leader’s books became a model for later 
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groups. While Japan has not had anything directly akin to “televangelists”, 
that is, Christian ministers that conduct sermons via television broadcasts, its 
new religions have maintained a high level of media presence. This has come 
mainly through advertisements in magazines and newspapers, in broadcasts 
on radio programmes and satellite television networks, and, more recently, 
through the use of websites and social networks. Furthermore, the enact-
ment and fruition of religious rituals and festivals may be influenced by the 
presence of media, as, for example, when followers gather at the centres of 
their movements to watch videos, television and satellite broadcasts.
CASE STUDIES IN THIS BOOK
In this book, the analysis of the interaction between media and new religions 
will focus primarily on three case studies, and are set predominantly during 
the first period of the development of the groups being analysed (the 1980s 
for Agonshū, the late 1980s to early 1990s for Kōfuku no Kagaku, and post-
2007 for Hikari no Wa). The media strategies of such groups tend, of course, 
to change over time. My interest is to show how media forms have been 
essential at particular moments in the development of these groups, that is, 
when they were building their image and setting the basis of their teaching 
and doctrine. The choices of using particular media devices played a central 
role in the determining the success (with various degrees) of these groups 
and strongly impacted their public images for years to come.
While Kōfuku no Kagaku, Agonshū and Hikari no Wa are not the big-
gest new religious movements in Japan, they are significant examples in 
the discourse concerning media and religion for two main reasons. Firstly, 
they can be considered, for different reasons discussed in later chapters, very 
self-conscious groups when it comes to media communication strategies. Sec-
ondly, changes in their media strategies could be seen as correlated to the 
impact of the sarin gas attack in 1995. Kōfuku no Kagaku and Agonshū, 
although not directly involved in the crimes and violent actions, received 
significant attention and criticism after the sarin attack. Asahara Shōkō (born 
in 1955 as Matsumoto Chizuo), the leader of Aum Shinrikyō, was a member 
of Agonshū, a group founded in 1954 by Kiriyama Seiyu (born in 1921 as 
Tsutsumi Masuo), for a period of time and borrowed some of its teachings 
(Reader 2000a, 13; Sh imazono 2001). Although Agonshū and its leader tried 
immediately to distance themselves from Aum after 1995 (Kiriyama 1995), 
the  previous connection resulted in negative publicity. Kōfuku no Kagaku, 
founded in 1986 by Ōkawa Ryūhō (born in 1956 as Nakagawa Takashi) 
strongly criticised Aum Shinrikyō before 1995 (Kisala 2001a), but t he rivalry 
between the two groups (Baffelli and Reader 2011), also f ueled by media, as 
I will discuss later, created in the public mind the idea that they were similar, 
both having young leaders, a largely young and well-educated membership 
and an interest in being publicly visible. Finally, Hikari no Wa was founded 
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in 2007 by a group of ex-members of Aum Shinrikyō led by Jōyū Fumihiro 
(born 1962; previously a well-known Aum spokesperson) and it has, since 
then, been trying to distance itself from the previous group, a process that has 
implied a substantial reshaping of previous teaching and practices.19
As was mentioned above, the focus in this book will be on the early 
stage of development of religious organisations, although some reference 
will be made to later developments, but only in relation to the discussion of 
earlier media and image strategies. The necessity for these groups to pres-
ent themselves as up-to-date and to continuously negotiate the relevance 
of the leader’s message can become difficult to sustain over the long run. 
Second- and third-generation members are sometimes less involved and less 
enthusiastic. At the same time, the leader is no longer a young and novel 
“product” to be presented as innovative, while changes in organisational 
structures (the creation of a board of senior members, for example) may 
result in a more conservative approach toward implementing changes. As 
a consequence, what initially was a pioneering approach in media terms 
may be followed by less innovative, and even static, image strategies. This 
became evident with the introduction of the Internet and, later on, social 
media, and the fact that most new religions were very late or even cautious 
in using these new technologies (Baffelli 2011). As wi ll be discussed later, 
this prudent approach to the Internet was also due to the impact of the sarin 
gas attacks and criticism toward new religions, as many groups learned that 
visibility is not necessarily always positive. However, it is also true that it is 
generally less controversial to implement changes or to include new technol-
ogies in the early stages of group formation, when teaching and practices are 
being created and often rapidly changed and reshaped, than later on, when 
a group has become more institutionalised, with more defined doctrines and 
ritual practices and, potentially, when members may be more resistant to 
changes. Therefore, the early stage of formation of new religions represents 
a dynamic and effervescent, but at the same time uncertain, moment where 
the processes of the media’s impact on the creation of religious identity are 
particularly fascinating.
STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK
This book has been structured to provide a discussion of themes and key 
issues related to the interconnections between media and new religions, and 
an analysis of specific case studies.
In Chapter One, I highlight the dual and complex relationship between 
media and new religions. In particular, I look at the tensions groups face 
between the need for visibility through the use of media and the risks of fac-
ing attacks and criticism through other media. New religions use both inter-
nal media (that is, media technologies or institutions owned by the group, 
such as satellite broadcasting facilities or publishing houses) and external 
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mass media (such as magazines and newspapers) as sources of legitimation 
and to reach a wider audience. They need external media such as newspapers 
and magazines because their internal media might be too limited in scope 
to broaden their visibility. However, this runs the risk that media exposure 
could have a negative impact on their public image. Yet without such expo-
sure, they could be completely ignored by the larger public. Therefore, the 
media in general have played a central role in both defining new religions 
and creating interest about these groups. The chapter traces both the history 
of the treatment of new religions by the mass media and the communication 
strategies, mediated practices and media technologies used by new religions 
(press, radio, visual media, anime, manga, satellite broadcastings, websites 
and so on). The relationship between the media and religion changed on 
March 20, 1995, when the nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway that I 
mentioned earlier occurred. Carried out by the new religion Aum Shinrikyō, 
the Aum Affair (Oumu jiken) is considered an important turning point in the 
relationship between new religions and society in Japan, and I argue that 
the media strategies of new religions in Japan must be examined in terms of 
the period before and the period after the events of 1995.
Chapter Two concentrates on major themes within the image and com-
munications strategies of new religions. First of all, media technologies can 
be employed by new religions to increase their profile and improve their 
image, and, ultimately, to support their propagation activities. Increasing 
numbers is a central issue for newly established organisations, as member-
ship is also seen as proof that the organisation is a legitimate religion and not 
a dangerous group. Furthermore, active engagements with media technolo-
gies can project the image of a successful and up-to-date religion. Secondly, 
media exposure can impact on two important elements in the structure and 
organisation of the group, namely religious authority and practice. Medi-
ated practices can reshape the relationship between a leader and followers, 
introducing new forms of interactions (such as online interactions), making 
the leader more accessible (for example, with live streaming of his/her lec-
tures), or challenging his/her authority and legitimacy. Media technologies 
can also transform ritual practices by adapting them to the logic of media 
technologies or by transforming rituals into a spectacle and entertainment 
performance. Further themes are the role played by media forms in shaping 
the image of new religions (by creating, for example, standardised narratives 
of conversion stories) and repackaging this image in order to make the group 
look relevant and in tune with changes in society. Finally, visibility involves 
risks, as media exposure can lead to severe criticism. Reactions to criticism 
can severely impact the future of a religious organisation. Some groups are 
able to use media attention and even criticism to strengthen their identity, 
while others are unprepared to respond to media attacks and may never 
recover from the damage to their image.
Chapter Three investigates the emergence of new forms, contexts and 
experiences of rituals mediated by the media. In particular, the chapter 
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addresses the satellite transmission of Agonshū rituals and the impact that 
new media have had on religious practices and rituals. The analysis will 
discuss how the ritual is recreated and extended by the media and also how 
“sacralised screens” can be a means to spectacularise but also internalise 
religious rituals. Agonshū is a striking example of a new religion that came 
into prominence especially via the use of media forms, initially publications, 
but also dramatic rituals broadcast across Japan. Agonshū engaged in a pro-
cess of “spectacularising” its practices in ways that attracted a following and 
also public attention. Also, Agonshū was a pioneer in creating new modes 
of ritual engagement and community, by transmitting its rituals visually and 
aurally to members in distant places, thereby creating a form of “mediated 
community” that enabled followers in different parts of Japan to participate 
together in a single ritual.
Chapter Four examines Kōfuku no Kagaku’s communication strategies 
in the 1990s. It focuses especially on the two-year period between 1991 
and 1992 when the sacralisation of the leader Ōkawa Ryūhō brought about 
through a massive publicity campaign can be contrasted with the attempt 
at delegitimisation carried out by the press in the same period (the so-called 
Kōdansha Friday Affair). Ōkawa is an interesting example of a religious 
leader whose status is particularly bound to his uses of media, in particular, 
printed media. The success of the group in the early 1990s was determined 
by a combination of savvy management strategies, combined with a flexi-
ble doctrine and an efficacious use of media strategies—including constant 
rewriting and republishing of texts according to doctrinal changes, advertis-
ing campaigns and large events centred around the leader.
Chapter Five is concerned with the use of computer-based communica-
tion by Aum Shinrikyō, and in particular with the use of websites and social 
networking sites by its splinter group, Hikari no Wa. For Hikari no Wa, 
the Internet is an important tool for reshaping its identity, claiming its sep-
aration from the violent past of Aum, communicating with members and 
presenting its reformed teachings. However, the Hikari no Wa case should 
be understood in the context of its specific circumstances. Because of its 
relationship to Aum, Hikari no Wa did not have access to media other than 
the Internet. Therefore, Internet-based interaction is vital for a group that is 
attempting to rebuild its credibility and legitimacy, but that is haunted by a 
traumatic past and has very limited access to mainstream media.
In the Conclusions, I suggest that the relationship between media and 
religion is not constant and stable, but shifting in a constant process of nego-
tiation. In particular, users’ reappropriation and reproduction (especially 
online) of publicly available materials produced by new religions can trans-
form them completely from a tool for propagation to an object of ridicule 
that potentially challenges and undermines religious authority. Such appro-
priation practices also demonstrate the dualistic nature of the media-religion 
relationship that has been discussed in the other case studies and indicate how 
the Internet can potentially create new challenges for religious organisations.
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NOTES
 1. In 2006–2007, for example, Sōka Gakkai launched a TV advertising campaign 
with the slogan “A new future for you, Sōka Gakkai” (anata no, ashita wo, 
atarashiku, Sōka Gakkai).
 2. One of the first movements to use print media for propagation activities was 
a group called Oomoto, which established its first magazine in 1914 ( Dorman 
2012a, 45–65; Stalker 2008).
 3. The field of the study of religion and media expanded from the mid-1990s 
onwards with the emergence of phenomena such as televangelists in North 
America. Subject areas include the new and evolving field of media, religion 
and culture ( Clark 2007; Hoover 2006;  Hoover and Clark eds. 2002;  Hoover 
and Lundby eds. 1997;  Lynch, Mitchell, and Strhan eds. 2011; Mitchell and 
Marriage eds. 2003;  Morgan ed. 2008), audience ( Stout and Buddenbaum 
1996;  2001), popular culture ( Forbes and Mahan 2005), critical studies ( De 
Vries and Weber eds.2001) and anthropology ( Meyer and Moors 2005). For 
overviews of the field, see  Mahan 2014;  Stout 2012;  Stout and Buddenbaum 
2002.
 4. For synoptic accounts on mediatization, see  Couldry and Hepp (2013);  Lundby 
(2009).
 5. Early works on the use of media by new religions in Japan and on represen-
tations of new religions in media include  Ishii (1989) and two comprehensive 
sections of the Shinshūkyō jiten (Encyclopaedia of New Religions) edited 
by  Inoue et al. 1994 (one article is by Ishii, 322–31 and the other by Inoue, 
516–58). A general overview in English on new religions and media is In oue 
(2012). Some works have focused on use of media by Aum Shinrikyō, such as 
Fu kamizu (1994; 19 96); Watanabe (2005, on the group use of computer-based 
communication); Ga rdner (2008, on manga and Aum’s views of media). In 
2011, Inoue and the Religious Information Research Center published a com-
prehensive volume including 21 chapters on material produced by and on 
Aum Shinrikyō. Dorman’s Celebrity Gods (2012a) investigates the relation-
ship between media and new religions in the postwar period, while Stalker’s 
Prophet Motive (2008) looks at the role played by media in the develop-
ment of Oomoto in the 1920s. Thoma s (2012) includes some discussion 
on anime and manga produced by new religions. There are also a few book 
chapters and articles that looked at related topics, such as Agonshū’s use of 
spectacular events and media technologies (Reader 1991), GLA-mediated 
practices (Whelan 2007b), Konkōkyō and Seichō no Ie’s use of radio (Enom-
oto 2006) and Kōfuku no Kagaku’s anime (Tsukada  2010). See also Ber-
thon  (2011). Finally, several studies have focused on computer-mediated 
communication, including Baffelli 2000; Baffelli 2010; Baffelli, Reader, and 
Staemmle r 2011; Ess, Kaw abata, and Kurosaki eds. 2007; Fukamizu 2007; 
Giambra  2015; Ikegami  and Nakamaki eds. 1996; Inoue ed. 2003; Kienle 
a nd Staemmler 2003; Kokusai  Shūkyō Kenkyūjo ed. 2000; Kurosaki 2006; 
2007; Ku rosaki ed. 2000; Kurosaki , Hoshino, and Terazawa 2009; Tamura 
1 998; 2005.
 6. For example, during the 1980s and 1990s, that is the period when new reli-
gions examined in this book expanded. During that time, 72 newspapers were 
published each day in Japan and 90per cent of the public read newspapers 
on a daily basis ( Foreign press centre 1990, 13;  Nihon Shinbun Kyōkai 1994; 
Pharr and Krauss 1996, 4). Four newspapers had a circulation of more than 
two million copies (Yomiuri, Asahi, Mainichi and Sankei) and several local 
and regional newspapers were also distributed. A survey conducted in 1989 
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by NHK (Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai, in English, Japan Broadcasting Corporation) 
showed that there were more television sets than homes in Japan and on aver-
age viewers, spent three hours and 23 minutes daily watching TV ( Foreign 
Press Centre 1990, 48). However, printed media and in particular newspapers 
enjoyed prestige and higher credibility ratings than TV news (but a majority 
of Japanese trusted both,  Nihon Shinbun Kyōkai, 1992, 32; 36–37).
 7. On the topic, see  Dorman (2012a);  Dorman and Reader (2007); Thomas 
(2012).
 8. It is very difficult to estimate the exact numbers of new religions. The Feder-
ation of New Religious Organizations of Japan (Shin Nihon shūkyō dantai 
rengōkai, which is abbreviated shinshūren), includes 39 organisations, but 
many new religions are not affiliated with the Federation. Furthermore, legal 
registration under the Japanese Religious Corporation Law (Shūkyō Hōjin Hō) 
is not compulsory and some groups may decide not to register (or they are 
not allowed to, as in the case of the splinter groups from Aum Shinrikyō). 
The Shinshūkyō jiten (Encyclopaedia of New Religions,  Inoue et. al. 1994) 
includes the profiles of over 300 groups, and similar numbers are confirmed 
by the database of the Religious Information Research Center in Tokyo (http://
www.rirc.or.jp). For further discussion on numbers, see  Astley (2006, 96–98); 
R eader (2015); Staemmler and Dehn (2011, 5). 
 9. In Japanese, shūkyō is the standard term for religion, and shin simply means 
“new”.
 10. Nishiyama Shigeru first used the term shin shinshūkyō (New New Religions) in 
1979 ( Nishiyama 1979, 33–37). The journal Shūkyō to Shakai vol. 3 in 1997 
published a debate regarding the validity of the term shin shinshūkyō with 
a critical article by I noue (1997) and responses from N ishiyama (1997) and 
S himazono (1997a).
 11. “new spiritual movements” is used to define the Japanese version of the New 
Age, and usually refers to a network of practitioners and practices not struc-
tured as a religious group. These can include informal gatherings of people 
sharing the same interests who occasionally attend the same ceremonies or 
activities. In these loose affiliations, there is rarely a well-defined leadership 
structure and these networks rarely form their own rites or doctrines. For a 
discussion of the term, see  Shimazono (1992a).
 12. Initially, more pejorative terms were used to indicate “new religions”, such 
as ruiji shūkyō (quasi religions) or shinkō shūkyō (newly arisen religions, but 
implying derogatory nuances of superficiality,  Astley 2006;  Murakami 1980). 
The latter term is still often used in media when referring to new religions. 
After the 1995 sarin gas attack, the term karuto (cult) started to be used to 
indicate potentially dangerous or unusual religious groups.
Shimazono also discussed the term shinshūkyō in relation to the terms 
shūgō shūkyō (syncretic religions) and minzoku shūkyō (popular religions). 
The former understands new religions in a tripartite system of institutionalised 
religions, popular beliefs and syncretic religions. The former, however, was 
considered too generic (see  Shimazono 1981 and  1987).  Inoue (1999;  2000; 
 2012) has proposed the term haipā shūkyō (hyper-religions) to define groups 
established since the 1970s to indicate the tendency in these groups to adopt 
teaching and rituals from outside the Japanese tradition and to use language 
from the natural sciences and psychology. Finally, after the 1995 sarin gas 
attack, the image of new religions (and of religion in general) has become 
increasingly negative (Baffelli and  Reader 2011). As a consequence, some 
groups avoid overt religious rituals or language or reject the term shinshūkyō 
in order not to be associated with dangerous “cults”. On terminology, see also 
 Introduction 13
 Inoue (1997);  Reader (2015); Shimazono (1994); Staemmler and Dehn eds. 
(2011). 
 13. It is often quite difficult to obtain precise figures regarding members, due to 
different ways of assessing membership figures by groups that tend to inflate 
numbers. Some scholars have estimated than between 10–20 per cent of Japa-
nese population are members of a new religion. For further discussion on mem-
bership and figures, see A stley (2006, 96–98); Ha rdacre (1986, 3); In oue (1992, 
9); Ki sala (1999, 2); Reader (1991, 195–196 and 2015); Shi mazono (1992b, 
106); Sta emmler and Dehn eds. (2011, 5–6). Official figures submitted by 
religious institutions are published annually by the Agency for Cultural Affairs 
in the Shūkyō Nenkan (Religions Year Book), now also available online at: 
http://www.bunka.go.jp/tokei_hakusho_shuppan/hakusho_nenjihokokusho/
shukyo_nenkan/. Accessed July 20, 2015.
 14. See, for example,  Fitzgerald (2000);  Isomae (2003;  2005);  Josephson (2012); 
 Maxey (2014);  Pye (2003);  Reader (2004;  2005b);  Shimazono and Tsuruoka 
eds. (2004).
 15. For a debate on different criteria used to define “new religious movement”, 
see the series of articles in Nova Religio by  Barker (2004);  Bromley (2004); 
 Melton (2004);  Reader (2005a).
 16. The term is generally used in scholarship on Japanese religions. See  Astley 
(2006);  Hardacre (1986);  Inoue et. al (1994);  Prohl (2012);  Reader (1991); 
 Staemmler and Dehn (2011).
 17. For a discussion on the historical phases of development of new religions, see 
 Astley (2006, 95–96), H ardacre (1986, 4); K isala (1999, 3); N ishiyama and 
Ōmura eds. (1998); R eader (1991, 195; 2 015); S himazono (1992b, 42–48); 
St aemmler (2011, 13–15).
 18. On the role of spirit possession in new religions and charismatic founders, see 
Davis (1980); Ooms (2010); Staemmler (2009).
 19. The analysis in this book is based on fieldwork and interviews I have con-
ducted with the three groups over an extended period of time: since 2003 for 
Kōfuku no Kagaku, since 2005 for Agonshū and since 2008 for Hikari no Wa.
THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING “VISIBLE”
In a scene of the documentary A by Mori Tatsuya,1 Araki Hiroshi—acting 
as Aum Shinrikyō’s spokesperson after its leader and other prominent mem-
bers were arrested following the 1995 sarin gas attack—looks at the camera 
and says to Mori that he wants him to film and record “them” accurately 
(chanto kiroku ni tottemoraitai). Aum didn’t have, he continues, a tradi-
tion of recording its activities; therefore, members’ communal lives were 
not documented. And, he argues, even if members had produced records of 
their activities, people would have not believed them.2 Therefore, he wants 
people who are able to do so to see this (chanto mieru hito ni mitemoraitai).
Araki’s words perfectly summarise the interdependence and the complex 
relationship between newly formed (and, at times, controversial) religious 
organisations and media in Japan. The leader of Aum Shinrikyō, Asahara 
Shōkō, and other members often appeared on television shows before the 
1995 sarin gas attack (Gardne r 2001; Kojima 2011). The unusual person-
ality of the leader, and the fact the some members were young and suc-
cessful but renounced their careers, donated their personal belongings, and 
left their families to join a communal life and to participate in extreme 
ascetic practices attracted media attention. Aum practices and lifestyles also 
raised many controversies over issues such as communes, brushes with the 
law and conflict with other groups, in particular with Kōfuku no Kagaku 
(Baffelli and Reader 2011; Dorman 2012a, 11; Reader 2000a; Watana be 
1997, 37–38). After the sarin gas attack, Aum was again used by the media 
to create an audience through the diffusion of stories of supposed brain-
washing techniques used by new religions, and obsessive reportages on the 
group’s unusual training practices and teaching. Members’ daily activities 
too, from their dietary restrictions to their religious practice, were the sub-
ject of intense media scrutiny and were portrayed as unconventional, bizarre 
and weird. Aum itself initially enjoyed media exposure and actively used 
the media to respond to its detractors and to promote its image, even in 
the period immediately after the sarin gas attacks, when Aum representa-
tives and Jōyū Fumihiro, the group’s spokesperson, frequently appeared in 
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press conferences and interviews to deny involvement in the crimes (Gardner 
20 01, 139; see also Chapter 5 in this volume). At the same time, Aum used 
media forms by producing numerous publications, videos and tapes with its 
leader’s sermons and teachings to be used by members during their practices. 
However, as Araki noted, the daily life reality of members and the banality 
of their daily routine, which included ascetic training and religious practices, 
but also cooking, cleaning, laughing and talking together, were not recorded.
Although distinctive, due to the violent trajectories followed by the group 
and its consequences, the ambivalent and problematic relationship between 
Aum Shinrikyō and the media is not unique. In the case of other new religions 
too, as will be discussed in further detail later, the representations of groups 
in external media (that is, media texts produced by agencies external to the 
group, such as mainstream media or, at times, media produced by other reli-
gious organisations) tend to be constructed to criticise or ridicule members 
and make them appear as dangerous, eccentric, metaphorical “others”3 that 
are therefore differentiated from the rest of society or from other religious 
organisations. At the same time, internal media (that is, media texts, such as 
magazines, videos, books and so on produced by the religious group itself) 
tend to present an image of harmony, and of highly committed and loyal 
members, while emphasising the role and importance of the leader. As Araki 
notes, very little is available, in both the material produced by religious 
groups and by external media, about the daily life activities of members 
and their personal histories and experiences. Paradoxically, publications by 
new religions frequently focus on personal accounts from members, their 
personal experiences in the group, and conversion stories. However, these 
accounts tend to be standardised and very similar to each other, creating a 
uniform narrative basis to strengthen a particular image of the group. These 
internal narratives, as well as external representations of members, tend to 
present the group as a uniform entity, while ignoring individual understand-
ings of the teaching and the continuous negotiation (and, at times, dissent) 
between the leader’s authority and the views of followers.
Araki’s words also raise another issue. Material produced by religious 
organisations is often seen as biased. In the above-mentioned example, if 
Aum members themselves had filmed their lives in the group, it would have 
been difficult to persuade viewers that what was presented was an accurate 
account of daily life in the group. Viewers may think that the group is hiding 
something, and, obviously, the group will have an interest in only present-
ing a positive image of itself, avoiding showing potentially controversial 
practices or contradictory statements about doctrine. However, visibility 
is essential for newly formed organisations that have to make themselves 
known to the larger public, and that need to present a counterargument to 
their detractors’ criticisms. As a consequence, groups are pressured to rely 
on external media to present a reliable account of themselves, that is, they 
are forced to depend on an external, non-member’s gaze and point of view 
to present their teaching, while at the same time advising members that 
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non-members and external media often misunderstand their practices and 
teachings.4 In an interesting conundrum, the documentary scene showed 
how Aum members had to rely on media, through Mori’s work, not only to 
attempt to show to the general public that the idea created and amplified by 
the media themselves of Aum’s members as “evil” and “weird” was inaccu-
rate, but also to have a record of their own existence, at a time when most 
of the group’s buildings and facilities were being confiscated and destroyed.
This contradiction seems unable to be resolved, as material produced by 
religious groups tends to be apologetic and didactic, making the reader wary 
that they are just attempts at proselytism. At the same time, the need for vis-
ibility by such groups has raised issues of media “objectivity”, as journalists, 
TV show producers and presenters, video directors and so on are extremely 
cautious when presenting materials about religious groups, to avoid being 
accused of partisanship or even of being supporters of a particular group. 
Objectivity, of course, cannot exist. In the two documentaries he filmed about 
Aum members, A (1998) and A25 (2001), and in his publications about the 
group (in particular, A3, 2010) Mori Tatsuya decided to take a different 
approach in filming Aum members compared to other Japanese mainstream 
media that tended to represent the group as an “evil cult” and members as 
“brainwashed” (Gardner 2001; Read er 2000a). He wrote a lett er to Aum’s 
spokesperson asking for the group’s permission for him to enter its facilities 
and to film members’ daily lives, and he decided not to add any commentary 
to his movies. Therefore, Mori obtained privileged access to the group and 
members’ private lives. As a consequence, members shared with him personal 
feelings and emotions, while his ability to keep a distance was questioned 
when members asked him to help them by providing his filming of their con-
frontation with authorities after a member was arrested (as discussed later in 
this Chapter).6 Mori also had to pay a high price for his decision, resulting 
in his movies being ignored by mainstream media and the Japanese public 
(Gardner 2001; Mori 200 0), in a sense reinforcing the widespread perception 
of incommunicability between Aum members and the external world.
Such problematic issues and dilemmas need always to be borne in mind 
when examining the strategies of new religions in the context of the media. 
Before discussing media strategies implemented by new religions, it is impor-
tant to briefly contextualise how the general media has perceived these 
groups. Although this is not the main focus of the book, it needs to be under-
stood as the framework within which new religions’ media strategies oper-
ate. Furthermore, the analysis of the relationship between shinshūkyō (new 
religions)7 and society in contemporary Japan needs to take into account 
the role of the media in both shaping public discourse about religion and in 
(re)creating religious groups’ images and identities. As noted by Dorman, the 
relationship between the media and newly founded and emerging religious 
groups can been described as a “mixed blessing” (Dorman 2005a): media 
tec hnologies and, at times, media attention may support the development of 
some new religions, but media scrutiny also can become a major destabilising 
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factor for some groups. As Hoover notes, “it is through the media that much 
of contemporary religion and spirituality is known” (2006, 1); indeed, the 
media can affect our ways of interpreting, understanding and representing 
religion.
MEDIA VIEWS ON NEW RELIGIONS
As previous studies have noted (Dorman and Reader 2007;  Hoover 2002), 
it is prob lematic to treat media and religion as completely separate entities, 
and the different layers of interconnections between the two spheres should 
be explored. In the context of Japan, it is important to note how mass media 
organisations and new religions developed around the same period and, 
as a consequence, how the two spheres became part of the same process 
of negotiating their new role(s) in the society. This resulted in a complex 
and ambivalent relationship between media and new religions that it is still 
visible nowadays and also in an overlap and in similarities in the language, 
image strategies and imagery shared between them.
Since the late nineteenth century, the media, in particular printed media, 
has become an important source of information regarding new religions in 
Japan. During the Meiji period, the development of newspapers, magazines 
and journals was encouraged and, in 1925, radio broadcasting started.8 
The media were under strict control and censorship,9 especially concern-
ing such topics as the emperor and the imperial family. Religious groups 
that were perceived as potentially “undermining or offering alternatives 
to the model of national and cultural identity centered on the emperor” 
(Gardner 2005, 155) were  put under severe scrutiny by the authorities 
and described as “pseudo-religions” (ruiji shūkyō) and “heresies” (jakyō).10 
The press played a central role in defining religious orthodoxy (Dorman 
2012a, 25; and,  more generally, Chapter One; Sawada 2004, 236), repea t-
ing the terms used by political authorities and labelling new religions as 
“repugnant, unwholesome phenomena that threatened the moral fiber of 
the Japanese nation” (Sawada 2004, 256) and at tacking them on the based 
on their supposed “immorality” (Dorman 2012a). The media contribution 
to campaigns against new religions (Gardner 2005, 155) resul ted in harsh 
criticism of these groups and their practices. The press was even stronger 
that the state in its condemnation, in order to show its role as protectors 
of national ideals (Dorman 2012a; Stalker 20 08). An early  example of this 
attitude is the publication in Chūo Shinbun in 1896 of 150 installments 
attacking Tenrikyō (Inoue 1992, 57; Stalker  2008, 84)—one of the earliest 
new religions, founded in 1838 by Nakayama Miki (1798–1887) and one 
of the largest movements at the time—which was condemned as “immoral 
heresy” (inshi jakyō).11 Tenrikyō received criticism from different news-
papers from 1883 to 1902 (Inoue 1992, 56–64; Sawada 2 004, 236–38; 
Stalker 2008, 84).
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The most significant example of the role played by those assuming the 
position of “public moralist” in the late nineteenth century in defining reli-
gious orthodoxy (Sawada 2004, 236) and also of the earlier tensions between 
media and new religions is probably the case of a short-lived group called 
Renmonkyō. Established by Shimamura Mitsu (1831–1904) in 1883, in the 
late nineteenth century, Renmonkyō12 became one of the largest new religious 
organisations in Japan. The adherents were attracted by Shimamura’s teach-
ings, which included aspects of Nichiren Buddhism, and by her practices 
based on “holy water” (shinsui), which was believed to have healing proper-
ties for different illnesses, including cholera (Dorman 2012a; Takeda 1991). 
In  1894, Renmonky ō and its leader became the object of a defamatory cam-
paign by Yorozu Chōhō, a popular newspaper established in 1892. The first 
derogatory articles appeared in February 1894 and for about nine months, 
critical articles about the leader and its followers were published, including a 
ninety-four installment series entitled, Inshi Renmonkyōkai (“The Immoral 
Religion Renmonkyō”, Inoue 1992, 49; Sawada 2004, 24 6; Takeda 1991). 
In these articles , the leader was accused of personal immorality, of being 
engaged in fraudulent practices and of illicit healing (Dorman 2012a, 37; 
Sawada 2004,  256), accusations  that, as will be discussed in Chapter Two, 
are often used in media attacks on new religions.13 Furthermore, Yorozu 
Chōhō and other newspapers accused Renmonkyō of heterodoxy and het-
eropraxis and of being anti-Shinto.14 In doing so, the newspaper subtly crit-
icised the legal provision of freedom of religion as one of the factors that 
contributed to the emergence of “dangerous” groups (Dorman 2012a, 36), 
and assumed  the role of the defender of religious orthodoxy. At the same 
time, criticisms toward Renmonkyō (and other new religions) were echoed 
in publications by other religious organisations, such as the Buddhist paper 
Meikyō Shinshi (Sawada 2004, 250), which called for groups like Ren-
monkyō to be dissolved by the Ministry.
Therefore, the attacks on Renmonkyō can be seen as representative of how 
new religions were used for power negotiations and definitions of religious 
orthodoxy between different actors in the Meiji period, such as government 
authorities, the emerging media and other religious institutions. The actors 
involved were concerned about the ability of emerging religious groups to 
attract adherents from different social groups that could result, in the case 
of Buddhist leaders, in the potential loss of their own parishioners (Dorman 
2012a, 28; Sawada 2004,  250) and about dev otion to the leader that could 
potentially challenge established religious and secular authorities. The case 
of Renmonkyō is also emblematic because of how the group responded to 
the crisis. As will be discussed in Chapters Two and Four, different responses 
to media attacks have resulted in significantly different consequences for the 
survival of the religious group involved in such conflicts. It is also import-
ant to note, however, that similar strategies have had dissimilar outcomes 
in different periods and circumstances. Renmonkyō responded by sending 
rebuttals to the newspapers that attacked it and demanding the retraction of 
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their accusations (Takeda 1991). Subsequently, the group placed announce-
ments in several newspapers, including Yorozu Chōhō, explaining its deci-
sion to start legal action against Yorozu Chōhō and its fabricated reporting. 
The civil suit was filed in April and, following a temporary injunction on 
publication issued by the Tokyo Court of Appeals, Yorozu Chōhō suspended 
its derogatory series (Takeda 1991). However, the deci sion by the group to 
take legal action, instead of refuting the criticism on doctrinal grounds, was 
highly criticised as not appropriate for a religious group and, ultimately, 
resulted in general reinforcement of the perception that Renmonkyō was a 
“bogus religion” (inshi jakyō)15, Takeda 1991). The numbers of ad herents 
dropped, leading to a rapid decline of group’s activities.
In the period of Japan’s rising militarism and involvement in campaigns in 
China from 1931 onwards and culminating in its involvement in World War 
Two, religious organisations that were not affiliated with one of the thirteen 
legally approved Sect Shinto (kyōha shintō) sects were considered suspicious 
and closely monitored by the authorities (Murakami 1980). This increased 
co ntrol by the authorities resulted in some groups, such as Oomoto,16 being 
suppressed (Murakami 1980). Morioka (1994, 30 9) argues than i n general, 
the press uncritically embraced the charges made by the police and in doing 
so helped to justify the government’s actions. However, Dorman (2005c, 
61–62) argues that  there was no unanimity in journalists’ reports about 
accusations against new religions. He shows, for instance, that some articles 
criticised (at least until mid-1930s) the accusations made by the authorities, 
without, however, questioning the severe scrutiny on new religions or the 
dominant depiction of them as problematic.
In the postwar period, the media continued their role in shaping and 
defining the image of new religions, assuming the role of protector of social 
norms and denouncing groups that were seen as potentially antisocial or a 
threat to social stability. Expressions such as “rush hour of the gods” (kami-
gami no rashu awā)17 appeared in the press to indicate an apparent increase 
in the numbers of new religions following the introduction of the Religious 
Juridical Persons Law in 1951.18 New religions were described in terms 
that made them sound transient and ephemeral, as “sprouting like bamboo 
shoots after the rain” (ugo no takenoko no yōni), (Dorman 2012a, 5), and 
media reportin g on them in the immediate postwar period tended to be very 
critical (Dorman 2005c; Inoue 1994, 516–517).  Media personal ities, such 
as the influential and prolific journalist Ōya Sōichi, also played an important 
role in shaping the negative image of new religions (Dorman 2005c) and in 
creating specifi c tropes with which to designate these groups.
Such attention on the supposedly rapid growth in the number of reli-
gious organisations or in religious practices has been a recurrent theme in 
media portrayals of new religions. In the late 1970s, for example, the media 
began to draw attention to a “return to religion” (shūkyō kaigi) and reli-
gious boom (shūkyō būmu19, Inoue 1992; Ishii 2008; Shimazono 199 2b).20 
The ba sis for asse rting a supposed revival of religious practices and beliefs 
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were two surveys, Nihonjin no Kokuminsei (The Japanese National Char-
acter) conducted by the Institute of Statistical Mathematics (Tōkei Sūri 
Kenkyūjo), a national research institute, and Nihonjin no Ishiki (Japanese 
Consciousness), a public opinion poll conducted by NHK, Japan’s national 
broadcasting corporation, both showing a supposed increase since 1973 in 
respondents claiming to have some sort of religious beliefs and to be inter-
ested in religion (Inoue 1992, 208; NHK Hōsō Yoron Chōsaj o ed. 1979; 
Shima zono 2001a,175–176). As discussed in Reader (19 90), academic dis-
cussions abo ut religion in modern society affected the interpretation of this 
survey data. A shift occurred in the mid-1970s and corresponded to a new 
approach to theories of secularisation, in which religion started to be seeing 
not as opposed to, but compatible with, modern society. At the same time, 
the media started showing an interest in religion-related topics and practices. 
Between 1976 and 1977, the Mainichi newspaper published a series of five 
volumes21 investigating the state of religion in Japan (Reader 1990, 62–63) 
that included a por trayal of a vibrant religious life. The series attracted a 
remarkable amount of interest, and other news and accounts about religious 
practices started to appear more frequently in mass media. Stories on mysti-
cism and occult-related phenomena were featured in broadcasts and printed 
media (Haga and Kisala 1995, 237). Popular maga zines specialising in the 
occult and supernatural phenomena (and in the sale of related goods), such 
as Mū and My Birthday, were established in the late 1970s, and translations 
of books associated with the New Age in the American context or with 
related topics, such as Nostradamus’s prophecies,22 were published. Con-
currently, popular movies, such as Genma Taisen (1983) and Akira (1988) 
popularised science fiction and apocalyptic themes (Haga and Kisala 1995, 
238), and variety s hows with religious content appeared on prime time TV 
(Ishii 2008, 19).
Scholars have expressed  doubts regarding a quantifiable religious “boom” 
in the period (Inoue 1992; Ishii 2008), instead directing attention  to the 
boom as a media-driven phenomenon, such as, for instance, an increase in 
TV programmes from the 1970s devoted to topics such as supernatural pow-
ers, prophecies, UFOs, telepathy and so on (Ishii 2008). According to Inoue, 
if a boo m existed, it was more related to the increase of information about 
religion (Inoue 1992, 338–348) than an increase in interest in something 
specifically religious or spiritual. The role played by the media in shaping 
definitions of religious practices in this period, “encouraging consumption 
of occult information as a form of entertainment” (Haga and Kisala 1995, 
238), created an int eresting overlap between the spheres of media, religion 
and marketing. An interesting example is provided by the use of the term 
seishin sekai (spiritual world), a term used to indicate an amorphous group 
of religious practices and teachings organised around loose networks or 
small groups.23 It is outside the scope of this research to attribute the cor-
rect genealogy to the term, but it appears that it started being used around 
the same time by the media, practitioners, bookstores and new religions. 
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Publications loosely addressing the variety of topics related to the “spiritual 
world” (from channelling to meditation, yoga, mysticism and so on) started 
appearing in the 1970s. Events on the seishin sekai were also organised in 
bookstores and department stores. For example, in June 1978, the book-
store Kinokuniya in Tokyo organised an event on Indo-Nepāru Seishin 
Sekai no Hon (“Books About the Indo-Nepalese Spiritual World”). In the 
same year in December, the bookstore Prasad hosted an event on Seishin 
Sekai no Hon—Best 800 (“Best 800 Books on the Spiritual World”). In 
1981, Kinokuniya opened a fair titled Seishin Sekai no Hon (“Spiritual 
World Books”) and in the 1980s, a seishin sekai corner started appearing 
in different bookstores (Fig. 1.1). Articles related to the spiritual world 
appeared in newspapers,24 while publications by new religions also started 
to use the term. In 1977, for example, Za Meditēshon (“The Meditation”), 
a new quarterly magazine published by Hirakawa, a publisher connected 
to the new religion Agonshū published a ranking of the top 100 books on 
the “spiritual world” (Shimazono 1996, 168). Furthermore, volume s even 
of Agonshū’s magazine Meisō Meditation in 1982 was devoted to the theme 
of the “spiritual world”, and the same group used the term seishin sekai 
in several publications and events from the late 1970s.25 Therefore, the 
term offers an interesting example of how marketing, new religions and 
Fig. 1.1 Seishin sekai (Spiritual world) section in a major bookstore in Tokyo. 
Photo by Erica Baffelli.
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media, often considered entirely separate spheres, used similar references 
and imaginary, and equally participated in the construction of a supposed 
“religion boom” in Japan in the 1970s and 1980s.
These are only few examples of a wider pattern of interconnectedness 
between new religions and media in Japan and in particular the role played 
by the media in shaping the image of new religions since the Meiji period. 
As these examples demonstrate, the ways in which media and new religions 
interact are neither stable nor predictable, while larger historical and politi-
cal contexts have influenced media attitudes toward new religions. Further-
more, although media reporting on new religions has tended to be critical, 
there have been instances where new religions attracted media curiosity and 
even, although less commonly, resulted in positive portrayals. This dualism 
in media approaches continued during the 1980s and early 1990s, when, 
as mentioned above, topics related to spiritual and religious practices often 
appeared in newspapers, magazines and entertainment TV shows, and spec-
tacular events and large advertising campaigns sponsored by new religions 
attracted media curiosity and controversies (see Chapters Two, Three and 
Four in this volume).
THE AUM AFFAIR AS A “TURNING POINT”
The relationship between the media and new religions that I have briefly 
outlined above changed on March 20, 1995, when members of Aum Shin-
rikyō perpetrated the nerve gas attack on the Tokyo metropolitan subway. 
Responsibility for this and other atrocious crimes was attributed to Aum’s 
leader Asahara Shōkō’s (born Matsumoto Chizuo, 1955–) influence upon 
his followers. Tensions between the group and society had already appeared 
in previous years, and legal groups in opposition to Aum were established 
already in the late 1980s, such as the Aum Shinrikyō Victims’ Society (Oumu 
Shinrikyō Higaisha no kai) that started in 1989. Others appeared imme-
diately after the sarin attack, such as the Subway Sarin Incident Victims’ 
Association (Chikatetsu Sarin Jiken Higaisha no Kai) and the Japan Society 
for Cult Prevention and Recovery (Nihon Datsukaruto Kyōkai). The Aum 
Affair (Oumu jiken), as it was referred to in the media, is considered an 
important turning point in the relationship between religion and society in 
Japan (Baffelli and Reader 2012; Kisala and Mullins 2001 ) and it strongly 
affected how religion is perceived there nowadays.26
Following the attack, journalists, lawyers and anti-cult activists became 
the main public voices claiming knowledge about Aum (Wilkinson 2009, 
120), and they called for a great er control on new religions, now labelled 
“cults” and accused of brainwashing their members.27 Several texts pub-
lished by American anti-cult activists were translated into Japanese.28 Fur-
thermore, many representatives of American anti-cult movements were 
invited to Japan and anti-cult activists such as Steve Hassan and Asami 
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Tadao frequently appeared on television (Wilkinson (2009, 129). Anti-cult 
journalists, suc h as Egawa Shōko, who was very critical of Aum before 1995 
and published extensively against the group (Egawa 1991a; Egawa 2000), 
achieved greater credib ility and vis ibility. Before 1995, being a small-scale 
group, Aum Shinrikyō had not been extensively studied. This caused a lot 
of criticism toward Japanese scholars, who were accused of not having rec-
ognised the potential public threat and even of having been supportive of 
Aum29 (Baffelli and Reader 2012; Dorman 2012b; Reader 20 00b; Tsukada 
2011; Watanab e 2001). As a  consequence, t he media becam e the primary 
source of information about the group, as explained by Hardacre:
Besides the media coverage that reported Aum’s various scrapes with 
the law since 1989 and mostly since the subway attack, Aum’s own 
publications, a couple of ‘instant books’ rushed out after the police 
investigation began, and a single book by investigate reporter Egawa 
Shōko, no literature of volume or substance on Aum had been available. 
[. . .] In the absence of academic research, scholars, no less than the gen-
eral public, were heavily dependent upon media representation for their 
understanding of this religion and the nerve gas attack.
(Hardacre 2007, 173)
At the same time, the media were  accused of letting the group and its 
leader’s imposing personality use and manipulate them. Indeed, the group 
used the media not only for promoting its image and political activities, but 
also to confront its critics and to counter its negative image (Dorman and 
Reader 2007; Hardacre 2007; Reader 2000a).  Yet, in the period immed iately 
after th e sarin gas attack and before Asahara’s arrest in May 1995, sev-
eral television debates occurred between anti-Aum activists (such as Egawa 
Shōko, Arita Yoshifu, Takimoto Tarō) and the group’s representatives, such 
as Murai Hideo, Aoyama Yoshinobu and Jōyū Fumihiro (Gardner 2001).30 
For several months after the attack, unt il the end of 1995, Aum Shinrikyō- 
related issues continued to receive extensive coverage in newspapers and 
on TV news programmes.31 In 1996, television broadcasting on new reli-
gions decreased and between 1996 and 1999, news concerning these groups 
was very limited. At the same time, new religions decreased their big public 
events (in the same cases, the media were no longer invited to attend these 
events) and reduced their massive advertising campaigns in order to avoid 
harsh criticism. Suddenly, these religious groups seemed to disappear from 
view.
The sarin gas attack therefore forced both the media and religious groups 
to renegotiate and change their relationship. The media assumed for a brief 
period both the role of society watchdog, in a sense reasserting the role 
they had assumed during the Meiji period, as mentioned above, willing to 
denounce and publicly expose potentially “dangerous” groups, but they 
also took on an educational role (Dorman 2012a, 239) in order to provide 
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information on Au m, due to the lack of knowledge and information avail-
able about the group.
On the other side, new religions reacted by condemning Aum’s actions, 
distancing themselves from it (Kisala 2001a, 195), and re-evaluating their 
image strateg ies. For these reasons, it is important to understand that the 
media strategies of new religions in Japan must be examined in terms of the 
period before and the period after the events of 1995.
Several works have addressed the relationship between the media and 
Aum Shinrikyō and about how media representations of religion in Japan 
changed after the sarin gas attack (Dorman 2001; 2012a; Dorman and 
Reader 2007; Gardner 2001; Hardacre 2007; Inou e 2012; Reader 2000a; 
Wa tanabe 2005).  As mentioned ea rlier, the relationship be tween religion 
and media in Japan in the 1980s and in particular the 1990s cannot be 
understood without reference to the traumatic events of 1995. After the 
Aum Affair, religious organisations in Japan had to face open criticism and 
still-lingering negative images of religion in society. As other studies have 
discussed (Baffelli and Reader 2012; Chilson 2004; Dorman 2012a; Gag né 
2014; McLaughlin 2012), the consequen ces of the Aum Affair invo lved not 
only new religions, but also more traditional religious organisations with 
no evident link to Aum. For the groups discussed in this book (Agonshū, 
Kōfuku no Kagaku and Hikari no Wa), the situation was more complicated, 
due to the fact that they were, as discussed in the Introduction, more or less 
directly a target of criticism and were associated in the public mind with 
Aum. In the case of Kōfuku no Kagaku, the group had been seen as Aum’s 
rival. Despite Kōfuku’s open criticism towards Aum (the group also organ-
ised several anti-Aum demonstrations and regularly criticised Aum in its 
publications), the two groups were perceived as similar by the general public 
due to the fact that they both had a young leader and young, well-educated 
membership and a similar interest in public visibility, showed, for example, 
by their intense use of the media and frequent appearances on television.
After numerous Aum members were arrested and extended and very 
detailed reports about Aum started to appear in the media, Agonshū became 
a focus of attention because Asahara had been affiliated with the group 
before leaving to found Aum. Although Agonshū immediately distanced 
itself from Aum and tried to downplay the relevance and length of Asaha-
ra’s membership, the media claimed that Kiriyama’s teaching had influenced 
Aum’s doctrines, and this shed a negative light on the group. The book 
published by Kiriyama Seiyū (Kiriyama 1995), Agonshū’s leader, to explain 
the differences between his group and Aum clearly illustrates the pressure 
placed by the media on the group after the attack. Finally, Hikari no Wa is 
one of the two splinter groups created by ex-Aum members, and its leader, 
Jōyū Fumihiro, maintained a highly public profile before and after 1995.
Therefore, the analysis of religion and media in the 1980s and 1990s in 
Japan offers an important angle on the discussion of how traumatic events 
could impact image shaping and member-leader relationships. It also shows 
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that evaluations of the impact of violence and trauma should not be limited 
to the analysis of the group that committed violence or to the victims, but 
also extended to consider the wider effects on society. Moreover, it demon-
strates that traumatic events could suddenly shift the attitude of the media 
toward religion. In the Japanese case, for example, after 1995, new reli-
gions were no longer viewed mainly as unusual groups with extravagant 
leaders who could create audiences, but they became potentially dangerous 
groups. Media institutions, which received severe criticism after the Aum 
Affair for having provided Asahara, on several occasions, with a public and 
wide-reaching stage and visibility by inviting him onto talk shows, for exam-
ple, reacted to criticism by becoming very suspicious of any new religions 
that could be potentially seen as “similar to Aum” (Baffelli and Reader 2012; 
Dorman 2005b).32 Otherwise, they avoid ed reporting about new rel igions’ 
activities. This applied not just to new religions, but also to more estab-
lished religious organisations (Hardacre 2003). Finally, the sarin gas attack 
happened while a m ajor publisher, Kōdansha, was involved in a long legal 
suit with another new religion, Kōfuku no Kagaku. The so-called Kōdansha 
Friday Affair (Kōdansha Furaidē Jiken), see Chapter Four in this volume) 
also impacted the negative media image of new religions, and it reinforced 
the image of new religions as potentially belligerent and prone to aggressive 
responses to criticism.
The above-mentioned documentary by Mori Tatsuya is again an emblem-
atic example of the fact that, after the Aum Affair, when representations of 
new religions in the media tended to be negative, divergent or more nuanced 
voices were not accepted. Mori Tatsuya was the only non-member allowed 
inside the group’s facilities to film members’ daily activities after the sarin 
gas attack and the arrest of Asahara and other senior members. As recounted 
by the director himself (Mori 2000), he was first commissioned to produce 
a TV documentary  on Aum, but when he obtained permission from the 
group, he decided to film their daily activities and to present a documen-
tary without overall commentary. His employer didn’t support this new idea 
and fired him, so Mori was forced to interrupt his filming and to opt for a 
self-produced documentary. When A was finally completed and showed at 
movie theatres in Japan, the director expected to create a debate regarding 
his different approach in presenting Aum members, who were showed in 
their quotidian routines and interactions with neighbours, and presented 
them as people who had divergent opinions on the crimes committed by 
other members, showed individual personalities, and who were far from 
being “brainwashed”. Mori’s documentary also showed that the media and 
police exasperated Aum members, creating in the viewers the impression of 
watching the unfolding of events from members’ points of view (although 
in reality, this view was still mediated by Mori’s gaze into the camera and 
his editing of the movie). Viewers are also confronted with the limits of 
supposedly detached media reportage, when Mori is asked to intervene and 
provide a video he filmed during a confrontation between members and 
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The Public Security Intelligence Agency (kōan chōsachō) officers, in order 
to help an Aum member to be released from gaol. Mori himself, at this 
point, became part of his documentary, thereby creating an overlap between 
the media (himself) and the religion (the group): it is then unclear who is 
filming whom and whose experiences are narrated in the documentary. The 
unfolding of Mori’s A reveals the different layers involved in the complex 
relationship between media and religion in 1980–1990s Japan. These lay-
ers include the need for the group to tell its truth—and the fact that only 
the media could help it to have a public face; the search for the “truth” 
by Japanese media after the traumatic event, which resulted in obsessive 
reporting about and scrutiny of Aum and its members; the need to create 
an uncompromising distinction between “evil” and “good”—which resulted 
in Aum’s members not being accepted as “ordinary”, but only as “deviant” 
and problematic, in order that the evil should be something far and strange, 
not familiar and “banal”; the morbid attention paid by the media to Aum’s 
members—with the extreme example of Murai Hideo, one of Aum’s senior 
representative, being stabbed to death in front of journalists and TV crews, 
which did not stop filming the event (Gardner 2001); the risk for the media 
of being trapped in an ethical dilemma w hen dealing with Aum, as exem-
plified by Mori’s experience; and, finally, the media and public rejection of 
any alternative construing of the event. Indeed, Mori’s documentary was not 
received with criticism, but was completely ignored (Gardner 2001).
BEYOND CRITICISM
Media reports on new religions tend to be unsymp athetic, but it would 
be erroneous to claim that all representations of new religions were neg-
ative, especially in the pre-1995 era (Dorman and Reader 2007). Indeed, 
Aum itself received, as mentioned above, some p ositive representations in 
the media. On September 28, 1991, for example, Asahara and other Aum 
members were invited as panellists, together with members of Kōfuku no 
Kagaku, on a four-hour-long, live programme called “Live TV Until Morn-
ing” (Asa Made Nama Terebi) on the Asahi network to discuss the topic 
of Shūkyō to wakamono (“Religion and Young People”). In the follow-
ing days, several positive comments about the group’s performance during 
the debate and its members’ knowledge of Buddhism were circulated by 
scholars and media personalities, such as Beat Takeshi33 (Watanabe 1997, 
37–38).
The media are not only an important source of information o n new 
religions, but see emerging groups and their leaders as providing a source 
of interesting stories. Newspapers and magazines can increase circulation 
via reporting rumours and scandals involving leaders and members. Simi-
larly, television programmes have attracted viewers’ attention by presenting 
unusual personalities and practices (not only Aum and Kōfuku no Kagaku, 
but representatives of other groups such as World Mate34 and Hō no Hana 
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Sanpōgyō35 appeared on talk shows). In his study on postwar new religions, 
Dorman also showed how media reports about a group called Tenshō Kōtai 
Jingūkyō,36 although often critical, were not entirely negative and that jour-
nalists had a more positive attitude after they interviewed Kitamura Sayo, 
the group’s leader, and her followers (Dorman 2012a, 191). Similarly, Mori 
Tatsuya commented that his opinion about Aum, whi ch he previously had 
considered a dangerous group, changed after he met the group members and 
started filming his documentary.37
Another often-overlooked element that has an impact on media reporting 
on new religious is related to the fact that religious groups, including new 
religions, could become important sources of revenue for newspapers through 
advertising.38 In general, new religions’ events and publications are promoted 
not only in in-house publications, but also in external media, posters at train 
stations, billboards, leaflets and so on. It was in particular from the 1970s 
that some new religions started investing in large advertising campaigns in 
magazines and, less frequently, on television.39 In 1971, for example, the group 
Reiyūkai, a lay Buddhist organisation founded in 1925 by Kakutarō Kubo 
(1892–1944) and Kimi Kotani (1901–1971) (Hardacre 1984) launched a cam-
paign entitled, “Inner Trip-ningen no kokoro ni kaerō” (“Inner Trip: Return-
ing to People’s Hearts”), which represents one of the first examples of mass 
media used for proselytism advertising. The advertisements were published in 
large format in newspapers and magazines and aimed to attract a young audi-
ence and to change the image of religion from something looking old and out-
dated (toshiyorikusai, Iwasa 1993, 131) to something modern and up to date. 
The following year, the group laun ched the monthly magazine Innā Torippu 
(Inner Trip), and its first issue sold four hundred thousand copies (Iwasa 1993, 
132). Around the same period, on August 18, 1973, Tenrikyō started an adver-
 tisement campaign with the slogan “Ningen onaji kyōdai” (“People are all 
Brothers and Sisters”), which occuppied a full page in the morning edition of 
forty-two newspapers throughout the country. In the late 1980s and 1990s, 
Agonshū was one of the most media-savvy groups and sponsored large adver-
tisement campaigns to promote the leader’s publications or its events, such as 
the annual Hoshi Matsuri (Star Festival, also Stars and Fire Rites Festival).40 
As will be discussed in Chapter Three, Agonshū also employed advertising 
agencies to promote its image, a strategy used in the 1990s also by Kōfuku 
no Kagaku for its large promotional campaigns (see Chapter Four in this vol-
ume). Although more research is needed on the economic aspects of the rela-
tionship between the media and new religions, it is possible to speculate that 
economic issues may also affect reporting on new religions, as mass media 
institutions, dependent on advertising revenue, may well have been reluctant 
to attack groups that were important sources of income.
The entrepreneurial skills of some new religions have also been rec-
ognised by media and communication analysts and these have led to some, 
although infre quent, positive representations of these groups. For example, 
in 1993, Senden kaigi, a publication specialising in marketing communi-
cations, published a series by Iwasa Yoshiya, a marketing producer, titled 
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Shūkyō ni manabu maketing katsudō (“Learning Marketing Activities 
from Religion”). In the second part of the series (titled Kyōdan no kōkoku 
puromōshon, “Religious groups’ promotion through advertising”, 1993) 
strategies implemented by several new religions (such as Kōfuku no Kagaku, 
Aum Shinrikyō, Agonshū, Byakkō Shinkō Kai, Seichō no Ie and Tenrikyō) to 
promote their images are analysed from the point of view of three marketing 
ideas, concept, activism and performance, in order to demonstrate how the 
appropriate balance between these elements has resulted in these groups’ 
success in the religious marketplace. The same magazine published in 1994 
a series titled Shūkyō no māketingu chikara (“The Marketing Power of Reli-
gion”, 1994), in which an article by Maeno Kazuhisa, a professor of infor-
mation studies at Gunma University, defined “religion” as an “information 
society” (jōhō sangyō, Maeno 1994, 78).41
Therefore the media, while often hostile, has been dualistic in its repr esen-
tations of new religions. What is undeniable is that the media in Japan has 
had a central role in defining these groups and has been seen as a trustworthy 
authority defining how we should think about religion and the religious 
groups that we could accept in society and those that should be labelled 
as “dangerous”. Recent publications (Fujiyama 2011a, 2011b; McLaughlin 
2016) have discussed changes in media discourse about re ligion following 
the Gr eat East Japan Earthquake disasters in March 2011. These studies 
make similar observations about how the recent traumas have not resulted 
in a particular increase of media reporting about religion, but, compared 
to the post-1995 Great Hanshin/Awaji earthquake42 and post-Aum Affair 
context, media narratives about religion have been more positive since 2011. 
As McLaughlin noted, however, positive representations focus on interde-
nominational activities promoted by some organisations that are supported 
by specific “information curators”, while “religious actors who do not fit a 
sanitized discourse deemed acceptable for public consumption” (McLaugh-
lin 2016, 39) are still excluded. New religions have been (and still are) often 
rep resented as “problematic”, so they have to develop strong media strat-
egies to present a different perspective and publicise their self-image. This 
leads to the discussion on how new religions use media.
NEW RELIGIONS’ USE OF MEDIA: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
Media forms have been important tools for new religions that use pub-
lishing and visual technologies for training, communicating with members, 
presenting their messages, reinforcing or protecting the image of the leader 
and potentially attracting converts. Media forms are also employed to affirm 
authority and legitimacy, for instance, to prove that new religions have a solid 
textual basis and should be considered legitimate religious organisations. 
Furthermore, media mastery displays images of leaders as multi-talented 
individuals, up to date and able to use technologies: for example, Sōka 
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Gakkai has published collections of the group leader, Ikeda Daisaku’s, pho-
tographs, and Ōkawa Ryūhō, leader of Kōfuku no Kagaku, recently pro-
moted his collaboration with his son in writing the original script of one of 
the animated movies produced by the group (Tsukada 2010).43
The intensive use of media by new religions was highlighted in both aca-
demic studies and journalistic reports on these groups that have at times 
been labelled as “media religions” (media shūkyō, Inamasu 1992). How-
ever, it is important to clarify that these groups are not completely medi ated 
(i.e. existing only in the media or having all their practices and activities 
supported by media), but that they use the media to support some of their 
practices and activities. The chapters in this book will discuss a number of 
examples in which media forms have had a relevant role in shaping religious 
practices or leader-member relationships, but I should emphasise also that 
new religions continue to operate primarily through their local and national 
centres, which are promoted online and via media means. Furthermore, 
media usage was not the only reason for the success of new religions. Earlier 
studies, such as McFarland (1967, 92),44 emphasised the role of media in the 
development of new religions, but they did this as a way of minimising their 
relevance and implying that they were ephemeral, media-driven phenomena 
with an emphasis on proselytism and propaganda. This portrayal, as we will 
see, is simplistic and does not acknowledge how the media strategies imple-
mented by some groups are highly sophisticated (indeed, other religious 
organisations, such as the Sōtō Zen Buddhist sect, showed an interested in 
new religions’ image strategies and admitted that they should follow their 
example (Reader 1983)). Consumer society from the early twentieth century 
“provided religious organisa tions [. . .] with new marketing opportunities” 
(Stalker 2008, 110) and media technologies, from photography to satellite 
broadcasting and fin ally to the Internet, offered new platforms for dissem-
inating teaching, explaining doctrines and branding leaders’ images. As far 
as organisational aspects are concerned, numerous new religions have teams 
specialising in public relations or in media planning.45 Some groups, as will 
be discussed later, also employ advertising agencies or web communication 
experts. Numerous groups, moreover, have their own publishing houses. 
They also distribute their books not just via their own religious centres but 
through general bookshops, which often have special sections for groups 
with large publications, such as Sōka Gakkai, Seichō no Ie and Kōfuku no 
Kagaku (Fig. 1.2).
It is beyond the scope of this book to provide a comprehensive account of 
the media used by new religions since the late nineteenth century. However, 
I will provide a brief overview, in chronological order, from the press to the 
Internet, and a few examples to highlight some pioneering entrepreneurial 
initiatives implemented by new religions and to emphasise the variety of 
media strategies that have been developed.
One of the forerunner groups in implementing a savvy use of media for 
enhancing the group’s public image was Oomoto, a group founded in 1892 
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Fig. 1.2 “Kōfuku no Kagaku” section in a major bookstore in Tokyo. Photo by 
Erica Baffelli.
by Deguchi Nao (1836–1918). It was under the co-founder Deguchi Ōnis-
aburō (1871–1948) that the group’s media strategies were implemented. In 
1908, the group published its first magazine, called Honkyō kōshū, and by 
1929, it owned thirteen magazines. In 1920, the group bought an Osaka 
newspaper, the Taishō Nichinichi Shinbun, published a magazine in the 
Esperanto language called Oomoto in 1925 and opened its own publishing 
house in 1931. Deguchi Ōnisaburō, in particular, extensively employed print 
media and recognised the power of visual images. Oomoto also implemented 
what we would now define as “media mix” (in Japanese media mikkusu), 
a combination of different media technologies and advertising strategies to 
promote the group and target different audiences: magazines, journals, pho-
tograph albums and visual media, in particular, film.46 Movies could be used 
to attract larger audiences and reach viewers outside the sphere of Oomoto’s 
members, a strategy that, as will be seen later, was implemented by other 
groups by using public events and spectacular rituals (such as Agonshū’s 
Hoshi Matsuri discussed in Chapter 3 in this volume). Furthermore, movies 
were used by Oomoto to enhance the leader’s charismatic aura and create 
visual associations between the leader and various figures in the Japanese 
religious pantheon. In the film Shōwa no shichijifukujin (“The Seven Lucky 
Gods of the Showa Period”), for example, Ōnisaburō dressed in costumes 
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representing each of the Seven Lucky Gods (shichijifukujin, Stalker 2008, 
133–137) and embodied the deities. It is clear that Oomoto’s legacy is 
important for n ew religions’ media strategies, especially for the importance 
placed on visual media. For example, in the 1990s, Ōkawa Ryūhō, leader of 
Kōfuku no Kagaku, dressed up in a similar fashion, as deities he was suppos-
edly reincarnating during ceremonies. In addition, other groups developed 
different strategies; Oomoto was not a unique example of religious groups 
experimenting with media language and imagery.
Among the media, the press played a central role in the development 
of new religions and in their communication strategies. Large publications 
were used, not exclusively by new religions and not uniquely in Japan, to 
reach out to a wider public, but also to convey the idea of a valid religion 
with a large textual base, and to enhance their leaders’ charisma—Seichō no 
Ie, Kōfuku no Kagaku, but also Scientology (to cite an example from outside 
Japan) are just a few examples of movements that operate in this way. For 
many new religions, the publication of leaders’ teachings, diaries and doc-
trines has played an important role in the process of institutionalisation. The 
oral messages of the kyōso (founders) are often rewritten in a later period 
of development of the group as its teachings are systematised into a more 
fixed doctrine. They are therefore transformed into “sacred texts” (Berthon 
and Kashio 2000, 72) that are used to reclaim the legitimacy of the group as 
part of a coherent and valid religious tradition and also as training materials 
for members.47 Earlier groups, such as Tenrikyō and Oomoto, are examples 
of this process.
Printed media are still nowadays central for new religions in Japan; in 
most cases, they still are the most used media and an important source of 
revenues. New publications are promoted with massive advertising cam-
paigns and public events and leaders’ publications often appear in the best-
sellers rankings. One of the first groups to start advertising its publications 
during the 1940s was Seichō no Ie, a group founded in 1930 and regis-
tered under the Religious Juridical Persons Law (Shūkyō Hōjin Hō) in 1952 
(Staemmler 2011, 144). The group has been named by the media as “the 
publisher religion” (shuppan shūkyō)48 an d “the advertising religion” (kōkoku 
shūkyō, Iwasa 1993, 130) to point out the large amount of publications 
it has promoted. The founder, Taniguchi Masah aru, a former member of 
Oomoto, believed in the importance of the press, radio and television in 
the diffusion of his teachings (Enomoto 2006; Ishii 1994, 331; Iwasa 1994), 
and the first magazine published by the group, Seichō no Ie, was launched in 
1 930 (Inoue 2012,  124). Printed media used by new religions include news-
papers, such as the above-mentioned Taishō Nichinichi Shinbun owned by 
Oomoto, and the Seikyō Shinbun, founded in 1951 by Sōka Gakkai and cur-
rently, with a circulation of 5.5 million copies, representing the third-largest 
circulation in Japan for newspapers (McLaughlin 2009, 143). Other publi-
cations, such as magazines, are diversified according to the audience (mem-
 bers, non-members, children, young members and so on), of which earlier 
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examples are Michi no Tomo (“Friend of the Way”), a magazine launched 
in 1891 by Tenrikyō and Tenri jihō (“Tenri Chronicle”), launched in 1930 
by the same group (Inoue 2012, 124); both are published by Tenrikyō’s 
publishing house, Dōyūsha, established in 1891. Kōfuku no Kagaku, for 
example, currently publishes six magazines in Japanese: Kōfuku no Kagaku 
Happy Science, established in 1987 and recently supplemented by the small 
booklet What’s Kōfuku no Kagaku; The Liberty, a monthly magazine on 
social, and political issues established in 1995; Za dendō (“The Mission”), 
a bimonthly publication for members and Herumesu Enzerusu (“Hermes 
Angels”), for children, both founded in 1996; Are you happy? a monthly 
women’s magazine started in 2004; and Young Buddha, a magazine for 
young followers published from 2005. At the moment, the group publishes 
only one magazine in English, Happy Science Monthly.49 In general, the top-
ics covered in magazines include articles on doctrinal aspects—often with 
practical examples of application to everyday life—excerpts from leaders’ 
publications, information and reports on activities, essays about lifestyle 
and commentary on socio-political events. Several pages are often devoted 
to interviews or testimonies by members about their experiences as well as 
to advertisements of books or other items. Sometimes, advertisements of 
members’ businesses or services are also included, providing a source of 
income for the group.50
Manga,51 or comics, have also been used by new religions, especially 
to reach a younger readership. Most of the manga produced by new reli-
gions have a didactic orientation and this can make them pedantic and even 
“potentially boring” (Thomas 2012, 71).52 However, they deserve attention 
as part of the communication strategies used by groups and becau se they 
reveal groups’ attempts to reach different audience segments and to “exper-
iment” with different media. Manga have been used by several new religions 
to spread their message or, in some cases, to attack their critics (as the manga 
discussed in Chapter Four of this volume will illustrate). Differently from 
manga published by commercial publishers, religious manga are not initially 
published in episodic form in weekly or monthly magazines, but usually they 
immediately appear as paperbacks. Some publications (such as, for example, 
Kōfuku no Kagaku’s manga) can be purchased at larger bookstores in Japan. 
Authors are often members of the group (for example, Aum’s manga were 
created by members of Aum’s Manga and Anime Team, Fig. 1.3), but some-
times the religious organisations may employ professional mangaka (manga 
artists) or animation studios to create and distribute their products, in order 
to potentially increase visibility and have a wider distribution of works.
Some of the earlier examples of manga published by new religions focused 
on the biography of the leader to show his/her importance as a central ele-
ment for the group, such as, for example, The Founder of Konko Religion,53 
published by Konkōkyō in 1966 (Ishii 1994, 326), and the longer series, ded-
icated to the founder Makiguchi Tsunesaburō and his successor, Toda Jōsei, 
in Sōka Gakkai: Makiguchi Sensei (“The Teacher Makiguchi”, in thirteen 
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volumes, 1972–79) and Komikku Kyojin Toda Jōsei (“The Great Men 
Comic”—Toda Jōsei, in five volumes, 1984). Usually, the life of the leader is 
narrated through major events in his/her life and particular attention is given 
to the first spirit possession or call by a kami. Graphic techniques are some-
times used to visually illustrate the leader’s change from a “common person” 
to a divine being. For example, in the manga series Kyōso monogatari (“The 
Story of Our Founder”) published by Tenrikyō in 1987–1988 (and reprinted 
in 2008), Nakayama Miki’s face disappears after she “becomes” a kami (Ishii 
1994, 24). Other publications include works focusing on doctrinal expla-
nations that can be used for proselytism or fo r members’ training and edu-
cation. For example, in Tenrikyō’s Ritoru magajin (“Little Magazine”), the 
teachings are applied to daily life situations such as school exams or relation-
ships with classmates. Other works are used to provide an illustrated edition 
of already published books and their style recalls that of information manga 
(jōhō manga, MacWilliams 2012, 606), that is, comics with an educational 
purpose. In these manga, large sections are often devoted to writ ten text 
quoted from the original work and images tend to be static. For example, the 
manga versions of the first three volumes of Kōfuku no Kagaku’s Laws Series, 
Taiyō no hō (illustrated by Hashimoto Kazunori, Ōkawa and Hashimoto 
1996–2000), Ōgon no hō (illustrated by Hashimoto Kazunori, Ōkawa and 
Hashimoto 2003a; 2003b; 2004) and Eien no hō (illustrated by Hashimoto 
Fig. 1.3 The manga Metsubō no Hi (“Doomsday”) published by Aum Shinrikyō.
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Kazunori, Ōkawa and Hashimoto 2006) are characterised by plain and sim-
ple images in well-defined and closed cells, the predominance of written text 
that faithfully follows the content of the original text, didactic explanations 
of each character and very little narrative development.
Some of these books and manga have been made into animated films.54 
For example, Kōfuku no Kagaku between 1994 and 2012 released several 
films based on Ōkawa’s writings, most of them as animated movies: Heru-
mesu ai wa kaze no gotoku (“Hermes, love as the wind”, 1997), Taiyō no hō 
(“The Laws of the Sun”, 2000), Ōgon no hō (“The Golden Laws”, 2003), 
Eien no hō (“The Laws of Eternity”, 2006), Buddha Saitan (“The Rebirth 
of Buddha”, 2009) and Shinpi no hō (“The Mystical Laws”, 2012).55 The 
movies were widely advertised and shown at mainstream cinemas through-
out the country, and many were produced by the well-known Japanese 
corporation Toei Animation (Tōei Animēshon Kabushikigaisha). Kōfuku 
no Kagaku’s anime are not simply the adaptation of books or manga into 
animated movies, but they are part of a wider multimedia strategy including 
advertising campaigns, ad hoc manga (created when the film is released), 
sophisticated websites (devoted to the film), posters, figurines, collectable 
and games (sold or distributed at the launch of the movie). The visual media 
allow the possibility to iconographically represent all the deities, historical 
characters and events narrated in the leader’s books and to integrate them 
in a fantasy story where the main characters are usually a young couple 
(male and female) who are, as the audience will discover at the end, mem-
bers of Kōfuku no Kagaku. The stories develop in different adventures, but 
the conclusion is always the discovery of the “light from Japan”, the spirit 
of El Cantāre (the group’s supreme deity, who is reincarnated in the leader). 
For example, in the anime Ōgon no hō (“The Golden Laws”, 2003), the 
story is set in the future, in 2403, where Satoru, a student of the U.H.S. 
(University of Happiness Science), located in a city called New Atlantis, 
finds a book called The Golden Laws in the school library. Shortly after, 
a time traveller called Alisa visits him from the thirtieth century. The two 
decide to start a time travel together to explore the twenty-first century, 
but a malfunction of the time machine will sent them through different 
historical periods and geographical areas (Ancient Greece, India, China, 
Palestine) where they will meet important historical and religious figures 
(such as Hermes, Moses, Jesus, Siddhartha and so on). Their travels become 
a spiritual journey through which they learn different expressions of “love” 
and “courage”, thanks to the help and teaching provided by their guides. 
The anime was launched with an advertising campaign in newspapers and 
on television, and with the distribution of flyers (Fig. 1.4) and posters. Toei 
Animation, which produced the movie, also created a sophisticated web-
site56 in English and Japanese with trailers of the movie, posters and press 
reviews. The website also included an interactive game allowing the visitors 
to “travel” through different historical periods and also a test to discover 
one’s previous lives.
Fig. 1.4 Advertising material for Kōfuku no Kagaku’s anime Ōgon no Hō (“The 
Golden Laws”), 2003.
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As far as broadcasting is concerned, several groups started their own radio 
programmes in the postwar period, following the introduction of the Broad-
casting Law in 1950 (Enomoto 2006, 38). These include, for example, Konkō-
kyo’s Konkōkyō no Jikan (“The Time of Konkōkyō”) and Tenrikyō’s Tenrikyō 
no Jika n (“The Time of Tenrikyō”), both started in 1951 (Ishii 1994, 323).57 
Radio programmes are still used nowadays by several groups, often for week-
end programmes with religious contents, s uch as Kōfuku no Kagaku’s Ten-
shi no mōningu kōru (“Angels’ Morning Call”), a thirty-minute programme 
started in 1991 and transmitted every Saturday and Sunday mornings. More 
limited has been the use of television by new religions, mainly due to the cost 
involved, but mostly due to the restrictive rules imposed by broadcasting 
companies on transmissions with religious content (Inoue 2012; Ishii 1994).58 
One of the few examples in this context was the TV programme Hito-mono-
koto (“People and Things”) by Tenrikyō started in 1962 and di scontinued i n 
1988 (Ishii 1994, 323). Usually, even the groups’ ceremonies are not broad-
cast on main television channels, except for some spectacular events, such 
as the fireworks organised on August 1st by PL Kyōdan in the Kansai area. 
More numerous are the examples of groups that, while not producing specific 
TV programmes, publicise texts or ceremonies through radio and television 
networks, or have expressed an interest in doing so.59
Satellite broadcasting has less restricted rules and from the 1980s, when 
satellite broadcasting started in Japan, several new religions have been using 
it for transmitting their public events or to communicate with members. The 
first group to implement the new technology was Agonshū, which signed a 
contract in 1987 with Japan Satellite Broadcast (Inoue 2012; see also Chap-
ter Three in this volume). Risshō Kōseikai used a satellite programme to 
transmit ceremonies and conferences in  200 centres around the country, and 
similarly, satellite broadcastings have been used by other groups, such as 
Reiyūkai, Seichō no Ie, Tenrikyō, Shinnyoen, Sōka Gakkai and World Mate 
(formerly Cosmomate).60 Often, such transmissions could be seen at the 
centres of the groups concerned, but in some cases, they can be accessed at 
some designated members’ houses, such as the katei kyōkai (“home church”) 
established by Kōfuku no Kagaku, especially for members living in the coun-
tryside and with no access to centres in their vicinity.61 The use of media was 
often paired with the organisation of choreographed, multi-media events 
that attracted many viewers. The spectacular events organised by Agonshū 
and Kōfuku no Kagaku will be analysed in detail in Chapters Three and 
Four, respectively, but events organised by other, groups such as Sōka Gak-
kai and the GLA have also been widely advertised and attended. Events 
are at times recorded on DVDs (and previously on videocassettes) that are 
then viewed again and reproduced in the centres for training purposes, or 
to remind members of how active the group is and how many people it 
attracts during events. Similarly, leaders’ speeches are often recorded and 
circulated. Videocassettes and now DVDs are relatively inexpensive items 
that can be created by non-professionals, so they are largely used by new 
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religions. There are also a small but limited number of examples where new 
religions have invested in more costly ventures, such as the above-mentioned 
films by Oomoto and the recent animated movies by Tenrikyō and Kōfuku 
no Kagaku (Tsukada 2010). Videos are also utilised by many groups during 
their ceremonies; for example, in the GLA, some meetings called “visual 
sessions” (bijuaru sessh on) were set up primarily for viewings of the leader’s 
speeches and explanations of the teachings. Some groups have also been 
using video to substitute for or integrate with printed newsletters to update 
members about recent activities and events, as with, for example Oomoto’s 
Ōmoto Bideo Nyūsu (“Oomoto Video News”) and Agonshū’s Agon Nyūsu 
(“Agon News”).62 On August 1, 2014, for example, I attended an Agonshū 
ceremony transmitted via satellite broadcasting at its centre in Miyazaki city. 
After the ceremony, I was asked if I wanted to see the “Agon News” DVD 
for that month. The DVD showed the performance of fire rituals around 
Japan (in particular, in the Miyazaki and Tottori Prefectures) and encounters 
between the leader Kiriyama and other representatives with local religious 
leaders. When the ritual was performed in Miyazaki, for example, the Agon-
shū priest met with the head priest of Aoshima shrine, one of the main Shinto 
shrines in the area. The DVD concluded with a “personalised” message from 
the leader to his followers.
Since the 1990s, the Internet has been offering new religions new possi-
bilities for presenting their teachings and reaching a wider audience, also 
at international levels. In 1999, I conducted an online search on 120 new 
religions, at which point twenty-five of them had a website (Baffelli 2000). 
Several new religions established their online presence in the late 1990s,63 
but the websites mainly replicated information pro vided in printed material, 
with very limited (or no) interaction with viewers. Nowadays, all groups 
tend to have a website and to engage to some extent with social media. How-
ever, thus far, new religions have tended to take a cautious approach to the 
Internet. As discussed in other publications (Baffelli 2011), one of the main 
reasons for this lack of use of new media has been the fact that the Internet, 
being an open-structured enviro nment, is more difficult to control compared 
to other media, so that groups can be exposed to harsh and unpredictable 
critical attacks.64 A few groups, such as, for example, Hikari no Wa and 
Seichō no Ie, have recently started engaging more in social media, and this 
could represent a new development in the use of new media (see Chapter 
Five in this volume). What is important to note, however, is that, compared 
to the pioneering approach new religions have had toward other media, as 
illustrated in the brief overview provided, the approach to the Internet has 
been more prudent, if not even suspicious. This change can also be ascribed 
to the consequences of the 1995 sarin gas attack. Twenty years after the 
Aum Affair, new religions are still exploring new avenues and strategies 
for presenting their teachings and activities and restructuring their images. 
Expensive media campaigns and spectacular events promoted in the pre-
1995 period may now be seen as exposing the group to criticism. Very little 
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data are available on the financial situation and membership figures of new 
religions, but it is possible to argue that decreasing or stagnating member-
ship may also be one of concurrent causes in the decline of costly events and 
advertisings. New religions are also still confronted with the image of being 
“dangerous” in popular culture representations65 and in public discourse, 
especially on the Internet. For example, discussions about new religions in 
bulletin board systems such as the popular 2Channel (2channeru) tend to 
be extremely critical (Tamura and Tamura 2011). Therefore, the use of the 
media by new religions should be considered both in the historical circum-
stances of a speci fic group and in the broader context of the intersection 
between media and religion in Japan.
In conclusion, as Gardner notes:
The history of Aum Shinrikyō cannot be written without continual 
reference to questions concerning the relation of religion and media. 
The growth of Aum, for instance, might be charted by tracing Aum’s 
development of a range of media forms (books, magazines, audiotapes, 
anime [animated films], manga, radio broadcasts, homepages, etc.) for 
use in both proselytizing and religious practice. Much of Aum’s teach-
ings might also be viewed as a recycled version of images, ideas, and 
notions circulated in a variety of forms by the mass media.
(2001, 133)
Similarly, the history of other new religions cannot be written without con-
sidering how their media strategies were shaped by reactions to media 
reporting, but also by a process of mutual influence and borrowing between 
different religious groups and between the two spheres of media and religion. 
Indeed, religious groups influenced each other and borrowed from different 
contexts. For example, Agonshū promoted itself as the Japanese version of 
American televangelists (but with the claim that it was in advance of them), 
while Kōfuku no Kagaku’s publications, events and advertising strategies 
were strongly influenced by other Japanese groups such as Agonshū, Sōka 
Gakkai, the GLA and Seichō no Ie, while also recalling the image strategies 
of non-Japanese groups such as Scientology. Risshō Kōseikai representatives 
mentioned in an interview with me that they have used the Catholic Church 
as one of their models for magazines differentiated by audience and so on. 
New religions have also borrowed media language and imaginaries, as with 
the publication of Nostradamus-related books and videos by Agonshū, 
Kōfuku no Kagaku and Aum Shinrikyō in the late 1980s and 1990s,66 for 
example, which followed the popularity of Gotō Ben’s 1973 translation of 
Nostradamus’s prophecies.67 New religions have also promoted spectacular 
events that call to mind secular events such as artists’ live performances, 
political events or sports competitions. These events also recall matsuri, or 
large traditional religious festivals, which are mass-media events that are 
often shown on mainstream television.
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At the same time, the media, at least until 1995, looked at new religious 
not only as unusual and potentially dangerous groups, but also as successful 
enterprises that could be exploited to attract audience attention. It is there-
fore inadequate to view the relationship between the two spheres as simply 
antagonistic or competitive. The interactions should be explored in the com-
plexity of layers they involve in order to understand why media engagement 
is important for religious organisations in general, and even more so for 
groups whose developments have been parallel to that of the modern and 
contemporary mediascape.
NOTES
 1. Director: Mori Tatsuya; producer: Yasuoka Takaharu. 136 minutes. Color. 1998.
 2. The conversation is translated in the film’s subtitles as follows: “I want you to 
look at us closely. I want you to record us. We don’t have a tradition of record-
ing things. Even if we did, people would see it differently because we made it. 
I want ordinary people, people who can understand, to see what they can see, 
to hear what they can hear”.
 3. For a discussion on the construction of “metaphorical foreigners” in the late 
Meiji period, see  Gluck (1985, 135). On the “otherness” of new religions, see 
also  McLaughlin (2012).
 4. This insider/outsider tensions was particularly explicit in Aum. Although 
Araki seems to show respect toward Mori’s role and allowed him into the 
facilities to film his documentary, when the director asked him at the end of 
above-mentioned scene, “Do you think I can see?” Araki can only laconically 
reply with a vague “Well . . .” (“soudesune”).
 5. Director: Mori Tatsuya; producer: Yasuoka Takaharu. 131 minutes. Color. 
2001.
 6. For a detailed analysis on this episode, see  Gardner 2001. For Mori’s account, 
see M ori (2000).
 7. For a discussion about terminology, see the Introduction in this volume.
 8. On mass media in this period, see  Huffman (1997) and  Gluck (1985, 232–233).
 9. On censorship, see  Kornicki (1998); Mitchell (1963).
 10. On the use of jakyō, see  Dorman (2012a, 25); Ketelaar (1990, 42).
 11. As pointed about by Dorman, inshi literally means “shrine of indecency” and 
refers to a “Confucian moralistic judgment implying sexual immorality and 
female promiscuity” (2012a, 25).
 12. For a more detailed account of Renmonkyō history and teaching, see  Dorman 
(2012a);  Sawada (2004);  Takeda (1991); on the conflict between Renmonkyō 
and the press, see also  Inoue (1992, 47–56).
 13. Furthermore, according to  Dorman (2012a), the form of condemnatory report-
ing (danzai hōdō) developed by Yorozu Chōhō and other emerging newspapers 
at the time constitutes a predecessor of the form of reporting, often based on 
alleged scandals, of the weekly magazines that developed in postwar Japan 
(2012, 34).
 14. On the formation of State Shinto, see  Hardacre (1989);  Murakami (1970; 
 1980);  Shimazono (2010). More generally, on the history of Shinto, see  Breen 
and Teeuwen eds. (2000);  Teeuwen and Scheid (2002).
 15. As previously mentioned, the term can also be translated as “immoral heresy”.
 16. On Oomoto’s First and Second Suppressions in 1921 and 1935, see B erthon 
(1985); S taemmler (2009); Stalker (2008).
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 17. The Rush of the Gods is also the title of one of the earliest works on postwar 
new religions by H. Neill McFarland. This is another example of how influen-
tial media definitions of new religions have been for both public and academic 
discourses on these groups.
 18. On phases of religious policy during the Occupation, see  Dorman (2012a, esp. 
chapter 4) and  Thomas (2014).
 19. “Boom” is a loanword used in Japanese media to denote cultural, economic 
and fashion trends. According to Skov, “One side-effect of successive booms is 
the creation of a strong sense of here-and-now- which, at least to some extent, 
dispenses with the content and causality of what happens to be in style in a 
particular year. Indeed, the Japanese word boom refers to more than consumer 
trends: environmental problems, economic fluctuations, political issues, cul-
tural debates—along with television series, writers and models—have been 
popularised and then forgotten according to the same temporal logic. This 
had led one scholar to go so far as to argue that Japan is in fact a ‘boom-based 
society’ (Yosh imoto 1989:9)” (1995, 175).
 20. On religious revival and shūkyō būmu, see also  Berthon (1997);  Inoue, Komoto, 
Nishiyama, Umetsu (1985);  Reader (1990);  Yokoyama and Nishiyama (1988) 
and the Special Issue of Shisō to Gendai. Shūkyō no kakusei: Gendai no shūkyō 
būmu o dō miru ka (1988).
 21. The volumes were reprinted in a three-volume series by Kadokawa Bunsho in 
1989.
 22. The first translation appeared in 1973 and met with considerable success 
( Kisala 1997).
 23.  Berthon and Kashio (2000, 76–77) compare seishin sekai (spiritual world) and 
shinreisei undō (new spiritual movements) to the New Age in North American 
and European contexts. On seishin sekai, see also S himazono (1992a; 1 992b; 
1 996; 2 001a; 2 007). On the New Age and spirituality in Japan, see also H orie 
2011.
 24. For example, see the article “‘Seishin sekai no hon’ jiwajiwa ryūhō” in Asahi 
Shinbun, February 4, 1980.
 25. A list of all events and publications using the term or covering topics related 
to Seishin sekai is available in the above-mentioned volume seven of Meisō 
Meditation published in 1982.
 26. On the repercussions of the Aum Affair in Japanese society, see  Kisala and 
Mullins (2001); and the Special Issue of the Japanese Journal of Religious 
Studies edited by  Erica Baffelli and Ian Reader (2012). On public perceptions 
and attitudes toward religion in Japan after 1995, see  Inoue (1999;  2003);  Ishii 
(2007).
 27. Examples of publications supporting these ideas are  Nishida (1995);  Taka-
hashi (1995); Takimoto and Nagaoka eds. (1995).
 28. For instance, Steve Hassan’s Combating Cult Mind Control, written in 1988 
about the Unification Church; Michael D. Langone What Parents Should Know. 
1988; Phillip Zambardo. What is Mind Control? 1995. See W atanabe (2001).
 29. In particular, two scholars, Shimada Hiromi and Nakazawa Shin’ichi, faced 
criticism after the sarin attack for perceived associations with and positive 
endorsement of Aum. Shimada lost his university position as a result.
 30. For a detailed account on Aum Shinrikyō’s members portrayals on Japanese 
television, see K ojima (2011); on journalist and academic reporting about 
Aum before 1995, see K umamoto (2011); T sukada (2011).
 31. Forty to fifty hours every week, according to  Hardacre (2007, 175).
 32. The most striking example was the Pana Wave Laboratory (Panawēbu ken-
kyūjo), a small group founded in 1977 by Chino Yūko (1934–2006) and referred 
to in the Japanese media as “the white-clad group” (shirozukume shūdan). 
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The group became the focus of a massive media campaign in 2002 and 2003 
because of escalating conflicts with local residents and authorities in the Fukui 
and Gifu Prefectures. Some characteristics of the group (communal lives, empha-
sis on prophecies, members wearing only white clothes and so on) resulted in 
it being labeled as potentially dangerous and as the “next Aum”(B affelli and 
Reader 2012, 13; D orman 2005b).
 33. Beat (Kitano) Takeshi (born 1947) is a Japanese TV personality and film 
director. He often appears in TV programmes discussing religious practices or 
supernatural phenomena.
 34. World Mate (formerly Cosmo Mate) is a new religion founded by Fukami 
Tōshū (born Handa Haruhisa and known as  Fukami Seizan, 1951–, in mid-
1984. In 1994, the group changed its name to World Mate. Fukami is a prolific 
writer, and his bestseller, Daikinun (“Lucky Fortune”, 1991) has sold about a 
million copies worldwide (see  Prohl 2004 and  2006).
 35. Hō no Hana Sanpōgyō was established in 1987 by Fukunaga Hōgen (born 
Fukunaga Teruyoshi, 1945–). The group was dissolved in early 2000s follow-
ing the arrest of the leader for fraud. The group was usually referred in the 
media as the ashiura shindan (“foot reading cult”) because the leader claimed 
to be able to diagnose people’s illnesses by examining the soles of their feet. 
(Ba ffelli and Reader 2012; Fu jita 2008; In oue et. al. 1996; Wi lkinson 2009; 
Yonemoto 2000).
 36. Founded by Kitamura Sayo (1900–1967) in 1945 and known as the “Dancing 
Religion” (Odoru Shūkyō) for the practice known as “dance of ecstasy” (muga 
no mai). See D orman (2012a).
 37. Personal communication with Mori Tatsuya, March 2015.
 38. For some examples about the advertising of temples in Japan, see  Reader and 
Tanabe (1998, 212–17); R eader (2014).
 39. For examples of large funding invested by new religions in advertising in the 
early 1990s, see  Iwasa (1993, 13).
 40. The advertising campaigns covered newspapers, magazines (often occupying 
several pages), television and public transport.
 41. In his overview on the use of media by new religions,  Ishii (1994) also men-
tioned the publication by  YTV Jōhō Sangyō Kenkyū Gurūpu (1975) that 
looked at several new religions as “information industries” (jōhō sangyō).
 42. After the Hanshin Awaji daishinsai (Great Hanshin/Awaji Earthquake) that 
occurred on January 17, 1995, religious groups were criticised in the media 
and accused of not having offered solace to the people affected by the disaster.
 43. Interview with representatives of Kōfuku Kagaku’s Public Relations Depart-
ment, July 2014.
 44. Also, Thomsen quoted a report from the General Secretary of the Soto Branch 
of Zen Buddhism who was worried about the threat posed by new religions 
and their “astonishingly effective propaganda methods” (1963,31).
 45. As an example, Risshō Kōseikai, one of the largest lay Buddhist movements 
in Japan, which was founded in 1938 by Niwano Nikkyō (1906–1999) and 
Naganuma Myōkō (1889–1957), has a publishing house and a department of 
external affairs that looks after the website and a specialised section for TV 
programmes. It also uses external experts as consultants.
 46. In 1935, the group opened a movie studio in Tokyo and established a Sacred 
Film Division (Eiga shingekibu) in Kameoka ( Stalker 2008, 132).
 47. According to Berthon and Kashio, “Lorsque le group religieux accroît le nom-
bre de ses fidèles et que son rayonnement dépasse les frontières villageoises, 
s’opère, souvent, un travail de réécriture des premiers écrits (réajustement du 
message en fonction de l’échéance messianique, mais aussi réorientation du 
mouvement dont les premiers écrits peuvent être, alors purement et simplement 
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supprimés). Une attention très vive est portée a la forme légitime du discours 
écrit, devenu, a fil du temps, « écriture sacrée » et source de valorisation, par 
la mise en perspective avec une tradition revendiquée” (Be rthon and Kashio 
2000, 72).
 48.  Tsukada (2010, 74) uses a similar term for Kōfuku no Kagaku, which he 
defines as “a religion that publishes and produces literature” (shuppan—
dokusho shūkyō).
 49. Similarly, in an interview conducted in 2003, a Risshō Kōseikai representative 
told me that the group had, at the time, different publications for different 
audiences: Yakushin for members, Dāna for senior members, Candela for high 
school girls and Ambition for boys (both issued every four months), as well 
as Donguri kurabu for kids and, finally, Dharma World, which was in English 
and included also contribution from scholars.
 50. See the example of GLA magazines mentioned by  Whelan (2007a, 72).
 51. Manga, or comics, occupy a significant sector of publishing in Japan. In the mid-
1990s (and up to 2005), manga represented roughly forty per cent of the print 
publishing market ( Zenkoku Shuppan Kyokai/Shuppan Kagaku Kenkyūjo 
2006). Although sales have declined over the last few years, the decrease seems 
tied to an overall drop in the publishing industry and in 2012, the reported 
sales of tankōbon (compiled book volumes) was still an impressive amount of 
267.5 billion yen (See: http://www.animenewsnetwork.com/news/2013–02–
03/oricon/manga-volume-sales-dipped-1.5-percent-in-japan-in-2012, accessed 
July 21, 2015). These numbers do not include manga sold second-hand, manga 
read at manga kissa (cafés where, for an hourly fee, one can read comics, watch 
DVDs and surf the Internet) or at bookshops or manga exchanged between 
readers or the numerous dōjinshi (amateur manga). Indeed, the Comiket (or 
komikku māketto, Comic Market), the largest dōjinshi fair started in 1975 and 
held twice a year (August and December) in Tokyo, attracts over 30,000 circles 
(publishing groups) and a large number of visitors (http://www.comiket.co.jp/
info-a/WhatIsEng080528.pdf Accessed July 21, 2015). Manga and anime are 
not consumed by an “average Japanese recipient” (Be rndt 2008, 297), but they 
include different subgenres catering to specific audience targets (boys, girls, 
men, women). Some have also a large crossover readership.
Manga are usually first published as short episodes in weekly or monthly 
magazines. Some of them are later compiled into single volumes and organ-
ised in series. Some manga are also turned into anime (or, in a few cases, live 
actions film).
 52. In his study on religious anime, Thomas (2009) divides religious narratives 
into two main types: aesthetic and didactic. Didactic products, such as, for 
example, proselytising videos or video used as teaching tools in religious meet-
ing, are conceived to convert or to introduce religious doctrine, while aes-
thetic works “utilize religious vocabulary and imagery to promote affective 
responses ranging from casual diversion to strong conviction” ( Thomas 2009, 
205). Some anime (and similarly, some manga) skillfully combine the two ele-
ments and create “emotive” products ( Thomas 2009, 206). On representation 
of religious themes in manga, see also  MacWilliams (2012);  Thomas (2012); 
 Watanabe (2015); Yamanaka (1996).
 53. The title is in English.
 54. Generally, the examples of new religions’ visual media distributed to the gen-
eral public are quite limited, also due to the elevated cost involved in the pro-
duction and distribution of movies. For other examples, see T sukada 2010, 77.
 55. To date, two movies produced by the group are not animated movies: Nosuto-
radamusu no senritsu no keiji (“The Terrifying Revelations of Nostradamus”, 
1994) and Fainaru Jajjimento (“The Final Judgement”, 2012). The latter is the 
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first movie produced by Kōfuku no Kagaku with an original script not based 
on previously published books.
 56. http://www.toei.co.jp/ougon. The website is no longer available.
 57. In the same period, other groups started radio broadcastings, such as Seichō 
no Ie, PL Kyōdan and Oomoto ( Ishii 1994, 323). For a comparative analysis 
of the use of radio by Seichō no Ie and Konkōkyō in the postwar period, see 
 Enomoto (2006). On Japanese religions’ use of radio and television, see also 
A be (1990).
 58. TV broadcasting started in Japan in 1953. The first TV programme with religious 
content was Shūkyō no Jikan (“The Time of Religion”) broadcast by Nihon Ter-
ebi and Yomiuri Terebi in 1960 ( Enomoto 2011: 75–76). For a comprehensive 
study on TV programmes with religious themes, see I shii (2008 and 2 010).
 59. This interest was not limited to new religions. In 1987, the Agency for Cultural 
Affairs published a survey on the use of media by religious groups, comprising 
241 religious groups ( Bunkachō Bunkabu Shūmuka 1987). It emerged that 
one group out of five had sponsored radio or television programmes or had 
public relations activities and that many groups are willing to utilise the mass 
media for propaganda purposes. Even though the report concerns not just new 
religions, it shows how the use of video, radio and television in that period was 
still quite limited.
 60. An article in the Asahi Shinbun on June 4, 1992 listed the groups that make 
use of satellite transmissions: Sōka Gakkai, Risshō Kōseikai, Agonshū, Shinn-
yoen, Sekai Kirisuto Kyōitsu Kyōkai, Kōfuku no Kagaku and Aum Shinrikyō. 
Quoted in  Maeno (1994, 78–81).
 61. Interview with representative of Public Relations Department, July 2014.
 62. Video newsletters were also used by PL Kyōdan, Ennokyō and Shinnyoen ( Ishii 
1994, 328).
 63. For example, MOA Sekai Kyūseikyō, 1995; Agonshū, 1997; Risshō Kōseikai 
1998; PL Kyōdan 1999 ( Baffelli 2000).
 64. On Japanese religions online, see Baffelli, Reader and Staemmler (2011);  Enom-
oto (2012);  Fukamizu (2007);  Ikegami and Nakamaki eds. (1996); Inoue (2000) 
 Inoue ed. (2003);  Kawabata and Tamura (2007);  Kienle and Staemmler (2003); 
 Kurosaki (2007); Kurosaki et al. eds (2000);  Porcu (2010); Staemmler (2011).
 65. For a discussion of representations of new religions in manga after 1995, see 
 Thomas (2012).
 66. For instance, Kiriyama of Agonshū published the book 1999 nen karuma to 
reishō kara no dasshutsu (“Escape From Harmful Spirits and the Karma of 
1999”) in 1981; Asahara of Aum published Nosutoradamusu himitsu no dai-
yogen. 1999 nen no nazo (“The Secret Prophecy of Nostradamus. The Enigma 
of Year 1999”) in 1991 and a movie version of the book in 1992. Ōkawa of 
Kōfuku no Kagaku published his first book on the topic in 1987, Nosutorada-
musu no shinyogen. 1999 nen to daikyūseishu no kōrin wo kataru (“The New 
prophecy of Nostradamus. Telling the Year 1999 and the Advent of Great Mes-
siah”) and a second book on prophecies, Nosutoradamusu no senritsu no keiji 
(“The Terrifying Revelations of Nostradamus”), in 1991 (Baffelli and  Reader 
2011, 11–12). The former work by Ōkawa in particular borrowed extensively 
from Gotō Ben’s 1973 book (Baffelli and Re ader 2011; Ki sala 1997).
 67. The book Nosutoradamusu no daiyogen. Semarikuru 1999 nen 7 no gatsu, 
jinrui metsubō no hi (“The Great Prophecies of Nostradamus. The seventh 
month of 1999 is hanging over, the day of humankind destruction”) by the 
journalist Gotō Ben was published in Japan in 1973 and became a bestseller. 
Several other books, magazines, manga, films and animated movies on the 
topic were produced, including 10 subsequent books by Gotō himself between 
1973 and 1998 (Baffelli and  Reader 2011, 11;  Kisala 1997).
2
INCREASING PROFILE, IMPROVING IMAGE AND 
RECRUITMENT
The outline presented in the previous chapter showed how the nexus between 
new religions and media technologies has developed and how media literacy 
has been an important instrument for the expansion of these groups. In par-
ticular, as the case studies discussed in the following chapters will elucidate, 
image strategies are particularly relevant at the initial stage of formation of 
religious organisations, when groups need to develop from an early stage 
of a small circle of interested people, usually formed around a charismatic 
teacher and leader, into a more distinctly defined and structured religious 
institution. As discussed in the Introduction, new religions usually refer to 
or locate themselves within an existing tradition to claim their legitimacy 
and to build their reputation, but at the same time, they need to offer a new 
innovative path and to increase their visibility in the religious marketplace. 
Media engagement can therefore become a vital element to determine the 
development and success of these groups.
Consequently, the first thematic issue in the analysis of media and new 
religions in the Japanese context is the opportunity offered by the media to 
increase a group’s public profile, improve its image and, ultimately, attract 
new members. Effective media use can play not just an important role but in 
fact a central one in creating, reshaping and innovating the identity of new 
religions. New media technologies create new opportunities for disseminat-
ing teachings and reaching wider audiences. As discussed by S talker (2008), 
for example, visual media were instrumental in Oomoto’s rapid expansion 
in Japan under its second leader, Deguchi Onisaburō:
Onisaburō foresightedly recognised the power of visual images and the 
increasingly influential role they would play in modern religious life. 
Oomoto used visual technologies and images to engage in market dif-
ferentiation, tailoring its message according to audience: art exhibitions 
emphasised the versatility, spirit, and genius of its charismatic leader and 
the promise of art for everyman; expositions stressed the sect’s modern 
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and international character, its status as an educational, humanitarian 
body that transcended the Japanese state; newsreels and movies featured 
Shintoist rituals and traditional arts during an era in which many Japa-
nese sought a return to traditional Japanese culture as a stable form of 
national identity.
(Sta lker 2008, 139)
In the 1980s, Agonshū used spectacular public events, widely advertised and 
magnified by state-of-the-art technology, to raise its profile as a “religious 
movement very much at home in the modern world” (Rea der 1991, 219) 
and to attract the attention of the general public. Similarly, Kōfuku no Kaga-
ku’s rapid expansion in the late 1980s and early 1990s was due in part to its 
large use of advertising in public spaces and use of slogans and catchphrases 
in the style of commercial enterprises (Astl ey 1995; Baff elli 2005 and 2007 ). 
Sōka Gakkai also maintains a high level of visibility, and its new publications 
are advertised in trains, shops and other public spaces such as screens at 
major crossroads in Tokyo (as described in the Introduction). Media forms 
are therefore used to “promote a desirable self-image in the public eye” 
(Stal ker 2008, 100) and to generate interest beyond the circle of adherents.
Media are also important to increase members’ cohesion and enhance 
the image of the group internally. The “media empire” (McLau ghlin 2009, 
18) created by Sōka Gakkai, for example—which includes the daily news-
paper Seikyō Shinbun,1 magazines and publications, visual media, music, 
websites—not only engages members in media-related activities (such as 
distributing newspapers), but also frames what kinds of information are 
received by members (McLaugh lin 2009, 18).
At the same time, the creation of positive images and the distribution 
of group-specific narratives are also important for existing members. For 
example, movies and videos produced by new religions are often made 
for internal use and employed for training purposes during seminars and 
meetings. In the case of Agonshū and other movements, videos of public 
events are also available at their centres to be watched by visitors and to 
demonstrate the group’s ability to attract large audiences. In the case of the 
anime (animated movies) produced by Kōfuku no Kagaku and mentioned 
in Chapter One, they are apparently produced to reach a wider public, as 
they are screened in cinemas throughout Japan and advertised with large 
campaigns and multimedia strategies (books, magazines, soundtrack CDs, 
DVDs, collectables, TV advertising). Tsukada  (2010, 18), however, notices 
that the main purpose of such animated-movie production seems to be to 
demonstrate to members that the group is reaching its objectives and to con-
vey a sense of achievement and affirmation. Therefore, in this case as well, 
media activities like anime are mainly intended for existing members to both 
reinforce their loyalty (with the distribution of free tickets, for example) and 
strengthen their interest by showing the movement’s ability to create and 
invest in costly media productions.
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At the same time, as public media are important sources of knowledge 
about religion, they have also created a space within which religious organi-
sations have “to act as their own advocates or defend themselves from public 
criticism” (Lynch and Mitchell 2011, 1); this is especially important for new 
religions because of general public mistrust (see discussion in Chapter One 
of this volume). As a consequence, media literacy is becoming a vital skill 
for the survival of these groups. New religions’ media strategies have to 
be sophisticated to enable the difficult balancing act between being excit-
ing, exotic and different (for example, by offering the possibility to achieve 
extraordinary spiritual powers, or promising attractive miracles and bene-
fits) without appearing too peculiar or demanding too much of potential 
followers. An example of a movement that failed to manage this balance and 
ended up developing a very negative image as a result was Aum Shinrikyō. 
As discussed in Chapter One, media external to the group played a crucial 
role in the initial development of Aum. When the magazine Sunday Mainichi 
in 1989 published interviews with concerned family members, Aum was 
also able to launch a “charm offensive” (Reader 200 0a, 38) in order to use 
criticism as a chance for self-promotion (Dorman 201 2a, 10–11; Hardacre 
20 07, 185). Asahara appeared in several interviews and TV programmes and 
the group demonstrated its ability to turn the critical portrayals to its favour. 
However, in the aftermath of the subway attack, the group’s unusual prac-
tices generated sensationalist accounts and Asahara became the “personifi-
cation of evil” (Reader 2000a , 34). Aum representatives initially attempted 
to deny their involvement in the criminal actions, but after the leader and 
top members were arrested, the remaining members were left without a clear 
direction to face media attacks and public condemnation, and their inability 
to explain Aum to the outside world became evident.2
Other new religions have been more successful in constructing an image 
of a media-savvy and up-to-date religion, especially in the pre-1995 period. 
Agonshū, for example, emphasised its ability to use media in advertising 
campaigns. Reader, for example, cites an advertisement sponsored by Agon-
shū in the Mainichi Daily News on October 15, 1987, in which the group is 
described as a “user-friendly religion”:
Kiriyama Seiyū consciously interprets Buddhism into a language that 
young people can relate to—thus the satellite broadcasts, the modern 
temple building, his friendly sermon and his approachable manner. All 
this adds up to a user-friendly religion appropriate to the needs of the 
modern Japan.
(Reader 1991,  219)3
Similarly, for Kōfuku no Kagaku, the development of media engagements—
from the foundation of its publishing house, to the establishment of its first 
magazine, radio broadcast, animated movie and so on—is part of a narrative 
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used by the group to appeal to the general public and to reinforce the idea of 
being part of a successful and modern group to adherents.4
Finally, terminology related to new technologies is also used by leaders 
to explain teachings and doctrine, while demonstrating their ability to use 
an accessible and easy-to-understand language. Seichō no Ie’s founder, Tan-
iguchi Masaharu, for example, encouraged the use of radio in the postwar 
period. For Taniguchi, radio was not just a means of propaganda, but he 
also used the metaphor of “tuning” in to radio waves to explain the mind 
reaching the “divine nature” (naibu shinsei or hontō no jibun, “true self”) 
and defined the meditative practice of shinsōkan,5 the most important rit-
ual in the group, as an “antenna for spiritual exchange” (reikō no antena, 
Enomoto 2006).6  GLA’s founder Takahashi Shinji, too, used a media-related 
metaphor to explain teachings, creating an overlap between media and reli-
gious languages. Referring to a technology that was new at the time, Shinji 
preached the idea that the soul was “a videotape on which all past lives had 
inevitably been recorded”7 (Whelan 2007a, 113 ) to explain his practice of 
past-life glossolalia. Therefore, by using modern media technologies, new 
religions tend to employ modern language forms and thus project an image 
of modernity compared to the more archaic language used by other religious 
institutions, in particular Buddhism. A recurrent comment by members I 
have heard during my visits to different new religions over the years is that 
the language used by leaders, as well as the language used in prayers and 
rituals, is a language that is accessible and easily comprehensible (wakari 
yasui) to anybody. Media therefore offer new religions not only convenient 
technologies to make their name and teachings known to a larger public, 
but also a new language for branding their images and conveying a sense of 
modernity and innovation.
RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY: SHOWING CHARISMA 
IN THE MEDIA
The use of media may be suitable for circulating religious ideas and promot-
ing a religious group’s image, but it also raises important questions regard-
ing religious authority.
The presence of a charismatic leader proposing a new vision has been one 
of the main characteristics attributed to new religions.8 The most-cited defi-
nition of charisma is that provided by sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920), 
who defines charisma as:
[. . .] A certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he 
[sic] is set apart from ordinary men [sic] and treated as endowed with 
supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers 
or qualities. These are such are not accessible to the ordinary, but are 
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regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them 
the individual concerned is treated as a leader.
(Weber 1968, 48)
Charisma is portrayed as an anti-traditionalist and potentially revolution-
ary force (Comaroff 1994; Webe r 1946, 249). A t the same time, charisma 
is described as unstable and prone to deterioration, because it is based on 
recognition of the leader by the members and on their emotional involve-
ment. Therefore, leaders are forced to constantly prove their legitimacy and 
success to members in order to maintain their authority. Several studies have 
debated the definition of charisma and charismatic authority, evaluating the 
complexity of relations between leader and members. Stalker (2008), for 
example, draws attention to the entrepreneurial character of charismatic 
leadership in Oomoto. According to her definition, “charismatic entrepre-
neurship” involves a “combination of spiritual authority, an intuitive grasp 
of the religious marketplace, savvy management skills, and a propensity for 
risk taking”(Stalker 2008, 3) an d it represents one of the key elements of 
successful new religions in the context of the competitive marketplace of reli-
gion (Stalker 2008, 15). Chilson (2014) disc usses the importance of the identi-
fication of members with the leader and the centrality of the mentor-disciple 
relationship in Sōka Gakkai. Feuchtwang emphasises the importance of 
institutionalisation, not as something opposed to charismatic authority, 
but as something suitable for reinforcing charisma and realising the vision 
shared between members and leaders (2008, 92). Finally, Csordas (1997) 
inte rprets charisma not as “a quality, but a collective, performative, inter-
subjective self-process” (1997, 140). Also important is the relational aspect 
of charisma, as it is constructed in and dependent on the dynamics between 
leader and followers. Therefore, it is not a one-way process, as followers’ 
responses to mediatised projections of the leader are also important.
The case studies presented in this book explore these aspects—the per-
formative aspect of charisma, the importance of entrepreneurial skills, the 
role played by religious intermediaries and institutions and the importance 
of the process of identification with and devotion to the leader—through a 
discussion of how media could impact religious authority and on the rela-
tionship between members and leaders. Media representations and visual 
culture play a central role in modern societies in the construction of a leader 
as a “bricoleur of heroic roles, religious symbols and stories” (Feuchtwang 
2008, 94) a nd in popularising and framing narratives centred around the 
leader. As mentioned in Chapter One, for example, printed media are cru-
cial to the transformation of leaders’ writings into a stable canon. They 
are also pivotal in reinforcing the emotional involvement of both leaders 
and followers in the vision and “expectation of the extraordinary” (Feucht-
wang 2008, 103),  especially when the group is expanding and direct con-
tact between them is no longer feasible. Therefore, it is important to ask: 
how are mediation practices impacting the relationship between members 
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and leaders and the perception of proximity between them? The case stud-
ies I use in this book refer in particular to primary charisma, that is, the 
charisma of the founding leader, and not to the secondary charisma of the 
successor.9 New forms of mediation offer immense potential for enhanc-
ing a leader’s status, presenting him/her as a multi-talented entrepreneur 
and a visionary and pioneering leader in using media. Indeed, the leader 
is generally projected by the group as its main visual focus, and this in 
turn further develops the relationship between the leader and followers, 
for whom the leader becomes an ever-accessible visible presence. The fol-
lowing chapters will explore these issues by investigating the mediation of 
the leader-members relationship through satellite broadcasting (Agonshū, 
Chapter Three) and videos (Kōfuku no Kagaku, Chapter Four), the con-
struction of a new idea of leader (Hikari no Wa, Chapter Five) and the 
attack on authority and attempt to “de-sacralise” the image of the leader 
through defamatory attacks to his persona (such as, for example, the vilify-
ing reporting about Ōkawa Ryūhō that led to the Kōdansha Friday Affair; 
see Chapter Four in this volume).
Media could offer important tools for shaping leader-member relation-
ships, encouraging emotional involvement and the internalisation of “mod-
els” of conversion and “ways of life”. The autobiographical accounts in 
Ikeda’s diaries (Chilson 2014) or Jōyū’s b log (Baffelli 2011), for exampl e, 
create a sense of intimacy through the sharing of everyday life. Through 
these accounts, the readers can identify themselves with the leader as “some-
one with whom readers can relate, and who readers can imagine as relating 
to them” (Chilson 2014, 74). Social  media, in particular, can create the image 
of a close, familiar leader who is engaged in a direct dialogue with members, 
in contrast with the distant, inaccessible leader presented in other groups 
(see for example, the shift in leader’s presentation from Aum Shinrikyō to 
Hikari no Wa discussed in Baffelli 2011 and in Chapte r Five in this volume). 
In the case of Hikari no Wa, for example, the leader’s engagement with social 
media such as Mixi or Twitter has created new spaces in which to reposition 
authority and affirm alternative ways of interaction between the leader and 
his audience. Similarly, conversion stories used in groups’ publications that 
emphasise practical guidance for everyday life (discussed later in this chapter) 
could reinforce the authority of the group and strengthen the internalisation 
of its ethics and values, and its visions regarding inter-personal relationships 
and society. Finally, the relationship between members and the leader can 
become virtual, offering a way to overcome the limits of physical proximity. 
As movements grow, indeed, leaders’ direct contact with members, such as 
direct one-to-one healings, initiations and so on, decrease. This leads to the 
development of structures with intermediaries, such as a board of directors 
or local leaders, who may gain some power and have some control on how 
messages from the leader are communicated to the members. New media 
therefore can offer leaders a way to interact directly with followers without 
intermediaries that could also potentially challenge their authority.
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At the same time, media practices can be used to create the image of a 
semi-divine leader (see Chapter Four in this volume) and to protect his/
her “aura” from criticism, making most of his/her contact with the public 
become mediated through the screen. Media can both protect the aura of 
the leader, but also make him/her more vulnerable and open to attack. As 
discussed in Chapter Four, for example, the overexposure of Ōkawa in the 
early 1990s triggered criticism and attacks from newspapers and magazines. 
Other studies have also examined how leaders have been cautious in using 
the Internet because of the risk of criticism (Baffelli, Reader and Staemmler 
2011). For Benjamin  (1970), the aura of a piece of art lies in its distance 
from the audience (Meyer and Moors 2005, 17). Sim ilarly, the aura of the 
charismatic leader may be attributed to his/her distance (in the sense of 
“extraordinary quality”, but also physical and spatial distance) from the 
members. Therefore, the “reproducibility” of a leader’s image and its visibil-
ity and accessibility may be a danger for its aura, although visual culture and 
mediation practices (such as the satellite broadcasting discussed in Chapter 
Three and videos analysed in Chapter Four) can also play an important role 
in relocating the aura, which may have not disappeared, but, as pointed out 
by Meyer and Moors, may be “being reconstructed through new techniques 
of representation” (2005, 17):
[. . .] In the era of media globalization the aura is re-embedded and 
reactivated in the place and time of the beholder, through its reception, 
thereby legitimating social authority through the medium of visual cul-
ture.
(Meyer and Moors 2005, 17)
An in teresting example about how media technology could affect 
leader-member relationships and also transform the role of intermediaries is 
provide by Sōka Gakkai, the lay Buddhist movement founded in the 1930s 
by the educator Makiguchi Tsunesaburō (1871–1944) and considered the 
biggest religious organisation in Japan. In the 1950s, the second leader, Toda 
Jōsei (1900–1958), introduced monthly meetings for local leaders (honbu 
kanbukai) in Tokyo. In the 1960s and 1970s, under Toda’s successor Ikeda 
Daisaku (born 1928), these m eetings were usually held at large facilities that 
could contain a considerable audience. The meeting included representatives 
from all of Japan’s Prefectures and the aim was to share information and 
to report back to members in their area about guidelines that they were 
in charge of. In the 1980s, the meetings were suspended due to the high 
cost involved in their organisation, and for around three years, they were 
held via audio conferences. The communication in this case was unidirec-
tional and the representatives were only able to listen without the possibili-
ties of dialogic interactions. Although practical, according to Sōka Gakkai’s 
representatives, this system was not perceived as very “inspirational” by 
local leaders.10 In the late 1980s, the group decided on a joint venture with 
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communication companies and on August 24, 1989, the meeting was trans-
mitted for the first time live from Sōka Gakkai’s headquarters via satellite 
broadcasting. After the first transmission, however, it was decided that the 
meetings were going to be recorded and broadcast some days later. Accord-
ing to the group’s representatives, the introduction of satellite broadcasting 
in the 1990s strongly affected the role and authority of local leaders. Pre-
viously, information and directives from the headquarters were transmitted 
to the members via the representatives, who were in the powerful position 
of being in control of this information. With satellite transmission, their 
mediation was not needed anymore and members could see and listen to 
Ikeda directly. Therefore, the new technology facilitated the feeling of direct 
contact with the leader and made it harder for intermediary figures to main-
tain their authority. The introduction of the new technology also facilitated 
the process Sōka Gakkai started in mid-1970s of “transformation from an 
organization headed by Ikeda into a group devoted completely to Ikeda 
Daisaku” (McLaughlin 2009, 108–109). Consequentl y, the sole authority of 
Ikeda became perceived as “less mediate” through the mediation practice of 
satellite broadcasting, and the practice is still commonly used nowadays.11
These broadcasts also allow members to witness interactions between 
the leader Ikeda and senior local leaders. During an interview I conducted 
with representatives of Soka Gakkai International and Sōka Gakkai Aca-
demics Affairs Division, it was stressed that the feeling of “being there with 
the leader” is more important than just reading texts and that this is one 
of the main positive aspects of satellite broadcasting.12 The transmission 
is usually one hour long13 (although the actual meeting is usually longer) 
and it is transmitted only at Sōka Gakkai centres in Japan.14 Programmes 
are usually showed for four days at specific times, so that members can 
choose the time that is more convenient for them. Similarly to other videos 
produced by new religions (see the example of Agonshū in Chapter Three), 
Sōka Gakkai broadcasts can only be watched at the centre, not in private 
homes. The broadcasts are open to external audience, but they are strongly 
encouraged to attend the group’s beginners’ programme or face-to-face dis-
cussion groups as well. Indeed, a strong emphasis is placed on face-to-face 
interactions, and introductions to its teaching are mainly done via personal 
contact and direct interaction. Therefore, in the case of Sōka Gakkai, satel-
lite broadcasting seems to have been used to reinforce the inspiration and 
commitment of members, more than as a proselytisation tool. Indeed, as 
previously discussed, the use of mediation practices is not necessary limited 
to practices of external promotion and proselytism, but may be introduced 
to support internal changes and transitions.
In conclusion, when discussing the impact of media on religious author-
ity, the focus is again on the need for a religious leader to be “visible”, as a 
proof of the validity of his/her teachings and as a means of legitimation of 
his/her vision. The fluidity of charismatic authority creates the necessity for 
a leader to constantly demonstrate his/her approachability and to be able to 
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able to innovate and to use new technology, while at the same time, media 
exposure raises issues about the protection of the leader’s image and about 
the risks associated with damage control from critical attacks. Finally, the 
leader’s lectures recorded on DVDs or other media can become part of the 
canon and used in ceremonies and practices after the death of the leader, so 
as to maintain the connection between the members and the founder.15
IMPACT ON PRACTICES, RITUAL, SPECTACLE
Another theme considered in the case studies is how various media forms 
could affect religious practices. As pointed out by Meyer and Moors in the 
introduction to an edited volume on Religion, Media, and the Public Sphere, 
“there is nothing entirely new about the link between religion and the 
media” (2005, 7) as religion could only exist as a form of mediation, through 
a book, a prophet or a founder acting as mediators between supernatural 
entities or forces and believers. However technology can create new forms of 
mediation practices or have an impact on existing ones. The ways in which 
this can occur will be discussed in later chapters, where I show how specific 
changes in various religious groups’ practices have been influenced by the 
use of media. Examples include practices created to fit a particular new tech-
nology, such as, for example, the new version of the fire ritual introduced by 
Agonshū to fit the broadcasting timeslot the group had access to (Chapter 
Three), or how the use of media impacted internally on the relationship 
between leaders and members, as previously discussed. One of the central 
questions is about what occurs when a ritual is not merely transmitted by 
the media, but when the media also enables viewers to participate via the 
screen. Through the media, rituals can become spectacle-oriented, stressing 
artistic performance and theatrical enactments (as illustrated by the use of 
satellite broadcasting of annual rituals by Agonshū in Chapter Three), in 
order to entertain followers and spectators—an association that, along with 
entertainment, has been seen as “crucial” for the survival of contemporary 
religion (Meyer and Moors 2005, 15). Ritual is not only recreated as specta-
cle, but also consumed via the media; Agonshū members, for example, will 
gather together in their centres and participate in the ritual via the screen. 
The media can make the ritual more accessible, allowing members who are 
living in remote centres or abroad to participate in it and have direct visual 
access to their leader, and it could help to foster the image of a cohesive, large 
organisation. At the same time, rituals that are media events are also specta-
cles in which believers are simultaneously spectators. They are not, however, 
simply passive, but actively involved as spectators and believers in the ritual 
performance, something that will be developed further in Chapter Three.
Large public events have been organised by several new religions to pro-
mote devotion to the leader and to exhibit their power and wealth.16 Sōka 
Gakkai, for example, started organising mass performances in the postwar 
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period under its second leader, Toda Jōsei. After Toda’s death in 1958, his 
successor, Ikeda Daisaku, continued the use of mass performances and in 
1964, the first Sōka Gakkai “culture festival” (bunkasai)17 was held under 
Ikeda’s leadership at the National Stadium in Sendagaya, Tokyo:
One hundred thousand people filled the stadium; fifteen thousand per-
formers swirled around the grounds in gymnastic routines, and thirty 
thousand people in the stadium seats created images of Mount Fuji 
and other symbols by holding up large flash cards. Three years later, 
Sōka Gakkai staged an even larger event at the same stadium, this time 
with forty-two thousand ‘human letters’ (hitomoji) flashing images of 
famous paintings, gardens, and finally the words ‘world peace’ in seven-
teen languages, as Gakkai performers from all over Japan and branches 
overseas danced in formation on the field by the thousands.
(McLaughlin 2009, 107)
In the 1970s, grandiose media spectacles in which hundreds of followers and 
artists performed in dances and elaborate choreographies18 were organised 
throughout the country,19 and supported the affirmation of Ikeda Daisaku as 
Sōka Gakkai’s central and sole authority (McLaughlin 2009, 108). As will be 
discussed in Chapt er Three, Agonshū staged spectacular rituals20 that were 
widely advertised and used in the 1980s to construct an image of a wealthy 
and powerful religion able to adapt traditional performances in a modern set-
ting, and of a religious leader who was a skilled ritual practitioner with vital 
teachings for the modern day. These events were also a means of recruiting 
new members, by attracting visitors and impressing them with spectacular 
performances. Grandiose spectacles with staged and rehearsed performances 
also characterised Kōfuku no Kagaku events in the 1990s. Its first event, 
examined in Chapter Four, was organised in July 1991 on the occasion of 
the birthday of its leader, and after that, several other festivals were insti-
tuted. During these events, its leader performed in different costumes, and 
dramatic choreographies were accompanied by members’ performances and 
parade. These events became well known and widely commented upon in the 
media for their grandeur and ostentation. Astley, for example, described the 
El Cantāre Festival held on December 26, 1991 as “Disneyesque”:21
In the first part of the program, after the obligatory fanfare for pass-
ing the five-million-member mark, the various divisions in turn took to 
the stage. The Women’s Division, representing love or family harmony, 
appeared first along with children dressed as angels and figures dressed 
as Disneyesque characters, to the accompaniment of nursery-rhyme 
music and clouds of bubbles. Next the Senior Division, representing 
Shinto and indigenous culture, appeared with the Seven Gods of For-
tune to stylised Japanese music. Finally the Youth Division appeared, 
symbolising vigour and strength, and perhaps the purity of youth in 
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their clean-cut attire. These Warriors of Light performed a rousing song 
titled Tsudoe, hikari no tenshi [Gather, angels of light!] to the accompa-
niment of what I would loosely describe as military music, punching the 
air with gold, then—dramatically at the climax of the song—red, blue, 
and white handkerchiefs.
(1995, 362)
An important predecessor of Kōfuku no Kagaku’s events were the perfor-
mances of Takahashi Shinji, the GLA’s founder, which created a strong emo-
tional involvement and exchange between the GLA’s leader and his followers 
and were characterised by the supposed transformation of Shinji’s sweat 
into flecks of gold that followers “scrambled to collect on their handker-
chiefs” (Whelan 2007a, 114). Dramatic events became a characteristic  of 
public performances of Shinji’s successor, his daughter Keiko, as well.
On January 25, 2004, I attended the GLA’s Shinnen no Tsudoi (“New Year 
Gathering”) held at the National Convention Hall at Pacifico Yokohama, 
a large convention centre in Yokohama city. The most anticipated moment 
of the ceremony was the final speech by the leader. As preparatory stages to 
her lecture, other teachers introduced elements of the GLA’s doctrine, and a 
video showing Keiko’s interactions with members was shown. When Keiko 
appeared on stage, the set was totally changed and revolved around lighting 
effects that drew attention to her figure and her words. Her elegant clothes, 
pure white, in perfect harmony with the set, and her movements created 
the image of a strong and determined woman, but also compassionate and 
caring. The voice, however, unwavering and quite loud in tone, grasped the 
attention of the audience. Keiko reproduced live a staged dialogue with a 
follower—aimed at a sort of “awakening of awareness of one’s potential”—
similar to the interaction shown in the video in the first part of the ceremony. 
She started an intense “spiritual dialogue” (shinri jissen) with a man called 
from the audience, narrating his past difficulties and troubles and enthrall-
ing him not only with a peremptory and rapid way of speaking, but also 
through physical contact, touching him on the shoulders and arms.22 The 
audience’s emotional involvement was such that not only did the follower 
on stage burst into tears, but so did many of those present. After the public 
conversation, during the handing out of a “truth card” (shinri card) to prese-
lected groups of members, short conversations were allowed with the leader, 
demonstrating the importance given by the group to constant, direct contact 
between members and teachers.
The impact of media on ritual and practices, therefore, is not simply as 
an intermediary, but as a mediating force with the power to transform what 
is transmitted and to redefine how religious rituals are presented and con-
sumed. Media-centred ritual performances and practices can project the 
image of a powerful group, boost the image of leaders, and create bonds 
directly between him/her and followers. They can also, however, produce 
negative responses, as the dramatic and spectacular projection of religious 
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rituals and excessive displays of attention- grabbing performances and events 
may negatively convey the image of a highly ambitious leader and of an 
overly materialistic organisation. I will discuss this issue further below, but 
here will just note that this further indicates how media can be a dual-edged 
mechanism, offering both potential for the development and reinforcement 
of a movement’s strengths and a leader’s charisma—and a potential means 
of generating criticism.
BRANDING NARRATIVES: MEDIA AND CONVERSION 
STORIES
A further important aspect in the use of media forms by new religions is 
the creation of testimonies and conversion narratives. The use of narratives 
centred on members’ stories and teaching explanations through daily life 
examples are often found in new religions’ publications, such as magazines, 
comics, videos and websites. These accounts are initially presented at meet-
ings and then eventually published. Many of these testimonies express teach-
ings concretely as being applicable to daily life and describe how difficulties 
can be overcome through faith. The stories are repeated at different meetings, 
from small to large and medium groups, and while repeated they are polished 
into a more coherent corpus that can then be published. According to Shim-
azono (1986; 1993), such conversion stories, despite focusing on indi vidual 
experience s, tend to become “standardized and uniform” (Shimazono 1986, 
161) and as pointed out by Watanabe (2011) create a “model” for members:
[. . .] testimonia ls which have been told repeatedly become internalized by 
the persons in question as their conversion stories based on the religion’s 
system of beliefs, while additionally they serve as essential factors in offer-
ing conversion models for other members including ways of attributing 
meaning to certain situations and strategies of coping with them.
(Watanabe 2011, 78)
Kawakami (2008) explores how World Mate, Kōfuku no Kaga ku and Agon-
shū deve loped the conversion tales found in their magazines and shows that 
there is a uniformity of style within each religious group. He also points out 
how verbal and written accounts may differ, with stories being written to 
shape how members think about their conversion and to attract potential new 
members. Media narratives and meeting performances therefore construct a 
narrative of testimonies and a “model” of conversion that becomes the “blue-
print for members to interpret their own life experiences” (McLaughlin 2009, 
139) and allows members to identify their individual goal s with those of the 
organisation. The publications become what McLaughlin calls “a participa-
tory canon”, in which standards of conduct and moral values are explained 
and members can become exemplary models themselves.
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One of the media forms that has been used to convey testimonial and con-
version narratives is manga, or comics. In manga, visual and written texts are 
combined together to create “multimodal texts” (Orcutt 2010, 94) in which 
the reader is required to “fill in” the gaps and details, such as, for exam-
ple, the sounds and dialogue between characters or the temporal succession 
between sequential panels. Manga narratives create a multi-sensorial expe-
rience through the use of rhetorical figures, onomatopoeia and cinematic 
techniques (such as close ups). An important aspect of the iconic power 
of manga is its being a participatory media (Orcutt 2010, 98) that creates 
immersive narratives. The reader is deeply i nvolved in the narratives and 
identifies with the characters and their imaginary words. These characteris-
tics of manga seem suitable, according to Orcutt, for the type of narratives 
familiar in religious traditions, narratives aiming to explain teachings or to 
offer exemplary role models and provide moral guidance (Orcutt 2010, 98).
The manga series Manga de Miru Kōfuku no Kagaku (“Kōfuku no Kagaku 
in Manga”), which includes four volumes, was initially published between 
1992 and 1994, and it is an example of the presentation of conversion tales 
in manga.
The first volume (Tengoku no Mon, “The Gate of Heaven”), published 
in 1992, presents an introduction to Ōkawa Ryūhō’s teachings. It includes 
four chapters drawn by four authors with a prologue, and intervals illus-
trated by a fifth author.23 Each chapter focuses on one of the Principles of 
Happiness (Kōfuku no Genri) constituting Kōfuku no Kagaku’s yonshōdō 
(Fourfold Path, see Chapter Four in this volume): ai (love), chi (wisdom), 
hansei (self-reflection) and hatten (progress).
The first page shows an image of an imposing door marked by the group’s 
logo (which was created in the early 1990s) and illuminated by a radiat-
ing light. The door slowly opens on the second page and a man appears 
and welcomes the visitor-reader to the “gate of heaven”. The man (who, 
as we will discover at the end of the volume, is an angel in disguise) makes 
immediately explicit his role as a narrator. The choice of having an internal 
narrator who comments on the events described is unusual in comics, but 
in this case, it is used to engage the reader and to enhance his/her emotional 
response and identification with the manga’s main characters. The omni-
scient narrator, indeed, does not simply report the stories, but he addresses 
the reader directly, looking at him/her as if he was looking at a camera. The 
narrator asks questions to the reader and “listens” to his/her answers. He 
shows interest and wants to grab the reader’s attention. The narrator creates 
a sort of conversation with the audience and graphically, this is illustrated 
by using close ups that position him face-to-face with the reader-viewer. The 
task of the narrator is to guide the reader through the episodes and to show 
him/her the right path to achieve happiness. The intervals between chapters 
are used to explain the doctrinal points and also, to suggest further read-
ings. In so doing, they become a sort of “advertising break” that interrupts 
the narration to promote other books published by the group. The frequent 
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repetition of the group’s logo and name together with the advertising of 
other publications confirms the importance given to reading and distribut-
ing printed material by Kōfuku no Kagaku, for which publishing represents 
a major source of revenue.
Each episode presents a story with different characters (a young female 
student, a young boy and a young adult) and contexts (this or “other” worlds), 
but the chapters follow similar themes and narrative developments. First of 
all, the protagonist is always represented together with a spiritual guide: an 
angel, a teacher or shugorei, a “guardian spirit” (except for the last episode, 
where the young woman herself becomes a guide for her co-workers). The 
role of the guide, who mirrors the relationship between the narrator and 
the reader, is to help the protagonist to discover Ōkawa’s teachings and to 
reflect on his/her actions and lifestyle. Thanks to the help of the guide, the 
central character achieves a sort of “spiritual awakening”, and he/she will 
understand the validity of the leader’s teachings and will join the group. 
Only in the third chapter does the main character, a young man, refuse to 
admit his mistakes and is damned. The main character in this chapter is the 
only one who is clearly identifiable with one of the journalists who wrote 
critical articles of Ōkawa in the magazine Friday (a topic that I will discuss 
extensively in Chapter Four).
The story stresses the unique, dramatic inner change of the individuals. 
The focus is on the occurrence of a new, remarkable event through which the 
character should reflect back and interpret his/her past and previous actions. 
After joining the group, the protagonist is rewarded with happiness that 
is expressed through “worldly benefit”, such as success in the workplace, 
improvement in personal relationships and economic success (the idea that 
economic wealth corresponds to a higher spiritual achievement is a common 
theme in Kōfuku no Kagaku, Astley 1995; Baffelli 2005).
One can find a similar story pattern, based on an enc ounter with a spir-
itual guide, the development of a dramatic event followed by a personal 
crisis and, finally, a conversion, in other manga published by new religions. 
For example, in an earlier manga published by Sōka Gakkai, Michore!Taiyō 
(“Look! The Sun!), which was published in two volumes and illustrated by 
the mangaka Ishii Isami (born 1941) in 1972–73, the young male protago-
nist, after the first co nversion in volume one, encounters a faith crisis, leaves 
the group, falls again into unpleasant situation and, finally, understands that 
he has to return to the group to achieve happiness and/or success. Similarly, 
Aum Shinrikyō’s manga feature stories about the experiences of young peo-
ple joining the group and, as with Kōfuku no Kagaku, manga were used to 
advertise other materials and goods distributed by the group (Schodt 1996, 
231). The three-volume series Spirit Jump, for example, uses different  styles 
to narrate the history of members who became disillusioned with their lives, 
joined the group and found happiness through Aum’s practice.
The narratives in these manga rely on easy comprehensible schema and 
reader’s identification with the stories’ characters (MacWilliams 2000, 10). 
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Although the use of different authors with different styles see ms to suggest 
an attempt to reach different audience groups, the characters in Tengoku no 
mon (and in the other manga mentioned above) are mainly young employ-
ees or students, and their problems concern daily life events (relationships 
with friends or colleagues, workplace-related stress, low-self esteem). The 
application of the teachings to daily life encourages the reader’s identifica-
tion, because he/she is probably familiar with the situation narrated in the 
stories (at the end of Tengoku no mon, the narrator explicitly ask the reader 
to choose one of the stories in order to understand “the nature of their own 
soul”). Therefore, the characters’ adventures and worries are recognisable 
to the reader, who can easily imagine being there. Each character embodies 
a set of values that have to coincide with the values of the group and its 
leader; otherwise the protagonist will have to face punishment, unhappiness 
and damnation (such as, for example, the character in the third episode of 
Tengoku no mon, who refuses to recognise his mistakes and bad actions).
This is only one example of how media texts can be used to present 
selected and polished conversion narratives in order to both create a model 
for members and to brand the image of the group for potential new mem-
bers. In 2006–2007, I conducted research on conversion stories in a small 
new religion based in Tokyo. I attended the group’s meetings in which con-
version tales were told and then asked members if they could write down 
their stories and then, if possible, I interviewed them. Around 50 members 
answered my questionnaire; 12 accepted a formal interview (that took 
around 3 hours each), while many others wanted to talk to me informally, 
during group meetings or while walking in a park in the neighbourhood. 
Finally, the office staff gave me copies of a group magazine where testi-
monies about members’ first encounters with the group were published. 
The comparison between different narratives confirmed what other studies 
have pointed out, that is, “conversion stories” appear to be quite different 
depending on context. In particular, testimonies in the magazine, as well 
as written testimonies, appeared very similar and standardised. Almost all 
members wrote about health problems and the healing benefits received 
through the group’s teachings and practices. The narratives in these stories 
follow a similar pattern to the manga discussed above: physical sufferance–
encounter with the group–happiness. During group meetings, the audience 
(other members) participates as “authors” and “critics” in constructing the 
story itself, adding particulars and anecdotes or asking questions. However, 
in one-to-one interviews, members’ accounts became individualised and per-
sonal. One of the members I interviewed, who was also employed by the 
group, realised that the story she was telling me was quite different from her 
testimony in the magazine (which had a strong focus on health issues and the 
benefits of the practice). She admitted that she wasn’t lying, but that she had 
adapted her story to the medium, creating a narrative of teaching applied to 
daily life that could be used as a model by other members. She was, indeed, 
branding her group as a “healing-focused group”.
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IMPORTANCE OF THE NEW: REPACKAGING AND 
REGENERATION
Fig. 2.1 Agonshū Star Festival, 1986/1987. Photo courtesy of Ian Reader. From the 
Photo Archives of the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture, Nagoya, Japan.
As previously discussed, a central issue for the development of new religions 
is the emphasis on visibility. A new group needs to be visible not only to 
potentially access a wider audience and to reinforce its proselytism activities, 
but also to corroborate to members that the leader’s message and visions are 
relevant and that they receive attention from a wider audience. Therefore, 
the public relations department is an important part of these institutions. 
To use terminology related to the field of advertising, the emphasis is not 
only on visibility for the new message and leader, but also on the ability to 
“brand” this newness.
The concept of shinhatsubai (literally: newly on sale) is often used in 
Japan as an advertising slogan for the latest and newest products.24 How-
ever, “new” does not necessarily mean a new product, but can also signify 
that some new flavours, packaging or functions have been added to an 
already existing product. The new product is not necessary entirely differ-
ent from the previous one, but it is innovated and presented as new and 
updated. In doing this, it offers a way to increase and sustain consumer 
interest. The notion of shinhatsubai can be used as a descriptive term for 
Japanese new religions’ constant image changes and attempts to be attrac-
tive. Often, new religions present themselves as offering a “modern” flavour 
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to already existing practices and doctrines, not so much rejecting the exist-
ing ones as offering an added and innovative element to them while claim-
ing a new mission. Agonshū, for example, draws on the goma (fire) rituals 
of the traditional mountain religious tradition of Shugendō (Fig. 2.1), but 
adds new elements to them such as electronic devices and satellite broad-
casting, while also claiming that its form of Buddhism is the “true” and 
“original” Buddhism (Chapter Three). Kōfuku no Kagaku’s advertising cam-
paigns announce that the “Eternal Buddha” is here to bring back a remote 
golden era from the past. The leader’s books are also reprinted in differ-
ent editions, according to changes in doctrine (Chapter Four), adding some 
new “flavours” to already existing teachings and doctrines. Jōyū Fumihiro, 
ex-spokesperson of Aum Shinrikyō and current leader of Hikari no Wa is, 
along with the members of his group, attempting to survive the trauma that 
Aum experienced by strongly rejecting the previous leader, Asahara, and 
Aum’s leader-centred group (see Chapter Five in this volume; Baffelli 2012). 
Through a balancing act in which it retains some of Aum’s teachings while 
discontinui ng some of its most problematic practices, such as prophecies and 
apocalyptic teaching, Hikari no Wa is attempting to rebrand the group to 
make it acceptable and original.
The sense of movement and process of transformation (Watts 1998, 
197) intrinsic in the term shinhatsubai fits the idea of religion as movement 
(Tweed 2006) and the dynamism of new religions, which are constantly 
reinventing themselves to be up to date and in order to maintain a process 
of regeneration so as to make the group continue to appear dynamic rather 
than mired in the past—a criticism often levelled at established Buddhism 
in Japan, for example.25 Especially at the early stage of their formation, new 
religions are often pioneers in their approach to media technology and inno-
vative in their image creation. Several image and media strategies may be 
implemented and the less popular abandoned (similarly, less popular prod-
ucts will disappear from the market shortly after they are launched). Finally, 
the marketing dynamics related to shinhatsubai highlight the importance 
of consumers in making a product successful (Watts 1998). Analogously, 
new religions may change and modify their image strategies according to 
the n eeds of members in order to make their messages relevant in changing 
environments and historical contexts.
VISIBILITY AND ITS RISKS
Media forms and mediation practices are important for new religions not 
only for acquiring visibility, but also as source of legitimisation. Undeni-
ably, this aspect is particularly relevant for groups that are still relatively 
unknown to the larger public and cannot rely on established networks and 
lineages like older religious institutions. Mass media reporting, however, can 
lead to criticism, and a group’s fate may depend on its reaction to it. Indeed, 
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the uses of media technology and visibility in media external to the group 
are important and necessary, but visibility involves risks, and the potential 
for religious image improvement described in the previous sections could 
also prove to be a destabilising factor for some groups.26 Several studies have 
focused mainly on the advantages and potential positive effects of media 
for new religions in Japan, such as public visibility and recruitment, but the 
interaction between media and religion spheres is more problematic and 
ambivalent.27 Undeniably, the media has been seen as a factor in the success 
of new religions, and other groups and organisations have tried to copy 
their strategies. New religions themselves have been influencing each other 
in terms of communication and image strategies (see Chapter One in this 
volume). However, it would be too simplistic to claim that the use of media 
itself produces success. For example, as considered in Chapter One, visual 
media supported Oomoto’s rapid expansion in Japan. However, in the case 
of Kōfuku no Kagaku, it is very difficult to determine if the investment in 
animated movies has attracted new adherents to the group or interest in 
its teachings (Thomas 2012, 83). Indeed, employing a famous animation 
studio and using well-known actors as cartoon voic es are not enough to 
create a good film. Furthermore, the focus on moral teachings and doctrinal 
explanations and the role of the narrator (a guide character or an external 
voice that guides the viewer and offers him/her a definite explanation of 
the events) creates a “closed narrative text” (“testo chiuso”, Eco 1962) that 
results in a rather uninteresting and pedantic product, despite its profes-
sional technical execution.
Furthermore, as argued in the Introduction, new religions tend to change 
radically in a short space of time (Astley 2006, 92; Whelan 2007a), especially 
at the early stage of formation, and they may modify their med ia strategies, 
bu t not necessary in a successful way. Also, media strategies may not be able 
to keep up with developing media technologies; as mentioned in Chapter One, 
for example, many new religions have not engaged in new media yet and, as 
will be discussed in Chapter Three, Agonshū’s pioneering approach to media 
in the 1980s and the success obtained by it has somehow became an obstacle 
to the development of new media strategies. Finally, other groups have been 
able to expand without necessarily relying on media so extensively. Numata 
(1988, 56–86) and Reader (1991, 218–219), for example, have noted that 
Shinnyoen grew mainly throug h personal contacts withou t much advertising, 
compared to Agonshū. Therefore, the dynamic of membership growth or stag-
nation in new religions can only be partially ascribed to media use.
New religions need to be legitimised by their presence in the public sphere, 
but at the same time, they can also very easily delegitimised. A key issue is 
the control of inputs and outputs.28 When using its own media, a group 
has complete control of how to present itself and how to express itself in 
the media. Internal media are used for proselytism, but they are often very 
didactic-oriented products with limited circulation, as they tend to be ignored 
by general audiences. As a consequence, it is vital for groups to possess their 
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own technology to achieve visibility. When employing external companies 
or media outlets for advertising or other promotional activities, religious 
groups have a certain degree of control over the final product; neverthe-
less, as discussed in Chapter Four, negotiations with media outlets, such as 
newspapers, for example, may be necessary regarding guidelines about what 
types of images and language are acceptable. The group, however, does not 
have any control over journalists, media specialists, opponents and, more 
recently, online users, or on how they comment and report on the group. In 
all these contexts, neither the media industries nor the religious groups have 
full control over the effects of their activities, namely how the images and 
themes portrayed through media forms are received, appropriated and/or 
rejected by viewers/users. This is an issue that will be discussed further in the 
Conclusions, where I examine how materials produced for internal use and 
by internal media can be reappropriated and transformed by users.
As a consequence, new religions could use media forms for advertising 
campaigns or to promote their activities, but they also could face a back-
lash through other media. While new religions can control their own media 
forms and use them to generate support, they are at the same time vulnerable 
to negative images that are beyond their control, such as critical or defama-
tory reporting from mass media outlets such as newspapers and magazines, 
journalists and, increasingly, from online sources. This is an issue I raised in 
Chapter One and it remains a crucial issue in how new religions function 
and operate. The intense use of mass media and marketing by new religions 
has been a controversial topic. On the one hand, stories about members 
being asked to donate large sum of money or about wealthy religious lead-
ers are recurrent topics in reporting about these groups. Prurient stories 
about religious leaders or scandals related to new religions can potentially 
increase media circulation (Dorman 2012a) and rivalry between groups 
has been fueled by media accounts (Baffelli and Reader 2011). Testi monies 
from ex-members are often reported in weekly magazines or published as 
books to cr iticise the group practices or to denounce allegedly suspicious 
practices in propagation strategies. For example, an ex-member of Agonshū 
published a book on the group claiming that members would go to book-
stores to buy several books by the leader to show that the books are popular 
and can potentially sell a lot of copies (Hirono 1992, 28). Furthermore, the 
above-mentioned spectacular events, while enhancing prestige and visibili ty, 
could also have negative effects in the wider context. Sōka Gakkai mass 
performances, for example, with their staged presentations of thousands of 
disciples in unison, were seen by some viewers as similar to military parades 
and even provoked images of fear, as in the very negative description of a 
Sōka Gakkai event by McFarland:
Almost frightened by the possible implications of these manifestations 
of mass energy and blind obedience. For one who remembers the World 
War II period, such a spectacle had a haunting effect. His [sic] mind 
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flashes back to newsreel dips of Nazi youth rallies and other similar 
vignettes of the totalitarism that once nearly destroyed civilization. Is 
the similarity here more circumstantial? Is this fascism reborn?
(1967, 195)
In this context, a key issue is how religious groups respond to criticism 
and hostility. Some movements have adopted a strategy of not replying to 
media criticism or of not reacting in a hostile way, while others have openly 
contested them. For some groups, a direct confrontation with the media 
resulted in loss of credibility and, in the case of Renmonkyō discussed in 
Chapter One, the group did not survive the backslash. Different responses 
resulted in significantly different outcomes for the group, impacting on its 
image and survival. Dorman’s work Celebrity Gods: New Religions, Media, 
and Authority in Occupied Japan, for example, investigates how two Japa-
nese new religions, Tenshō Kōtai Jingūkyō29 and Jiu,30 reacted to substantial 
press attention and harsh criticism from the print media. Dorman’s study 
shows how the two groups’ reactions had a significant different impact on 
the groups’ future. Kitamura, the leader of Tenshō Kōtai Jingūkyō, attempted 
to turn media harsh criticism to her advantage, and the group managed to 
grow. By contrast, in the case of Jiu, the negative press, combined with police 
intervention and the arrest of key members, resulted in high-profile members 
leaving the group and Jiu disappearing from the public eye.
A different attitude was showed by the Buddhist group Risshō Kōseikai, 
which in the 1950s was the object of a series of critical articles published 
by the newspaper Yomiuri Shinbun. Critical accounts about discontented 
ex-members had already appeared on public television in 1952 (Morioka 
1994) and in 1956, the newspaper launched its derogatory campaign that 
led to the so-called Yomiuri Affair (Yomiuri jike n). The group’s reaction was 
restrained and no legal action was launched against the newspaper. Accord-
ing to Morioka’s analysis (1994), Risshō Kōseikai was able to use the affair 
as an opportunity to restructure its doctri nes and organisational structure, 
thereby providing the basis for the development of a larger movement, while 
the newspaper suffered a drop in circulation as many Risshō Kōseikai mem-
bers discontinued their subscriptions.
Sōka Gakkai has been possibly the most criticised organisation in the Jap-
anese press. In the postwar period, its rapid growth, members’ commitments 
and fervent proselytism activities attracted public attention and concern. 
In 1969–1970, the group was accused of attempting to stop the publica-
tion of a critical book, Sōka Gakkai o kiru (“I Denounce Sōka Gakkai”), 
by Fujiwara Hirotatsu. This event, which is known as the Obstruction of 
Press Freedom Incident (Genron Shuppan Bōgai Jiken) generated a series 
of unfavourable reports in weekly tabloids and the formation of a genre 
that McLaughlin has defined as “anti-Sōka Gakkai journalism” (2009, 97), 
that is, frequent attacks by the press (in particular, weekly magazines and 
tabloids, more rarely, newspapers) on the group, including salacious stories 
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and scandals involving the leader, gossip about members who are part of 
the celebrity business and conjectures related to the role of Kōmeitō,31 the 
political party previously affiliated with Sōka Gakkai.
When responding to media vilification, some groups have embarked on 
moralising campaigns about the role of media in modern society, and accused 
the mass media of being evil and corrupt. In this way, some movements seem 
to take a very incoherent attitude toward media, seeing them as necessary 
and proper when used to support the group’s agenda, but at the same time 
as corrupted and wrongful when criticising groups’ teachings and practices. 
Kōfuku no Kagaku, for example, as will be extensively discussed in Chapter 
Four, attacked external media through its own publications (for example, a 
chapter of Ōkawa’s book, Arā no daikeikoku, “Allah’s Great Warning”, is 
entitled “The Crimes of Mass Media”, Masukomi no hanzai, Ōkawa 1991) 
while at the same time claiming that religion should use technology when 
it is useful for its own purposes  (Ōkawa 2001). In the 1990s, Kōfuku no 
Kagaku reacted to media criticism in a confrontational way, attacking a pub-
lisher’s offices and promoting a moralising campaign against the mass media 
(see Chapter Four in this volume) and this allowed the group to limit, albeit 
not completely, the damage caused by the criticism it faced. Similarly, Aum 
Shinrikyō responded to condemnatory accounts published by the weekly 
magazine Sunday Mainichi in 1989 by filing lawsuits against the magazine 
(Reader 2000a, 148). In the early 1990s, however, Aum often replied to 
criticisms by promoting its image through the mass media and increasing 
its presence on television talk shows and in public events (Reader 2000a, 
173–175),32 therefore using criticism as a chance for self-promotion, while 
at the same time attacking33 and ridiculing journalists, magazines and news-
papers that criticised the group and its leader.
As the case studies discussed in the following chapters will show, new 
religions have also attempted to limit the risks by controlling access to the 
media. For example, although magazines and books published by new reli-
gions can generally be bought by non-members, access to videos and DVDs 
is often more restricted. In the case of “news videos”, for example, or in 
case of Agonshū’s videos about rituals, they could only be seen at the move-
ment’s centres or in a controlled environment (that is, with a representative 
from the group present).34 The issue of control is becoming more pressing 
and more challenging with the rise and continuing expansion of the Inter-
net. In particular, social media makes it more difficult for groups to control 
even their own media, as members can have access to the platform and 
can take the initiative in presenting the group online.35 Even in the case of 
Hikari no Wa, which uses the Internet as its main platform for presenting 
videos and other material, the access to material is controlled. As discussed 
in other publications (Baffelli 2011 and 2012), for example, a section for 
members only has been created on its official website and comments on v id-
eos are not allo wed in video sharing websites such as YouTube. Therefore, 
as these examples illustrate, in order to use media effectively, new religions 
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are required to invest in sophisticated image strategies that could also coun-
terbalance the potential risks.
The themes described in this chapter illustrate the dual-edged sword rep-
resented by media engagement and mediation practices. Indeed, control of 
media technologies and mass-media visibility legitimate and validate new 
religions, offering opportunities to proselytise widely and increase interest, 
to develop and to brand the image of the leader, to draw large numbers of 
people to be part of their events and also to enable them to participate in 
mass ceremonies in an intimate way. At the same time, however, overexpo-
sure in the mass media and excessive ostentations of opulence may have a 
destabilising effect on new religions by providing an avenue for criticism and 
hostility (such as derogatory reporting, scandals and mass-media defama-
tory campaigns) and enabling people outside the movement to scrutinise and 
criticise the movement’s teachings and practices that may be perceived as 
unusual and against social norms. As a consequence, new religions’ attitudes 
towards media industries and media technologies tend to be ambivalent; 
media are useful and powerful devices for enabling new religions to enter 
public discourse and be taken seriously, but at the same time, movements 
need to protect themselves and their leaders from outside scrutiny in order 
to preserve their cohesion and their legitimacy.
NOTES
 1. For a detailed history of Seikyō Shinbun, see  McLaughlin 2009.
 2. This aspect is clearly illustrated in Mori’s documentary A, in which Araki, 
Aum’s new spokesperson, and other members are overwhelmed by requests 
from the press and TV programmes and, at the same time, their explanations 
about the events seem contradictory and confused.
 3. In another advertising text published in the magazine Shūkan Sunday (July 9, 
1987, 232–233) Agonshū’s use of new media, in a particular satellite broad-
casting, is emphasised.
 4. On various occasions during visits to their centres in 2005–2006, I was shown 
a video narrating the history of the group via the implementation of different 
media. In October 2006, I accompanied a group of undergraduate students on 
a visit to the branch in the city of Tokushima (Shikoku Island) and the video 
was shown at the beginning of the meeting, preceding a brief explanation 
about the movement’s main doctrinal aspects. Interestingly, the group’s suc-
cessful engagement with media practices was considered more relevant than 
its doctrines when presenting itself to the general public.
 5. On shinsōkan, see  Staemmler 2011, 158–59.
 6. Offner and Van Straelen also describe the use of media-related metaphors in 
Seichō no Ie: “Frequently in Seichō no Ie writing the phenomenal world is 
described as the images cast upon the screen when a film, blocking the perfect 
flow of light, is placed in a projector. As the film is changed, so the images 
cast upon the screen of life change accordingly. By a recognition of the true 
nature of reality, the film is changed and the light of the real world disperses 
the shadows of the world of illusion” (1963, 128).
 7. According to  Whelan (2007a), the metaphor is no longer used in the GLA.
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 8. Several works have discussed the role of charismatic leadership or focused 
on specific new religions’ founders in the Japanese context. Just to name a 
few, B affelli (2005); C hilson (2014); K awamura (1981); M cLaughlin (2009); 
Numata (1987 and 1 988); Ooms (1993); R eader (1991); S hūkyō Shakaigaku 
Kenkyūkai (1987); S taemmler and Dehn (2011); S talker (2008). Charismatic 
leadership has also been discussed in many works on new religious movements 
in other contexts. For example, for a discussion on the redefinition of charisma 
in China, see the Special Issue of Nova Religio 12, 2 (2008), edited by Vincent 
Goosaert and David Ownby and including articles by Julia Huang, Ji Zhe, 
David Palmer and Stephan Feuchtwang. See also P almer (2007). For a general 
overview of charismatic leadership in new religious movements, see W essinger 
(2012).
 9. This issue is one that requires a separate discussion and is beyond the scope 
of the book, but various new religions have had problems with dealing with 
the transition from an initial leader to later leaders (see, for example,  Whelan 
2007a on the transition of leadership in the GLA).
 10. Interview with a representative of Sōka Gakkai Academic Affairs Division, 
May 2012.
 11. In his PhD dissertation, McLaughlin reports several occasions in which mem-
bers gathered together to watch satellite broadcasts.
 12. McLaughlin reports a member’s declaration that broadcasts are “when Ikeda’s 
sincerity (shinkensa) is transmitted” (Mc Laughlin 2009, 305).
 13. Other videos are used for big events and educational purposes (DVDs, for 
example, are used to support group discussions), and they are usually in lec-
ture style. Short lectures are also available on the website and are designed to 
support seminars and lectures and to help the local leaders in preparing the 
monthly meeting. Interestingly, since Ikeda stopped attending the representa-
tive meeting in 2010, the group has been introducing more TV-style techniques 
(including music performances and dances) in the broadcasts to replace some 
of the speeches in order to increase the entertainment aspects now that the 
main attraction of the videos (that is, Ikeda himself) is absent.
 14. According to the group’s’ representative (personal communication May 2012), 
Sōka Gakkai is now considering gradually shifting from broadcasting to the 
Internet because of the high costs associated with the receiving equipment, 
which needs to be replaced every few years, and which are especially onerous 
for smaller centres.
 15. For example, videos of the founder Itō Shinjō (1906–1984) and his wife 
Tomoji (1912–1967) were used in Shinnyoen ceremonies. Thank you to Mon-
ika Schrimpf for this observation.
 16. In a book chapter on religious fundamentalism, Davis describes the Grand 
Festival of a new religion in Tokyo. The group is called by the pseudonym 
“Church of Health and Happiness” and the account of the grandiose event 
(expectant members, grandiose music, solemn entrance of the leader, presenta-
tion of testimonies, touched and thrilled members, pompous leader and so on) 
recall similar reporting of new religions’ events from the postwar period to the 
1990s (1991,782–83).
 17. See also  Inoue et al. (1994).
 18. See, for example, the catalogues with collections of festival images accompa-
 nied by explanations of the dances and of the various stages of the ceremony 
’67 Tōkyō Bunkasai Kiroku Iinkai ed. (1982); K ita Heiwa Bunkasai Shashin-
shū Hensan Iinkai ed. (1985). In addition, see the videos recorded during the 
festivals, such as Heiwa no Michi, Bunka no Michi, Sekai no Michi (1990), a 
video of the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the foundation of the Gak-
kai held on November 18, 1990 at the Yokohama Arena in Yokohama.
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 19. Mass performances organised by the group were also performed around the 
world. In 1994, for example, the spectacle Ali was held at the Teatro Lir-
ico in Milan, and volunteer artists from throughout Italy participated in the 
production.
 20. Some of the main events of the group are the Hoshi Matsuri, which is held 
in Yamashina, in the Kyōto area, on February 11th, and a fire rite, known as 
Tsuitachi Goma, which takes place at the Tōkyō branch on the first day of 
every month.
 21. The event was reported in similar terms in several magazine articles. See, for 
example,  Arita (1991);  Egawa (1991a) Friday 30, July 26, 1991; Friday 31, 
August 2, 1991.
 22. For a detailed account on “spiritual dialogues”, see  Whelan 2007a, 133.
 23. The authors are Saito Eiichi (prologue and intervals), Isobe Mamoru (chap-
ter 1), Nanbara Ban (chapter 2), Kikuike Toshiwo (chapter 3) and Ōishi 
Nozomi (chapter 4).
 24.  Kornicki (1994, 183) indicates that the concept was used as part of advertis-
ing rhetoric for the book trade well before the Meiji Restoration. A search on 
Kikuzo II Visual, a database of the Asahi newspaper, showed that the term was 
used in the Meiji period in advertising (see, for example, Asahi Shinbun March 
13, 1880, Osaka edition).
 25. For recent works on Buddhism in contemporary Japan and its perception, see 
 Covell (2005);  Reader (2011); Rowe (2011).
 26. It also worth mentioning that being involved in communication strategies for 
new religions may involve risks for companies as well. In the 1980s, for exam-
ple, Dentsū was initially reluctant to work with Agonshū. Also, as discussed in 
Chapter One, alternative voices, such as Mori’s documentaries, in presenting 
new religions may face social ostracism.
 27. Some studies have indeed indicated some ambivalence in the relationship 
between media and new religions in Japan. See, for example, Baffelli, Reader 
and  Staemmler (2011);  Dorman (2005a;  2012a);  Dorman and Reader (2007); 
 Reader (2000).
 28. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for his/her input on this discussion.
 29. See note 36 in Chapter One.
 30. Jiu was a small new religion founded in the early 1940s by Jikōson (born 
Nagaoka Nagako, 1903–1984). See D orman 2012a.
 31. For an up-to-date work on Kōmeitō, see  Ehrhardt et al. (2014). On religions 
and politics in postwar Japan, see also  Nakano (2003);  Tsukada (2015).
 32. For detailed data on the media used by Aum and reporting about the group, 
see  Inoue and RIRC eds. (2012).
 33. Aum members also attempted to murder Egawa Shōko, the journalist who 
published several critical articles about the group ( Egawa 1991a).
 34. For example, it was reported to me that permission to show an video by one 
of the religious organizations mentioned in this chapter during a lecture in a 
university in Europe was granted on the condition of a representative of the 
group being present at the screening.
 35. In several interviews with Kōfuku no Kagakus representatives it was reiterated 
that access to some videos was restricted (members can only watch them at the 
centres). Kōfuku no Kagaku tended to have a centralised approach to media 
produced by the group, but recently it has allowed some individual initia-
tives. In 2008, for example the head minister at the Happy Science Centre in 
Auckland established a radio programme in English streamed online (Happy 
Science on Air, now discontinued), and in 2014, an independent radio pro-
gramme by Kōfuku no Kagaku members started on a radio station in Miyazaki 
(personal communication with representative at Miyazaki branch, July 2014).
Mediating (Buddhist) Rituals
Agonshū’s Satellite Broadcasting
Agonshū, a group that developed in the late 1970s from a previous organi-
sation founded in the 1950s, gained public and media attention in the 1980s 
and early 1990s due to its aggressive use of media and for its widely adver-
tised public event, the Hoshi Matsuri (Star Festival) (I wasa 1993, 130).
As was discussed in Chapter One, the intensive use of mass media to 
advertise teachings and events was nothing new for Japanese new reli-
gions. Furthermore, during the same period, other Buddhist groups were 
experimenting with the introduction of new technologies into traditional 
rituals in order to create attractive and spectacular events (see the exam-
ples described in R eader 1994, 40). For example, O ohashi (1988) discusses 
a series of experiments carried out during Expo’85 by a team of research-
ers at Tsukuba University related to a digital system, INS, developed by 
NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, Japan’s largest tele-
communications company), which featured an optical fibre network with 
a satellite system. One of the organisations that participated in the exper-
iments was the Kongōbuji Temple, head temple of the esoteric Shingon 
Buddhist sect. On June 8 and 9, 1985, an esoteric ritual was performed at 
the temple in Kōyasan (Wakayama Prefecture) and transmitted to a hall in 
Tsukuba, near Tokyo. The priest explained the ritual to the audience and 
the script of the mantra to be chanted was sent by facsimile to the partic-
ipants (Ooh ashi 1988, 96). According to Oohashi’s account, the viewers 
became progressively involved in the rituals and started participating in it 
from a distance:
As the programme proceeded, the audience was able to follow the ritual 
at Koyasan on the screen. The spectators could also look at the script 
of the tantric chant which was being transmitted by facsimile. Some of 
them were involved in the chanting, and, incredible as it may sound, most 
of the spectators inside the hall finally joined in the incantation. [. . .] 
Gradually, the entire hall was transformed into a meditation space con-
nected on-line with Koyasan. The audience prayed and chanted, and 
their voices filled the hall with a resounding chorus [. . .].
(Oohashi 1988, 96)
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Agonshū, one of the first organisations to use satellite broadcasts and con-
sidered one of the most technology-conscious religious groups in Japan 
(Read er 1991, 218), understood the possibility offered by new technologies 
to enhance viewers’ experience of a religious ritual. Its use of media tech-
nologies and visual culture, from large advertising campaigns to spectacular 
rituals transmitted via satellite broadcasting, has been pioneering and has 
influenced other groups’ use of media (for example, Kōfuku no Kagaku, 
discussed in Chapter Four in this volume).
Agonshū not only has used media to construct its public image and to 
spread its teaching, but it has also been innovative in developing business 
relationships with communication and marketing agencies, employing, for 
example, external experts on advertising and image management. As I will 
discuss later in this chapter, the promotion of religious practices through 
mass media (books, videos, billboards, radio and so on) together with the 
ability to package traditional practices, such as esoteric Buddhist fire rituals 
or Shugendō training, in modern garb—transforming the rites into “saleable, 
consumable products” (Grimes  2006, 15) that can be “experienced” through 
the screen and repeated infinitely via DVDs—are the keys to understanding 
Agonshū’s success in the 1980s. Furthermore, this analysis shows how medi-
ation practices can create new forms of religious practice or affect existing 
ones, and how the technology was used not only to create spectacular ritual 
events, but also to engage members in the ritual from a distance, allowing 
them to recreate the community dimension of the ritual through the screen.
My descriptions of the rituals in these chapters are based on attendance at 
the Hoshi Matsuri in February 2006 at Agonshū’s main temple in Kyoto and 
regular attendance at events at its main centre in Tokyo: First of the Month 
Fire Rite (Tsuitachi engi hōshō goma, attended regularly at the Tokyo centre 
between December 2005 and June 2006 and in February 2007) and the 
Ritual for the Liberation of the Spirit of Ancestors (meitokusai, May 2006, 
June 2006, January 2007, May 2012, all at the centre in Tokyo). In addition, 
I attended the transmission of the goma rite performed by Kiriyama, Agon-
shū’s leader, in Auschwitz (Poland) on June 13, 2006, and the New Year’s 
Sacred Fire Ceremony (Hatsugoma, January 2009, January 2014), both at 
the Agonshū centre in Tokyo, and followed Agonshū’s One Peace Live Aura 
Festival that was streamed live on the Internet on November 7, 2010. In 
July and August 2014, I attended the Mandō senzo kuyō, the annual lantern 
memorial ceremony for the ancestors, in Tokyo and the First of the Month 
Fire Rite transmitted via satellite at the Miyazaki centre in Miyazaki city. In 
addition, I have interviewed members attending the rituals at the Tokyo cen-
tre, a former public relation representative who was in charge of Agonshū’s 
public image, advertising and media in the early 1980s and representatives 
of the Tokyo headquarters.
The focus of this chapter is on the use of satellite broadcasting by Agon-
shū, but before introducing the different ways in which Agonshū transmits 
rituals, a brief overview of the group and its teachings is necessary.
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KIRIYAMA SEIYŪ AND THE “ORIGINAL BUDDHISM”
As with other new religions, Agonshū focuses on a charismatic leader and 
its cosmology, drawing mainly from esoteric Buddhism and Shugendō,1 and 
is based on what Reader and Tan abe (1998) have defined the “common 
religion of Japan”, that is the pursuit of genze riyaku (practical benefits). 
Kiriyama Seiyū, the founder of Agonshū, was born in 1921 as Tsutsumi 
Masao. His life before becoming a religious leader was marked by a child-
hood of poverty and several business failures, culminating in a sentence of 
six months in prison for tax offences in 1953. According to Kiriyama’s own 
account, his religious search began when he read, after a suicide attempt, 
a copy of a text (the Kannonkyō) in praise of the bodhisattva Kannon and 
started believing that he had been saved by Kannon. In 1954, Kiriyama 
founded a group called Kannon Jikeikai (Kannon worshipping movement) 
and in 1955, he obtained a lay ordination in the esoteric Buddhist school 
Shingon and changed his name:2
By undergoing a long period of ascetic practice, standing under water-
falls, meditating, fasting, reciting Buddhist prayers and making offerings 
to Kannon, he came to realize that he had been surrounded by karmic 
hindrances (specifically, unhappy ancestral figures) that were the root 
cause of his failures. His religious practice served to eradicate these hin-
drances and, at the same time, to build up a small group of followers. In 
1970 Kannon appeared to him in a dream and told him he had eradi-
cated the encumbrances of the past (in Agonshū terminology he had ‘cut 
his karma’—karuma o kiru): henceforth he was no longer a seeker but 
a guide for others and was to go out and help others ‘cut their karma’ 
and find salvation.
(Reader 1991, 209–210 )
In 1971, Kiriyama published his first book, Henshin no genre (“The Prin-
ciples of Transformation”) and became a prolific writer,3 but by 1974, the 
group still only had a limited number of members (500, according to Prohl 
(2004, 463); se e also Bunkachō (1977)). In  1978, Kiriyama changed the 
name of the group to Agonshū and introduced the reading of the Āgama 
sutras (in Japanese, Agonkyō), early pre-Mahayana Buddhist texts. Kiriyama 
claims that Agonshū’s teachings represent the “original Buddhism” (konpon 
bukkyō or genshi bukkyō, Kiriyama 2001, 2); his teachings are based on 
his interpretation of the teaching of the Āgama sutras. Kiriyama used his 
personal life experiences to claim that he had discovered the “hidden truths” 
in the Āgama sutras and that unhappy spirits—who are suffering because 
they weren’t able to achieve liberation after death—are the causes of human 
beings’ problems and misfortunes. Kiriyama asserts that his method can free 
people from the negative influence of “wandering spirits” (reishō) and will 
bring happiness and good fortune; accounts from his personal history are 
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often used in his writings and talks in order to demonstrate the role played 
by malignant ancestral spirits in his misfortune, and his ability to overcome 
difficulties and to became the role model for his method.
Agonshū’s practice focuses on three esoteric methods of training (shugyō): 
jōbutsu hō (the Dharma of attaining Buddhahood), a method to “cut one’s 
karma”, that is, to be freed of the spiritual hindrances that, according to 
Agonshū’s teaching, influence individuals’ well-being, fortune and destiny; 
the Dharma of the Wish-Fulfilling Jewel (nyoi hōju hō), a practice performed 
with the shinsei busshari, a miniature representation of the relic of the Bud-
dha, donated to Agonshū in 1986 by President Jayewardene of Sri Lanka 
and believed to have the power to transform the spirits of the dead and ful-
fil the wishes of the living (Reader 1991, 217), in order “t o gain happiness 
and good fortune” (Agonshū 1989 quoted in Prohl 2004, 463–464); and 
the Buddha’s Dharma (gumo nji sōmei hō), an esoteric doctrine developed 
from kundalini yoga and Taoism that is said to be able to “make a person a 
genius”.4 As with most Japanese new religions, Agonshū does not demand 
absolute adherence from its followers.
Rituals are performed in Agonshū for two main aims: to realise the wishes 
of living people and to liberate the souls of dead ancestors. The event calen-
dar includes major rituals (performed monthly or annually, such as the First 
of the Month Fire Rite held on the first day of each month or the Hoshi Mat-
suri in February) and some occasional events, such as the performance of fire 
rituals overseas. According to Agonshū, the ceremonies performed outside 
Japan are “dedicated to world peace and harmony”,5 and they are usually 
held in places where tragedies and large numbers of death have occurred 
in dramatic circumstances (for example, on October 2009, a Fire Rite cere-
mony was organised in Guadalcanal to commemorate the war dead in the 
South Pacific). These rituals are aimed at pacifying and bringing peace to 
spirits that have not been properly memorialised and therefore are unhappy 
and potentially a source of unease. On other occasions, events are organised 
in major centres to attract attention and position Agonshū as a group con-
nected with other world religions (for example, in September 2008, a Fire 
Rite ceremony was held in Jerusalem on the occasion of the 60th anniversary 
of the founding of Israel).
The number of Agonshū’s members increased exponentially in the 1980s. 
The number of members declared by the group rose from just over 30,000 in 
1980 to over 200,000 in 1984,6 and over the years, new centres were estab-
lished in Taiwan, Brazil, California and the United Kingdom. In an article 
published in the Kyoto Shinbun on October 2, 1993, the rapid increase in 
the number of participants during the Hoshi Matsuri in 1984, according to 
the article, 40,000 more visitors attended the event compared to 1983. This 
was attributed to the group’s media and event strategies, including TV and 
radio advertising and PR events. Although the above figures may have been 
inflated, it is clear that Kiriyama was able to connect to growing numbers 
of followers in the mid-1980s by using his own experiences, introducing 
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mainly worship-related practices with an esoteric flavour that made them 
look exotic, by suggesting that people could access spiritual power and by 
intensifying efforts of media usage and public events.
AGONSHŪ AND THE MEDIA: THE CONSTRUCTION OF A 
RELIGIOUS GROUP’S IMAGE BY A “MEDIA MIX” STRATEGY
Agonshū’s media and image strategies in 1980s were planned by its Public 
Relations Department, focusing on what it is often called in Japanese media 
mikkusu (media mix), that is, the combination of multiple media types for 
the promotion of a product (such as a movie). As with many new religions, 
the first step was to establish a publishing house, called Hirakawa Shuppan. 
Agonshū’s aim, however, was not simply to distribute the leader’s books 
through internal channels—such as selling the books at group centres or 
asking members to distribute them—but also to reach general bookstores 
and to transform them into “showcases for the group”.7 Agonshū also hired 
Dentsū Corporation, the largest advertising company in Japan, to implement 
its image strategy. According to a former PR representative of Agonshū, it 
was quite arduous to persuade Dentsū to work for it, because of the compa-
ny’s concerns with being associated with a religious group,8 but Agonshū’s 
success in getting a large advertising agency to work for it opened the doors 
to future collaborations between advertising agencies and new religions in 
Japan—a path later followed by Kōfuku no Kagaku (see Chapter Four in 
this volume). In the following years, Agonshū also collaborated with various 
professional artists and experts, such as, for example, the manga writer Iida 
Kōichirō for the manga series in three volumes, Mikkyō no nenriki (“Power 
of Esoteric Buddhism”, 1988–89).9
The advertising concept was developed by the creative staff of Dentsū, but 
because of their inexperience with religious organisations, Agonshū’s gen-
eral manager in its Public Relations Department and his staff had a crucial 
role in selecting the texts (both written and visual) and in the design of the 
campaign. The advertising campaign received final approval from Agonshū’s 
leader (Kyoto Shinbun, October 21, 1993).10 The first aim of the advertis-
ing campaign, which was based on market research and modified accord-
ingly, was to make the name of Agonshū clearly visible and recognisable 
to the general public. The mass media campaign had the scope to create 
interest in the group’s activities and events, and eventually to attract poten-
tial new members. The advertising campaign covered major newspapers and 
magazines11—at times, the text occupied more than one entire page—and 
also appeared on posters in train stations. It was centred on the leader’s 
image, his publications and the group’s events, and aimed to promote the idea 
of an up-to-date and technology-savvy religion. For example, in the title of 
one of advertising pages published in the magazine Shūkan Sunday, Agonshū 
defined itself as “the religion of the new media age” (nyūmedia jidai no shūkyō) 
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and announced that it was covering seven big Japanese cities with its satel-
lite broadcasting, while comparing its activities to American televangelists 
(Shūkan Sunday, July 9, 1987, 232). In another advertisement, in English 
that appeared in the Mainichi Daily News on October 15, 1987, Agonshū is 
promoted as “The Original Buddhism for a Modern World”, branding the 
image of a contemporary religion rooted in traditional Buddhism.
Agonshū, like other new religions at an early stage of their formation, 
experimented with different media and communication strategies. The pub-
lishing house distributed the leader’s books, and various magazines were 
also established, such as Āgama in 1979 (now discontinued). Some of the 
publications used initially were lately discontinued, such as the magazine 
Seika (“Sacred Fire”), published between 1976 and 1983 and devoted to 
the Hoshi Matsuri, with pictures and explanations of the ritual. At the same 
time, the group started using television and radio broadcasts, as well as 
shortwave and satellite broadcasting. The organisation didn’t decide on a 
step-by-step strategy. Rather, it worked simultaneously on different media 
projects as circumstances dictated. Agonshū also produced numerous vid-
eos and films that expounded the leader’s messages, and installed video dis-
play systems at all their centres so that any member or visitor could watch 
them. In addition, its media usage was reinforced by the development of PR 
activities, such as religious festivals or events aimed at sponsoring interfaith 
dialogues on world peace (for example, a meeting with the Dalai Lama in 
1984 and with Pope John Paul II in 1985), in order to create what Mat-
suzawa Masahiro, former head of Agonshū’s Public Relations Department 
and former editor-in-chief of Āgama, termed “eventification” (shūkyō no 
ibentoka, Matsuzawa 1985, 73). Therefore, Agonshū consciously imp le-
mented a strategy to promote its image and activities to a larger public, and 
Kiriyama used examples of media-savvy religious groups, such as Ameri-
can televangelists, as a model for his own use of broadcast media (Whelan 
2007a, 404).
Satellite Broadcasting
Agonshū was  not only one of the first religious groups to use satellite 
communications, it was one of the first private organisations of any kind 
to engage in live satellite broadcasting in Japan.12 In the early 1980s, some 
telecommunications companies were introducing satellite communications 
in Japan and contacted Agonshū, amongst other companies and organi-
sations, offering a free trial of the new technology. For Agonshū and its 
Public Relations Department, this sounded an interesting opportunity and 
they decided to accept the proposal. The group waited for an appropriate 
occasion, and the inauguration of the Kantō region centre in April 1987 
was considered the right event for testing the transmission. Agonshū’s 
first broadcast was transmitted on April 8, 1987. The group borrowed 
equipment from the NTT for this purpose and transmitted the broadcast 
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to centres in Kyūshū and Hokkaidō. Afterwards, from May 1987, it was 
decided to perform a fire rite on the first day of each month and to trans-
mit it by satellite. The rite was initially performed in Tokyo and transmit-
ted in Kyoto and later to other centres.13 At that time, the group rented 
half an hour of transmission time and the rite was created to take exactly 
30 minutes (Reader 1991, 226). The tsuitachi goma is a traditional f ire rite 
performed by esoteric Buddhism sects, but in Agonshū’s ritual, the pres-
ence of the media is not only important, it plays a central role. Indeed, the 
ritual was not just supported by and transmitted through the media, but 
was especially modified and recreated to fit the new technology. During the 
last thirty years, Agonshū has developed the use of satellite broadcasting, 
and nowadays, two types of events are usually screened: indoor rituals, 
namely the monthly tsuitachi goma and the meitokusai, a ritual for the 
ancestors, transmitted respectively from Agonshū’s Tokyo and Yamashima 
centres; and outdoor rituals, namely the annual Hoshi Matsuri and some 
occasional goma rites performed by the leader overseas. In these events, 
the use of satellite broadcasting and how viewers interact with it present 
some crucial differences that I will analyse in more detail in the following 
sections.
INDOOR RITUALS ON-SCREEN: CREATING A NATIONWIDE 
VIRTUAL TEMPLE
As mentioned before, two main indoor rituals started to be performed in 
the late 1980s by Agonshū: tsuitachi engi hōshō goma (a fire rite), held on 
the first day of each month at the Tokyo centre, and meitokusai (a rite for the 
ancestors), performed on the 16th of each month at the Yamashina temple 
in Kyoto. Both rituals are transmitted to other Agonshū centres throughout 
Japan, where members assemble in front of large video screens and participate 
in the rite being performed on the other side of the country. The transmis-
sion, which is aired by the Agon New System Network (Agon Nettowāku 
Shin Shisutemu), usually starts before the ceremony with images from out-
side the temple, showing attendees being welcomed by members at the 
entrance. Sometimes, the audience is entertained while waiting with videos 
showing an orchestra playing Agonshū-related songs or advertising for the 
group’s new publications. Then, as a sign that the ceremony will be starting 
shortly, the voice of a presenter welcomes participants who are taking part 
by satellite broadcasting, inviting them to pray and explaining the aims of 
the ritual (in the case of the tsuitachi goma, these are the world peace, good 
fortune and improving the participant’s luck, while the meitokusai focuses 
on praying for ancestors’ souls). The same speaker will say goodbye to the 
participants at the end of the transmission. Both rituals include two parts: 
a fire ritual performed by Kiriyama and a brief speech by the leader himself 
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(but only the first part of his speech, around 10 minutes, is transmitted to 
all centres, although often he talks for longer).14 When I participated in the 
event at the Tokyo centre, the regular monthly audience numbered between 
250 and 400 people. Non-members were clearly identifiable by a “guest” 
nametag, but they were usually in a minority. Three TV sets were installed 
on the first floor, and two big screens and five televisions were placed in the 
main hall on the second floor.
In the transmission of indoor rituals, the camera is placed at the same 
vantage point as a participant attending the rite in person and sitting in the 
best seat in the temple hall. The camera faces an altar or some other focus of 
the ritual, which is often Kiriyama or an Agonshū priest leading a prayer or 
chant. There is no panning, no zooming, no fading to another scene, except 
for a few brief static images of the busshari (sacred relic) after the fire has 
been lit. The camera image is static and unchanging, as if the person viewing 
the ritual through the screen is right there at the same physical location. The 
camera follows, rather than drives, the action.
When I attended the rituals, the members watching the video through 
the screen responded to the leader’s questions and chanted the sutras in 
very much the same way as those attending the live performance. The rit-
ual seemed to be “extended by the media” (Grimes 2002, 220) and “made 
present” (Grime s 2002, 221) through the screen. The members “partici-
pate” in the ritual, ev en though they do so at a distance, and are actively 
involved. Furthermore, even when the ritual is performed live, the screens 
in the hall are turned on and they show how the ritual is being transmitted 
and what the members in the other centres are watching. The framing is the 
same for both the Tokyo and Kyoto centres (the altar with the sacred relic 
is moved from one centre to the other before the ritual), and this creates 
the impression to viewers that the ritual is indeed performed always in the 
same location.
During an interview with a former representative of the Public Relations 
Department, he argued that the synchronism of satellite communications 
created a “sense of unity” and a “feeling of solidarity” between viewers. For 
the members, he added, it is usually difficult to understand what the leader 
is doing during the ritual because he is too distant and the sacred relics are 
often closed in an inner altar and are difficult to see. Via satellite television, 
every member has a good position—that is, the position of the camera—and 
can clearly understand the founder’s speech. Therefore, the camera helps 
viewers to grasp the actions and make all members equal (they are all vir-
tually seating in the best seat inside the temple hall). Furthermore, they can 
participate along with the leader in events in Kyoto or Tokyo without having 
to travel:
Even if the place is distant it is wonderful the feeling of sharing the same 
prayer and the same feelings. In the traditional pilgrimage the sense of 
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unity comes from being in the same place, even if at different time. With 
the satellite communications the reverse is true: being in a different place 
at the same time.15
This idea of connection through the technology is also repeated in the 
advertising material used to promote the broadcasts. For example, the 
above-mentioned advertisement in the Mainichi Daily News in 1987 says, 
“Agon-shu is the first religion in Japan to use satellite broadcastings of ser-
vices to link their believers around the country” (p. 5). Viewers put them-
selves in a position to engage in the screened performance by first ritualising 
their own view. They arrive at the temple before the start of the ritual, receive 
the information material at the entrance, buy the wooden sticks (gomagi) 
on which prayer and requests are made, write their wishes/prayer, enter the 
main hall, get their rosaries ready and wait quietly until the beginning of the 
ritual. The effectiveness of the screened ritual, as described by group’s rep-
resentatives and participants, is enhanced by viewers’ active participation in 
the performance. This modifies the conventional understanding of ritual as 
face-to-face, to include viewers at the group’s centres as participants in the 
broadcasted performances.
In a study on American televangelism, Alexander argues that the poten-
tial of televangelism to promote community is undermined by the medium 
itself, television, which does not permit direct interaction between viewers: 
“Here community is not direct or immediate and spontaneous, as in the 
case of the usual, face-to-face forms of rituals that embody community” 
(Alexander 2007, 205). Similarly, in the case of Agonshū, the message is uni-
directional and there is no interaction between the leader and the viewers 
via the screen. However, viewers gather in the same place to watch the ritual 
and they can continue discussions about it afterwards, share their opinions, 
ask for more information and engage in ritualised activities (for example, 
buying wooden sticks for the rituals, eating together the rice balls received 
before the ceremony and so on). The viewing is not a solitary, atomised 
experience, as is watching a ceremony on television alone at home, and 
the satellite broadcasting allows for a transformation and enlargement of 
the traditional temple space to include all Agonshū’s centres in Japan. The 
performance of the ritual via the means of the screen involves the collective 
body of members in a specific physical space (the sacred place), and the role 
of ritual is to unify the practice and create a collective identity as part of a 
(virtual) nationwide temple. Therefore, the televised experience of the rit-
ual watched with others is both collective and individual(ised) at the same 
time. Participants can see it in a very personal way, but also feel a sense of 
communal participation.
This analysis, however, seems to apply only to indoor rituals, attended 
mainly by members, so I will now turn my attention to outdoor public 
rituals.
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Agonshū’s major media event was, and still is, the Hoshi Matsuri.16 The annual 
event is held on February 11th at the Yamashina main temple near Kyoto.17 
During the matsuri, a goma (fire rite) is performed. The festival starts at seven 
in the morning with a procession of members dressed as yamabushi (moun-
tain ascetics) in front of an altar decorated with offerings to Buddha and 
on which Agonshū’s sacred relic (shinsei busshari) is enshrined. The proces-
sion is accompanied by fireworks, the blowing of conch shells and dramatic 
symphonic music. The yamabushi perform several rituals and afterwards, 
Kiriyama—who is seated in a special seat called the “lion seat” (shishiza) which 
symbolizes the place where a Buddha is seated—blesses the torches that are 
used to light the pyres. The fires, around eleven metres in diameter and seven 
metres high, are lit on the two massive pyres dominating the ritual space 
while dramatic orchestral music plays in the background. The performance 
continues until late afternoon, with participants chanting sutras accompanied 
by taiko drumming, and several million wooden sticks18 written on by mem-
bers and participants, will be burned. The two pyres (Fig. 3.1) represented 
the two maṇḍala worlds of the esoteric tradition, taizō (womb) and kongō 
(diamond). One pyre, shinkai dan, is for the realisation of the prayers and 
the wishes of living people, while the other, bukkai dan, is for the liberation 
OUTDOOR RITUAL SCREENINGS: EXPERIENCING 
A SENSE OF “BEING THERE”
Fig. 3.1 The two pyres at the Stars and Fire Rites Festival 1986/1987. Photo cour-
tesy of Ian Reader. From the Photo Archives of the Nanzan Institute for Religion and 
Culture, Nagoya, Japan.
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of the spirits of the dead.19 Consequently, two types of wooden sticks can be 
purchased. One, called kūyo gomagi, is intended for the ancestors, and their 
name(s) will be written on it and burned on the bukkai dan, while the other, 
kigan gomagi, will be inscribed with wishes and requests for this-worldly 
benefits and burned on the shinkai dan.20
At the site, visitors are welcomed by members shouting, “Okaerinasai” 
(“Welcome back”, Fig. 3.2), and huge loudspeakers explain details regard-
ing the rituals (how many participants are attending, how big the pyres are, 
how many million of wooden sticks will be burned and so on) and the sig-
nificance of the rituals (to protect Japan,21 but also to promote world peace).
The event advertising campaign focuses on the grand and spectacular 
nature of the event and at the site of the Festival, an elaborate media centre is 
set up that utilises an entire building. The coverage of the event is total. Cam-
eras are even mounted on helicopters to give a bird’s eye view of the event, 
which is transmitted live to all Agonshū centres in Japan and on some local 
TV stations. At the same time, the ritual “contains media and media devices” 
(Grimes 2002, 222) to convey a sense of intense drama and spectacle. The 
desc ription by Reader of the ritual in 1980s seemed almost unchanged when 
I attended in the mid-2000s:
[. .  .] the helpers wear headphones and have two-way radios [Fig. 3.3] 
(including may of those dressed as yamabushi, making a rather interesting 
Fig. 3.2 Participant at the Star Festival with loudspeaker, 1986/1987. Photo cour-
tesy of Ian Reader. From the Photo Archives of the Nanzan Institute for Religion and 
Culture, Nagoya, Japan.
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cameo picture of the traditional costume of the mountain ascetic topped 
off with the technology of the modern age) to keep things coordinated. 
[.  .  .] Teams of yamabushi take turns in beating great rows of drums 
and chanting through microphones, to accompany the activities of those 
hurling gomagi on to the fire, and especially composed dramatic music 
is played through the banks of loudspeakers to add to the overall effect.
(Reader 1991, 224)
Furthermore, media operators (cameramen, photographers) an d their devices 
enter the main ritual area, the sacred space that traditionally is reserved for 
yamabushi, while the public is seated on temporary stands. The spectacle 
promised by the advertising campaign preceding the event is guaranteed 
and religious entertainment (including fortune-telling, traditional dance and 
music performances, entertainment for children and families and food) is 
offered all day long at the sacred centre.
A similar ritual (on a smaller scale and with only one pyre) is occasion-
ally performed overseas by Kiriyama and Agonshū’s yamabushi, such as, for 
example, the Fire Rituals held near the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration 
camp in 2006 to commemorate Holocaust victims. During these perfor-
mances, a procession will similarly introduce the performers to the main 
ritual area and the same ritual actions are performed before lighting up the 
pyre. In these cases, the ritual is often preceded by a discourse by Kiriyama 
Fig. 3.3 Members with headphones and two-way radios participating in the Star 
Festival 1986/1987. Photo courtesy of Ian Reader. From the Photo Archives of the 
Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture, Nagoya, Japan.
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explaining the reasons why the ritual is being performed in that specific 
location and by greetings from several local authorities.
The Hoshi Matsuri and overseas rituals are transmitted live via satellite at 
Agonshū centres around Japan. Participants who couldn’t attend in person 
gather at the centres a few hours before the beginning of the ritual. As with 
the indoor rituals, they are greeted at the entrance by members and they 
receive information pamphlets and advertising leaflets. Usually they also 
receive a special present, such as a book or a flower, prepared for the special 
occasion. The festival atmosphere and religious ambiance are recreated at 
the centre, albeit on a smaller scale. For example, on the ground floor at the 
Tokyo centre, counselling and fortune-telling services are offered and partic-
ipants can also buy amulets, wooden sticks or other souvenirs of the event. 
The atmosphere is louder than during the monthly ritual gathering, with 
members chatting outside the main hall or in the “coffee corner” provided. 
A few minutes before the start of the ritual, however, they will all sit quietly 
and wait for the beginning of the live programme.
Yet, the transmission of the Hoshi Matsuri or other outdoor goma rites (for 
example, the occasional ritual performed overseas) is the complete opposite 
of Agonshū’s closed-circuit (that is, members and guests only) broadcasts of 
indoor rituals. Instead of a camera and microphone being the eyes and ears of 
distant worshippers, the media enter into the ritual. The ceremonies are not 
just transmitted by the media, but recreated by them. The viewers experience 
not just being there, but they see more than those attending the ceremonies 
in person: they can see the ceremonies from different points of view, read 
supplementary explanations on the screen, enter in the ritual space and enjoy 
close-up images of performers and ritual objects. In this case, the camera is not 
discreet, but intrusive or sometimes distant. Its rhythms are not the rhythms 
of the ritual: long sequences are alternated with quick changes of scene and 
zooming. The transmission allows the viewers to see details, and the on-screen 
written explanations (or simultaneous translation of talks) give them more 
information about the different phases of the ceremony. The viewers become 
omniscient, and this compensates for the lack of physical proximity between 
the charismatic leader and his followers. The members watching the festival at 
the centres participate actively in the rite, praying during the central part of the 
ritual and loudly clapping after Kiriyama’s talks, but above all creating a fes-
tival atmosphere at the centre. The big festivals are an extraordinary occasion 
also for the members who watch them on the screen. The rules of daily life in 
the centre are temporarily suspended and a festive atmosphere is created. For 
example, on the day of the transmission of the fire rite performed in Poland in 
June 2006, the Tokyo centre offered gifts, free drinks and fortune-telling ser-
vices for the visitors. The participation through the screen cannot reproduce 
the intensity of the live ritual, in particular the physical sensation of the heat 
of the fire and smoke, but the planned performance of the event is perceived as 
extraordinary. Members attending these special events told me that they took 
a day’s leave from work to attend it. In such ways, the creation of the special 
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event and the presence of cameras announce that “this is an important event” 
(Grimes 2006, 4) and validate the ritual. Furthermore, viewing the transmis-
sion al lows the participants to take part in a “virtual pilgrimage”: without 
leaving their seats, they are transported around the globe and can contribute 
to the circulation of Agonshū’s universal message.
The transmission of the event recalls some of the characteristics that 
Dayan and Katz (1992) attributed to media events. Although in this case, it 
is not an event that has the whole world watching it, such Agonshū events, 
with their extended community of members and visitors, the interruption 
of everyday life (such as the festive and extraordinary atmosphere at the 
centres), their live broadcasts and the “reverent, awe-filled character of the 
narration” (Katz and Liebes 2007, 158) have shared characteristics with 
the bigger-scale event s theorised by Dayan and Katz. The transmission and 
recreation of the ritual allow the viewers not only to participate in the ritual, 
chanting and following the ritual actions, but to create the feeling of “being 
there”, with the leader, inside the ritual sacred space, where only initiated 
practitioners (and media devices) can enter.
MEDIATED RITUALS AND AFFIRMING “WHAT WE SHARE”
Over the last three decades, ritual performance and consumption in Agon-
shū have evolved in new forms modelled by the media, while the mediated 
form of the rites has affected the direct experience of participants. The ritual 
attended at a distance offers to the viewers not only the possibility of being 
there, but also of being an active protagonist.
The different use of satellite transmissions depending on events shows dif-
ferent image strategies. In the case of indoor rituals, the focus is on the sense 
of community of the members who participate together, but at different 
physical locations. The aim of the (virtual) nationwide temple is to reinforce 
the inner cohesion of the members and the proximity between the leader and 
the members. Regarding the broadcasting of outdoor rituals, the focus is 
on creating a spectacular event that “serves as an affirmation of the vitality 
and prominence of their religion” (Reader 1991, 225) for members, and 
an occasion to participate in a special event,  although at a distance. For 
non-members, it is a demonstration of the power and wealth of the group 
that might help persuade other people to join. Agonshū’s self-proclaimed 
mission of world salvation is reinforced by its goma rituals performed over-
seas, which become an expression of Agonshū’s universal message and its 
role in world salvation. In both cases, media have been used to create what 
Reader defines as a “user-friendly” religion:
[.  .  .] the term [.  .  .] in this context in many ways captures the ethos 
Agonshū is attempting to put across to its potential members. It points 
to its inherent modernity that in many ways balances and reinforces the 
82 Mediating (Buddhist) Rituals
intrinsic traditionalism of its teachings, and also implies the relaxed, 
open and accessible style that Agonshū, like other new religions, wishes 
to maintain so as to allow its members to feel at home in it.
(1991, 219)
Although they make reference to traditional practices, the transmission 
of the rituals challenges and transforms the nature of esoteric rituals, 
in which secrecy is an important aspect reinforcing its believed power 
and the authority of priests who perform it. In Agonshū’s broadcasts, 
the viewer’s gaze can enter the ritual and unfold its secrets. The videos 
“democratise” the rituals, making the teaching accessible to all viewers 
and eroding differences between leader, members with the rank of yam-
abushi and others. Material objects, such as the sacred relic, are also 
made visible. This erosion is, however, “virtual”, because in practice, the 
video eliminates direct interactions and contact between the leader and 
members.
Finally, another way in which viewers can experience the ritual is by 
sitting in front of one of the TVs alone and watching the recorded ritual 
on DVD. This represents a very different form of accessing the ritual, as a 
solitary experience, but still in the same place (DVDs can only be watched 
at Agonshū centres, in open spaces). The reproduction of the ritual on DVD 
again transforms the ritual. It is no more a unique experience, but one that 
can be repeated and reproduced at hoc and used as advertising material. The 
repetition of the ritual can be used by members to remind them of the spec-
tacular events produced by the group, or it can be used as a didactic support 
during training and teaching sessions.
THE EXPERIENCE OF A PLACE
Both indoor and outdoor types of satellite transmissions have in common 
the place of consumption of the media product. Indeed, the only places 
where one can see the satellite transmissions and the DVD reproduction of 
rituals are at Agonshū’s centres around Japan.22
The rituals, both live and mediated by the screen during the satellite 
broadcasts, cannot be consumed in a private space (i.e. at home), but only 
in a public space controlled by the group. The centres are open to all visitors, 
but all must register at the entrance or show their membership card. The 
consumption of the videos, therefore, is not privatised, but collective. This 
indicates a tension in the image strategy of the group between opening up 
publicly and reaching a wider audience and, at the same time, still consid-
ering the communal dimension and face-to-face interaction essential for the 
members. As a consequence, the potentiality of satellite broadcasting (that 
is, the possibility of reaching everyone individually in their houses, like the 
televised performances of American televangelists) is restricted by the con-
trolled (and clearly defined) space of the group’s centres. The space of the 
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centre becomes the viewing environment that is structured to contain the 
crowd and at the same time to focus attention upon the screen.
Gathering at the centre and attending the rituals performed on the screen 
seem, however, to entail not only a consumption of the ritual, but also an 
experience of it. In his work on cinema, Casetti provided a twofold defini-
tion of the experience:
On the one hand, it refers to the act of exposing ourselves to something 
that surprises and captures us (‘to experience’). On the other hand, it 
relates to the act of reelaborating this exposition into a knowledge and 
a competence, so that we are then richer in the face of things, since we 
are able to master them (‘to have experience’).
(2009, 36)
In the case of satellite videos, the experience of a place, the temple where mem-
bers converge and share the same emotional experience, becomes crucial for 
understanding the role of mediated rituals. Differently from the spectators in 
a movie theatre, the viewers of Agonshū’s screened rituals are asked to engage 
with what they have seen as an interpretative community, but also to be active 
participants in the event—attendees contribute to the ritual chanting and clap-
ping, and when the ritual is performed live, the presence of cameras and videos 
screens also reminds them that other people are watching. The viewer is not 
a passive viewer, but is empowered because the ritual could not exist without 
him/her. The screened ritual is a ritual of “togetherness” that includes both 
members participating live and members watching through the screen.
AGONSHŪ AFTER AUM
When I started attending regularly the rituals (both performed live and 
transmitted via satellite broadcasting) at the Tokyo centre in the mid-2000s, 
I noticed that the beginning of Kiriyama’s speech after the performance was 
exactly as described by Reader in his account from the 1980s:
Holding a microphone he began a dialogue which started as follows:
KIRIYAMA: O-genki desu ka [Are you well?]
AUDIENCE: Hai, genki desu [Yes, we are.]
At this Kiriyama shook his head a little and said that they did not sound 
as if they really were well: he wanted them to say it again, but this time 
with feeling. They did, shouting loudly and in unison. (Reader 1991, 226)
The speeches also always ended with the leader inciting the audience with 
his signature catchphrases:
Saa yaruzo! (Let’s do it!)
Kanarazu seikō suru! (I will certainly succeed!)
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Watakushi wa totemo un ga ii no da! (I have a lot of luck!)
Kanarazu umaku iku! (I will certainly do well!)
Zettai ni katsu! (I will definitely win!)
Also, the content of the leader’s monologue has changed only slightly over 
the years: Kiriyama talks about his future projects, uses himself as an exam-
ple of someone who was able to become a successful man after liberating 
himself from the negative influence of ancestors’ spirits and encourages his 
audience to develop a positive attitude.
When I compared my field notes from 2006–2007 and Ian Reader’s 
account from the late 1980s regarding both indoor rituals and the Hoshi 
Matsuri, it was clear that they shared several similarities. The transmission 
of the rituals and the main events were still organised exactly in the same 
way and, as mentioned above, even the leader’s talks followed an almost 
identical structure. The most striking difference between the two accounts 
is the number of participants reported for each event. While the number 
of participants during the Hoshi Matsuri has remained almost unchanged 
(around 500,000 people attending the event were usually reported in the 
media in the late 1980s, and similar figures are reported now), the number of 
individuals attending the monthly rituals has dropped significantly. Reader 
described a large crowd (about 2000 people) attending the tsuitachi goma in 
July 1987 and Agonshū volunteers lining up at the nearest subway station to 
greet people and guide them to the centre (1991, 225). When I have attended 
the same event, on more than one occasion, I have only counted 300–400 
participants, and volunteers were only outside the group’s building. How-
ever, when I attended the event organised for the performance of the goma 
rite in Auschwitz in 2006 and the New Year events in 2009 and 2014, the 
main hall was crowded and could not fit all the participants.
One of the reasons for this significant change should be ascribed to both 
the effect that the Aum Affair (as already discussed Chapter One) had on 
Agonshū in mid-1990s and the decrease in membership in the group, due 
also to a leader who is no longer able to appear as forceful as before.23 After 
the Aum attacks and the subsequent criticisms made in the media about reli-
gious groups that appeared to differ from the mainstream, Agonshū was one 
of the movements that came under attack for its massive use of media and 
for its spectacular image. Furthermore, the group, as mentioned in Chapter 
One, was associated with Aum’s leader because Asahara was member of 
Agonshū for a brief period before founding Aum Shinrikyō. The negative 
publicity derived by this association triggered a defensive reaction by Kiri-
yama himself, who published a book to explain the relationship between 
Aum and Agonshū (Kiriyama 1995).
The group reacted by becoming withdrawn. The Hoshi Matsuri contin-
ued, but advertising ca mpaigns decreased, as did Agonshū’s presence in the 
media. In the late 1990s, the Agonshū website, for example, was just a sim-
ple information page on the group’s teachings and it did not provide any 
Mediating (Buddhist) Rituals 85
information about centres’ addresses or contact details. In the last few years, 
however, the group has shown an interest in the Internet and the website has 
been completely renovated. However, despite the new attractive website, 
thus far it has not appeared to develop a striking online presence and its 
use of the Internet is still limited to non-interactive communication, with, 
for example, very limited use of social media (Baffelli 2011). In 2012, a new 
advertising campaign created by Dentsū was launched to promote the Hoshi 
Mat suri, showing images of young men and women in yamabushi clothes 
(Fig. 3.4).
Another main change since 1995 has been the increasing numbers of 
goma rituals performed outside the main centres and in particular, overseas. 
The event has been performed (among other places) in New York (2000), 
Auschwitz (2006) and Jerusalem (2008). According to Alexandre Benod 
(2010), it is difficult to understand i f the aim of these pe rformances is more 
related to an internal strategy (to confirm to members the importance of 
the leader and his message) or an external one (the necessity for the group 
to expand overseas). Probably both are important, and the transmissions 
of rituals performed overseas play an important role in placing the leader’s 
message in a universal context and reinforcing the idea of Agonshū’s legiti-
mation as a religious group with an international profile.
These changes of image that have occurred over the past ten years reflect 
an attempt to renovate the image of the group. However, none of these 
attempts has proved successful yet. The fact that Agonshū’s satellite broad-
casts are still identical to those broadcast almost thirty years ago seems 
to indicate stagnation in the group’s image strategies, which are fixed and 
Fig. 3.4. Agonshū’s advertisement poster, 2012.
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haven’t evolved in step with the developments of new technologies and new 
media.24 In my conversation with a long-term member during the Mandō 
senzo kuyō (Memorial Festival for the Ancestors) in July 2014, she expressed 
her worries about the struggle to attract new members, which, in her opin-
ion, was due to the fact that Agonshū had lost its “distinctive feature” 
(tokushoku) that made it attractive to people in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
The ageing leader and members will also represent a challenge for the future 
of the organisation. When I attended the New Year event in 2009, the Tokyo 
hall was crowded and some members told me that they were there because 
they weren’t able to travel to Kyoto for the Hoshi Matsuri anymore and 
they wanted to see the leader, because that could have been one of his last 
performances. In May 2012, the transmission of the meitokusai showed a 
video of a very frail leader who was travelling in a boat on the ocean to pay 
respect to the Japanese soldiers who died during the World War Two. Simi-
larly, at the New Year Festival in 2014 and the above-mentioned Memorial 
Festival in July 2014, the centre overflowed with visitors and the leader 
was still performing the rituals and addressing the members, despite evident 
physical and mobility difficulties. The image and message promoted by these 
videos and the average age of the participants during the ceremony seemed 
in contrast with the image of the young yamabushi promoted by the Hoshi 
Matsuri advertising campaign in 2012. 
CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF MEDIATED RITUALS AND 
THE IMPORTANCE OF FACE-TO-FACE INTERACTION
The adoption of modern audio-visual media indeed transforms practices 
of religious mediation. The power of the media, however, should not be 
overestimated. The process of transforming traditional practices and rituals 
involves complicated negotiations and cannot be attributed entirely to the 
use of media. In the case of Agonshū, the successful use of new media devices 
was supported by a flexible doctrine and a focus on esoteric and millennial 
topics that attracted new members in the 1980s and that was combined 
with a strategic marketing plan. The employment of advertising agencies 
and the setting up of a Public Relations Department staffed by communica-
tion experts led to the creation of an attractive package (spectacular events, 
appealing teaching, charismatic leader and up-to-date technologies) that led 
to growth in membership and public attention in the 1980s.
As was mentioned previously, Agonshū was not the only Buddhist organ-
isation to start using satellite broadcasting in the 1980s. Other groups saw 
in the new technology a useful educational tool or a way to restructure the 
interactions between the leader and members. In Chapter Two, for example, 
I discussed how satellite broadcasting was used by Sōka Gakkai to reaffirm 
direct contact between the leader and members and to weaken the power 
of local intermediaries. For Agonshū, satellite broadcasting became both an 
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integrated part of the practices and a reinforcement of the group’s image. 
The example also showed that watching videos is not just consumption, but 
an experience that can affect members’ commitment and religious author-
ity. Agonshū’s example also shows how traumatic events can impact the 
development of image strategies, with the results that the movement, which 
was considered a model of the new religions at the forefront of technology, 
now looks rather backward and out of date in both the way it is presenting 
its message and in its content. Agonshū seems to be struggling to make the 
shift from early new media (such as satellite broadcasting), which, linked to 
a flexible doctrine and messianic optimist, were the basis of its success in 
the 1980s, to the latest new media (websites and social media), and it seems 
to have lost, over the years, its status as a user-friendly religion. However, 
the resistance to employing new media, such as, for example, the creation 
of a dedicated channel for the online broadcasting of rituals, may also be 
connected to the importance placed by Agonshū on face-to-face interactions 
and physical communions between members. Indeed, satellite broadcasting 
allows the members to be physically distant from the space where the rit-
ual is performed but still together at the temple, in a sense reaffirming the 
importance of physical participation in rituals, while online transmission 
will completely relocate the ritual event to a non-physical space and com-
pletely transform participants’ experiences of ritual actions.
NOTES
 1. For a detailed history of Agonshū and a more detailed discussion of its teach-
ings, see  Inoue et al. (1994);  Numata (1988);  Prohl (1995); Reader (1991; 
1994).
 2. It is not uncommon for people in Japan who undergo a religious awakening 
and become leaders to take on a new name.
 3. On Kiriyama’s publications, see N umata (1988, 61–65).
 4. See the explanation of the three methods on Agonshū’s website: http://www.
agon.org/about/about_000010.php (in Japanese). Accessed July 22, 2015. 
http://www.agon.org/en/about/page_a3ml (English), both accessed July 11, 
2015. See also Clarke ed. (1999, 136).
 5. http://www.agon.org/en/history/page_a.html. Accessed July 22, 2015.
 6. It is difficult to estimate accurately the membership of religious organisations. 
The numbers provided are based on Agonshū’s official estimate (see B unkachō 
1982;  1986), but, as Ian Reader has pointed out, the number of dedicated 
members was probably much lower, (around 100,000, see R eader 1994, 39)
 7. Personal communication with former PR representative of Agonshū, June 
2006.
 8. Personal communication with former PR representative of Agonshū, June 
2006.
 9. As for other new religions (see, for example, Chapter One in this volume), 
Agonshū published manga to reach a wider public, although they did not con-
stitute the main media forms used by the group. In the series mentioned, the 
narratives are centred around the idea that one could acquire supernatural 
powers (chōnōryoku) through Agonshū’s esoteric spiritual practices. The main 
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character is Morio Mayura, a beautiful young woman who meets an unem-
ployed young man, Kudō Kazuki, and introduces him to yoga practices and 
to the esoteric teaching of her “guru”, Kiriyama. The story is interrupted by 
explanations of teachings and illustrations of practices, such as energy points, 
or chakra, and mudra (ritual gestures) performed with hands and fingers.
 10. Personal communication with former PR representative of Agonshū, June 
2006.
 11. See, for example, Shūkan Bunshun June 4, 1987, 123–127; Shūkan Sunday 
July 9, 1987; 232–233; Shūkan Sunday September 10, 1987, 192–193.
 12. Japan’s national public broadcasting organisation (Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai, 
NHK), for example, started experimentally broadcasting TV programmes 
using a BS-2a satellite in May 1984. After these successful experiments, NHK 
started regular service (NTSC) and experimental HDTV broadcasting using 
BS-2b in June 1989. See: https://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/english/about/history.
html. Accessed July 22, 2015.
 13. Personal communication with former PR representative of Agonshū, June 
2006.
 14. For a detailed description of the tsuitachi goma, see  Reader 1991, 225–227.
 15. Personal communication with former PR representative of Agonshū, June 
2006. My translation.
 16. The complete name of the event is Shinbutsu ryōkai daisaitō gomaku, which 
the group translates as Shinto-Buddhist Sacred Fire Rite. In English, the festi-
val is also called the Stars and Fire Rites Festival. See: http://www.agon.org/en/
schedule/page_b.html. Accessed July 18, 2015.
 17. Promotional videos of the event are available on the YouTube channel of the 
group: www.youtube.com/user/agonpublicinfo. Accessed July 22, 2015.
 18. According to Reader, one million wooden sticks were purchased in 1979 and 
the number rose to over 30 million in 1988 (1994, 54). Similar data on the 
increase in visitors and number of wooden sticks sold are reported also in an 
article published in Kyoto Shinbun, October 21, 1993.
 19. Until 1981, only one pyre was used (covering both purposes), but the signifi-
cant increase in the numbers of participants and wooden sticks burned led to 
the creation of a second fire.
 20. For a detailed explanation of different gomagi, see: http://www.agon.org/
hoshimatsuri/moushikomi.html. Accessed July 11, 2015.
 21. The nationalistic connotations of the event have been discussed by  Reader 
(1991;  2002) and  Prohl (2004). February 11th, now known as Constitution 
Day, was previously called National Foundation Day and named after the 
myth according to which the legendary first emperor of Japan, Jimmu, descen-
dant of the sun goddess Amaterasu, descended to earth and created Japan on 
that date. The Hoshi Matsuri was introduced in 1970 and moved to February 
in 1975.
 22. The Hoshi Matsuri is broadcast publicly on some local TV channels, but this 
only in a 30-minute-long programme.
 23. Although official membership numbers provided by the group show a little 
increase over the last decades, during informal conversations with members, 
they admitted that the number of members is stagnant and there are very few 
young members joining the group. Reader reported similar conversations with 
a priest from Agonshū in Kyoto (2012, 20).
 24. It is also possible that as Kiriyama (and members of the board) has aged, he has 
become less inclined to move away from a familiar communication strategy 
and to experiment with new technologies.
Mediating the Leader’s Image
Kōfuku no Kagaku’s Communication 
Strategies in the 1990s
Kōfuku no Kagaku (literally, Science of Happiness), also known as Happy 
Science,1 was founded in 1986 by Ōkawa Ryūhō. During the early 1990s, 
the group registered a rapid increase in membership and received exten-
sive coverage in the Japanese press for its large advertising campaigns and 
spectacular public events, its legal action against a publisher, Kōdansha (the 
so-called Kōdansha furaidē jiken, Kōdansha Friday Affair, which I will deal 
with below) and its severe criticisms against other new religions, such as 
Aum Shinrikyō and Sōka Gakkai. It also appeared in some international 
magazines, such as, for example, the Financial Times and the Los Angeles 
Times, for similar reasons (see Fa rley 1995; Tennant 1995; Thomson 1991). 
In this chapter, the mediation practices adopted by Kōfuku no Kagaku and 
its reaction to critical reporting in the press will be discussed in order to 
investigate the potential impact of religion-media dynamics on the branding 
of religious leaders’ images and on the relationship between leaders and 
members. Therefore, after a brief introduction of the leader and his teach-
ings, the relationship between Kōfuku no Kagaku and the mass media will 
be investigated by focusing on three major events: the advertising campaign 
of 1991 (and the text used for the advertisement of Ōkawa’s book Eien no 
Budda [“The Eternal Buddha”], 1991c), the major event held for the leader’s 
birthday on July 15, 1991 and the Kōdansha Friday Affair, which began in 
September of the same year.
ŌKAWA RYŪHŌ AND THE SCIENCE OF HAPPINESS
Ōkawa Ryūhō was born Nakagawa Takashi on July 7, 1956 in Kawashi-
machō, Tokushima Prefecture, on the island of Shikoku.2 His father, Nak-
agawa Tadayoshi, who played an important role in the establishment of 
Kōfuku no Kagaku, is said to have been interested in different religious 
traditions and to have been in contact with other new religions, includ-
ing Seichō no Ie and the GLA (Numat a 1995, 183), whose influences can 
be seen in Kōfuku no Kagaku’s structure and teachings. Ōkawa graduated 
from the prestigious University of Tokyo, but failed to gain admission to the 
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postgraduate programme. This failure, however, would be later reinterpreted 
as a sign from the “high spirits” (kōkyūrei) that he was destined to become a 
religious leader (Ōkawa  1997, 345; Ōkawa 2001a, 171–172). After gradua-
tion, Ōkawa started working for a Japanese trading company. On the after-
noon of March 23, 1981, he experienced his first spirit possession and what 
he would later call, in Buddhist terms, his “enlightenment” (daigo):
Suddenly, I sensed an invisible presence with me in the room, and almost 
simultaneously understood by intuition that whatever it was wished to 
communicate with me. I ran to get a pencil and some blank cards. My 
hand holding the pencil begun to move as if it had a life of its own. On 
card after card it wrote the words, ‘Good News’, ‘Good News’.3
‘Who are you?’ I asked. My hand signed the name ‘Nikko’. I was 
experiencing automatic writing under the control of Nikko, one of six 
senior disciples of the thirteenth-century Buddhist saint Nichiren.
(Ōkawa 2001a, 17 4)
According to his autobiographical account, a week later, Ōkawa received 
a message from Nichiren4 himself: “Love others, nurture others, forgive oth-
ers” (Hito o aishi, hito o ikashi, hito o yuruse, Ōkawa 1997, 351 ; Ōkawa 
2001a, 17 5). The following June, according to Ōkawa, the spirit of Takahashi 
Shinji, founder of the GLA, whose books Ōkawa had read in the months 
preceding the event (Ōkawa 1997, 349 ), recognised him as the “true reincar-
nation of the Buddha” ( shaka no sairai, Ōkawa 1997, 352 )5 and invited him 
to form his own group (Ōkawa 1997, 353 ). Later in the same year, commu-
nications from spirits through automatic writing (jidōshoki) were replaced 
by channelling experiences. The first group of publications attributed to 
Ōkawa is a series of reigen (spiritual words) received by him and recorded 
by his father. The books were initially published under his father’s pen name, 
Yoshikawa Saburō (to avoid problems with his employer according to his 
own account, Ōkawa 1997, 366) and included his first book, Nichiren no 
reigen (“Spiritual messages from Nichiren”, Yoshikawa 1985a) and mes-
sages from different religious and philosophical personalities, such as Kūkai, 
the founder of the esoteric Shingon Buddhist sect (Yoshikawa 1985b) , Jesus 
(Yoshikawa 1985c) , the sun goddess Amaterasu (Yoshikawa 1986a) and the 
philosopher Socrates (Yoshikawa 1986b) . In July 1986, in order to follow 
the spirits’ calling, Ōkawa quit his job, and in October of the same year, he 
established Kōfuku no Kagaku and changed his name to Ōkawa Ryūhō. In 
1 987, the first edition of Taiyō no hō (“The Laws of the Sun”), which is the 
first book that is not a collection of spiritual messages and that contains 
explanations of Kōfuku no Kagaku’s theology, was published by the pub-
lishing firm Tsuchiya Shoten, and it is still considered by members as one of 
the central texts for learning Ōkawa’s teachings,6 together with other texts 
in the Laws series such as Ōgon no hō, “The Golden Laws” (Ōkawa 1990a), 
and Eien no hō, “The Laws of Eternity” (Ōkawa 1990b).
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Kōfuku no Kagaku started as a small study group that gathered in a 
rented apartment in Tokyo. Initially, the selection of members was quite rig-
orous, and participants were required to read several texts by the leader and 
pass a qualification exam (Fukui 2004, 71). Ac cording to Astley (1995, 358), 
this resulted in the creation of a core group of highly motivated members 
and in the reinforcement of the group’s sense of identity. In the initial period, 
proselytism was mainly based on members inviting relatives, friends, and 
co-workers to read Ōkawa’s books and to attend the group’s conferences 
and seminars, such as public talks (zadankai) the first of which was held in 
Nippori, Tokyo, in November 1986, and bigger public lectures (kōenkai) 
which started in in Ushigome in March 1987 in front of an audience of about 
400 people (Astley 1995, 357; Nijū Isseiki 1991). In the first period, group 
activities were mainly based on group discussion and research on happiness 
and the “divine truth” (shinri). In 1989, the centre of the group moved from 
a small rented flat to an expensive apartment in the Shinjuku area (Fukui 
1999, 150) and i ts missionary activities intensified. In November of the same 
year, Ōkawa launched the “Project Sunrise 90” (Sanraizu 90 keikaku) which 
aimed at reaching 50,000 followers by the end of 1990. The group’s lectures 
were now accessible to the general public, subscription fees were reduced 
and it became possible to join the group without a member’s recommenda-
tion. A new system of membership was also introduced, with a new category 
of “friendship members” (shiyū kaiin, literally “Friends-of-the magazine 
members” , Astley 1995, 353), which made it easier to join the movement 
(Fukui 2004, 71) and indi cated “the move towards a mass-oriented system” 
(Astley 1995, 359). Accor ding to the figures reported by the group, mem-
bership in 1990 increased from 10,000 members in January to 30,000 by 
the end of May, 60,000 by the end of June and 77,000 by the end of July 
(Fukui 1999, 150).
In his numerous books, Ōkawa syncretically draws from different tradi-
tions, both religious—Indian, Chinese and Japanese Buddhist schools and 
Christianity—and philosophical, from Greek philosophy to modern think-
ers. According to the presentation of Kōfuku no Kagaku on its websites and 
in its pamphlets, the main aim of its teaching is to help people to attain “true 
happiness” (also called satori in Japanese, “enlightenment”), to spread hap-
piness and to create an ideal world. Therefore, the three main concepts are ai 
(love), satori (enlightenment) and the yūtopia kensetsu (creation of Utopia) 
in order to create “universal happiness and worldly harmony” (Pokorny and 
Winter 2012, 32). The esch atological view of Kōfuku no Kagaku, rather than 
marking the end of time and the creation of a new world in the future, is in 
continuity with the present time and space, in order to create—through the 
application of Ōkawa’s teaching to daily life activities and to relationships 
with colleagues, relatives and friends—an ideal world on earth, a world that 
already existed in a mythical past and that will be restored with the creation 
of a “global utopia on Earth” (chikyū yūtopia, or, in other publications, 
“eternal Utopia” kōkyū yūtopia). As a consequence, the realisation of this 
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utopian world does not imply an apocalyptic event, but it is the result of 
transformations in personal relationships and lifestyles.
The utopian world is an idealised version of the present world. Regarding 
cosmology, the universe is considered as being formed by several dimen-
sions,7 in which hundreds of historical figures (from Einstein to Chopin, to 
Mozart, Muhammad, Archangel Gabriel and so on) are assigned positions at 
different levels. Śākyamuni, the historical Buddha, Jesus and other religious 
personalities or philosophers of the ancient or modern world are collocated 
in the highest of these dimensions. El Cantāre (Eru Kantāre)8 is the most 
elevated spirit in the terrestrial group, whose ishiki (consciousness) is said to 
have manifested in various figures, including Hermes, Buddha and, in modern 
times, Ōkawa Ryūhō. Members, by studying the books of the leader, could 
attain happiness and transmit it to other people. In Buddhist terms, members 
of Kōfuku no Kagaku take refuge in the Three Jewels: the Buddha (Ōkawa), 
the Dharma (his teachings) and the Sangha (the believers’ community). Fur-
thermore, the teachings are based on four basic principles, “The Principles 
of Happiness” (Kōfuku no genri), also known as “The Fourfold Path”(yon-
shōdō), referring to the Noble Eightfold Path of Buddhism (hasshōdō). These 
four principles are: ai (love), chi (wisdom), hansei (self-reflection) and hatten 
(development). The first includes six levels of love: instinctual love, love that 
loves, love that values, love that forgives, love as existence and love of the 
Saviour (Ōkawa’s love); the second expresses the knowledge of “the divine 
truth” (shinri) as expressed by the Ten Commandments of Moses, by Jesus’ 
teachings on love and by the Noble Eightfold Path of Buddha; the third is 
the act of reflection on oneself and on one’s life, and this is a daily practice 
in Kōfuku no Kagaku; the fourth is connected to self-development and is 
the sum of the other principles.9 These principles were first introduced by 
Ōkawa at his first conference in March 1987, and in 1990, a trilogy on these 
teachings was published: Kōfuku no genri (“The Principle of Happiness”), 
Satori no genri (“The Principle of Enlightenment”) and Yūtopia no genri 
(“The Principle of Utopia”).
In 1991, the group announced the “Miracle Project” (mirakuru keikaku, 
Nijū Isseiki 1991, 91–93; Ōkawa 1 997, 370) based on propheci es of its 
members increasing over a period of three years (Miracle 91; Miracle 
92; and Miracle 93; Numata 1995, 194), and in March 19 91, Kōfuku no 
Kagaku was granted official recognition as a religious juridical person 
(shūkyō hōjin). The period from 1991 to 1994 can be seen as the peak of the 
expansion and visibility of the group and the number of members increased 
rapidly (Astley 1995, 352–354). This succes s was owed on the one hand 
to specific doctrinal and organisational choices, such as, for example, the 
introduction of the above-mentioned flexible membership system, and on 
the other hand, to an effective media campaign centred on the figure of the 
leader. It was in this period, and particularly in 1991 and 1992, that the 
group underwent the most radical changes in terms of its doctrine, which 
became more markedly Buddhist, and turned its leader, previously seen as a 
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teacher, into the physical manifestation of El Cantāre, the central deity for 
Kōfuku no Kagaku. The following sections of this chapter will therefore 
focus on this critical period in the history of the group.
“NOW IS THE AGE OF KŌFUKU NO KAGAKU”: THE MAJOR 
ADVERTISING CAMPAIGN OF 1991
Fig. 4.1 Advertisement stickers for Ōkawa Ryūhō’s books Nosutoradamusu Sen-
ritsu no Keiji (“The Terrifying Revelations of Nostradamus”) and Arā no Daikeikoku 
(“Allah’s Great Warning”) with the slogan “Jidai wa ima, Kōfuku no Kagaku” (“Now 
Is the Age of Kōfuku no Kagaku”), 1991.
Since its es tablishment, Kōfuku no Kagaku has been using publications as 
its main means of propagation. Members are required to read Ōkawa’s 
publications (initially, they were required to read at least ten books writ-
ten by the leader in order to join the group) and proselytism activities are 
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still nowadays centred on distributing and recommending Ōkawa’s books. 
Indeed, for Kōfuku no Kagaku, “salvation comes through a book” (Kisala 
2001b, 74) and members’ testimon ies are often centred around their life 
changes after reading one of the founder’s books. Therefore, the publish-
ing house, Kōfuku no Kagaku Shuppan (or IRH press in English), which 
was founded in 1987, represents possibly the most important organ of the 
group. Ōkawa is presented as a prolific, record-breaking author (to date, 
he is said to have published more than 1,900 books) and his books often 
appear in the bestseller rankings.10 The texts are also often modified and 
published in a new edition following changes in the doctrine. For example, 
the above-mentioned text Taiyō no Hō (“Laws of the Sun”) was initially 
published in 1987 by Tsuchiya Shoten. In 1994, after the declaration of 
the leader as the current manifestation of a supreme deity, a new edition 
was released (Shin Taiyō no Hō, “New Laws on the Sun”), in which the 
new identity of the leader is explicit and the terminology more markedly 
Buddhist. In particular, the term kami (god) was replaced in the text by 
butsu (Buddha), and shinri (god’s truth) became buppō shinri (the truth’s 
of Buddha’s teachings).11
In the early 1990s, Kōfuku no Kagaku also started investing in the pro-
motion of Ōkawa’s books in the media. In the period between March and 
July 1991, Kōfuku no Kagaku financed an advertising campaign entrusted 
to Dentsū, the advertising and public relations company that promoted 
Agonshū in the 1980s, as discussed in Chapter Three. Initially, the cam-
paign’s goal was publicity for two books published by Kōfuku no Kaga-
ku’s publishing house and attributed to the leader Ōkawa Ryūhō (1991a; 
1991b), Nosutoradamusu Senr itsu no Keiji (“The Terrifying Revelations of 
Nostradamus”) and Arā no Daikeikoku (“Allah’s Great Warning”, Fig. 4.1). 
Later, the campaign included advertisements for the book Eien no Budda 
(“The Eternal Buddha”, Ōkawa 1991c) and for the Birthday Party (goseit-
ansai) to celebrate Ōkawa’s 35th birthday, which took place on July 15, 
1991 at the Tokyo Dome in Tokyo, a big complex usually used for sport-
ing events and concerts that can accommodate more than fifty thousand 
spectators. The large scale of the campaign and its high cost were reported 
by several newspapers and magazines. According to the Asahi Shinbun, for 
example, in the one and a half months between May 28 and July 15, the 
campaign cost 20 billion yen (around £9 million at the time) and involved 
four national and thirty-seven regional newspapers—which published the 
full-page advertisement for the books three times—thirty magazines, various 
television channels—which broadcasted a fifteen-second commercial 500 
times—and thirty-three radio stations (which transmitted the advertisement 
200 times). In addition to this, fifty thousand stickers (Fig. 4.1) appeared on 
taxis all over the country, forty advertising cars were rented and a dirigible 
flew over Tokyo for a week with the slogan “Now Is the Age of Kō fuku no 
Kagaku” (Jidai wa ima, Kōfuku no Kagaku, Asahi Shinbun, July 30, 1991, 
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29; Berthon 1991, 36). The impressive breadth of the camp aign was even 
compared by journalists to that of the campaigns for American presidential 
elections (Iwasa 1993, 128–134).
Advertising The Eternal Buddha 
An important characteristic of advertising texts is that the persuasive func-
tion is entrusted not only to the image, but also to the language, especially 
to the slogan or catchphrase destined to imprint itself in consumers’ mem-
ories and arouse their interest (Baldi et al. 1996, 90–91). Often, as Moeran 
(1989) also suggests in his analysis of advertisi ng language in Japan, the 
message is not clearly explicit, but is characterised by an undercurrent of 
meaning and by an emphasis through association, suggestion and structural 
incompleteness.
The slogans circulated by Kōfuku no Kagaku in 1991 were used not only 
for the advertising campaign, but represented the image the group wanted 
to project of itself in the period preceding the Birthday Festival in July. The 
recurrent theme in the advertisement texts was an emphasis on the advent of 
a new era, with expressions such as “Japan’s time is coming” (nihon no jidai 
ga kuru), “An era more extraordinary than the age of Shakyamuni and the 
age of Jesus is beginning” (Shaka no jidai yori, Iesu no jidai yori, motto sugoi 
jidai o hajimatteiru) and “You have been waiting for this day since before you 
were born” (Umareru mae kara kono hi o matteita, Arita 1991, 140–158). 
The era that is about to arrive is  the one indicated in the main slogan used 
in the campaign (“Now Is the Age of Kōfuku no Kagaku”, Fig. 4.2), the time 
of the Science of Happiness. Consequently, the first impression is that of an 
emphasis on prophetic tones about an epochal change and the construction 
of the expectation that something new is about to arrive.
A more detailed analysis of the advertisement text for the book Eien no 
Budda (“The Eternal Buddha”) can illustrate how this atmosphere of expec-
tation and momentousness was created by use of a specific combination of 
text and images. The book, published in 1991, is presented as a speech by 
the Buddha, who is bestowing his teachings on humanity. The sentences are 
rather brief and often end with exhortative or peremptory expressions. After 
having explained that the Buddha’s nature is present in all human beings, 
lines of conduct are illustrated for changing one’s way of living by following 
Buddhist teachings. Finally, in the last section, followers are urged to spread 
Buddha’s teachings, and his coming is announced.
The advertisement for the book appeared in several newspapers from 
July 15–19, 1991. While newspaper advertising, which is commonly used 
to promote new publications by new religions, has the disadvantage that 
it is not able to guarantee a high graphic quality, it nonetheless offers the 
opportunity for dissemination on a very large scale. Advertisements in the 
press also have a series of advantages, including the opportunity to occupy 
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Fig. 4 .2 Advertisement stickers distributed by Kōfuku no Kagaku, 1991.
a large space, to be reread and retained (something that is impossible for 
television commercials) and to be illustrated (unlike radio broadcasts). 
Furthermore, the medium presupposes an active reception and can be 
easily transported (Baldi et al. 1996). Kōfuku no Kagaku’s advertisement 
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covered a n entire page, and the central image was a close-up photo of the 
leader, dressed in a business suit, with a microphone, (supposedly) address-
ing an audience.
According to a report in the magazine Senden Kaigi, only the Maini-
chi Shinbun agreed to publish this image, while other newspapers, such as 
Yomiuri Shinbun, Nikkei Shinbun, Sankei Shinbun and Tokyo Shinbun, 
requested that the picture should be replaced with an image of the universe 
and the cover of the book; finally, the Asahi Shinbun only published the 
cover of the book across half a page (“Kōfuku no Kagaku . . .” 1991, 75). 
Similarly, some newspapers a nd most TV channels refused to advertise the 
Birthday Festival (“Kōfuku no Kagaku . . .” 1991, 75–78). The reasons for 
rejecting the images proposed by Kōfuku no Kagaku may be related to both 
a concern about explicitly supporting the proselytism activities of a new 
religion and its leader, and different interpretations of guidelines regard-
ing the publication of material related to religious groups for newspapers 
and television. Television stations tend to follow the Broadcasting Standards 
(hōsō kijun) set in 1970 by the Japan Commercial Broadcasters Association 
(Nihon minkan hōso renmei). Item 7 in the standards document is about 
religion, and it states, “Fundraising, etc., for any particular religion shall 
not be presented”.12 On the other hand, newspaper guidelines for religious 
advertisements vary and they can be interpreted differently on a case-by-case 
basis: some newspapers who rejected Kōfuku no Kagaku’s advertisement for 
the Birthday Festival, for example, published advertisements for Agonshū’s 
Star Festival. It is possible that the attention from the press that Kōfuku no 
Kagaku was starting to receive for the advertising campaign and the increase 
in critical articles about Ōkawa in weekly magazines, paired with the group’s 
eagerness to attract new members, had made newspapers more cautious 
toward facilitating its proselytism or PR activities. This is an issue that will 
become more evident during the Kōdansha Friday Affair discussed later in 
this chapter. The negotiations for the publication of the photograph of the 
leader was one of the first signs of the tensions between Kōfuku no Kagaku 
and the media that would increase in the following months.
A textual analysis of the advertisement text published in the Mainichi 
Shinbun (in other words, the original advertisement selected by the group) 
provides some useful information on how the image of the leader was pre-
sented. In the visual framing of the advertisement, the image of the leader 
is immediately associated with the title of the book (The Eternal Buddha), 
which appears in white under his photo. The association is reinforced by the 
body of the advertising text, which claims that “the everlasting light is here 
now” (fumetsu no hikari, ima koko ni), invites people to “read the light, learn 
the immense love” (hikari o yomu. Ooinaru ai o shiru) and promises a return 
to a lost age of love and light:
Sore wa maru de taiyō no yōna hikari ga
Anata no mune no tobira o akete, sashikonde kuru kanji
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Ima made yami ni tozasarete ita kokoro ga
Kumanaku akaruku terasareru kankaku
Sono toki, haruka mukashi ni wasuresatte ita
Ano natsukashii kandō ga
Anata no kokoro ippai ni
Afurekuru koto deshō.
(The sensation that a light, like that of the sun/opening the door to your heart, 
enters you/ and the perception that your heart that was until now enclosed in 
the darkness/ is brightly lit in every corner/ and a nostalgic emotion that was 
completely forgotten long, long ago, will completely fill your heart.)
The nostalgic feeling is the desire for a past—that is, the feeling of nos-
talgia of something precious that resurfaces in the memory and that is con-
tained in the semantic field of the term natsukashii. The lamented past is the 
source of lost values that people, obscured in the shadows, do not know any-
more. Memory is connected to the light, hikari, which appears in the title, 
the subtitle and the first line of the advertisement. The second, fourth and 
sixth lines are constructed in such a way that they include a term related to 
the semantic field of memory and feeling: kanji-kankaku and kandō create 
a rising climax, from a vague feeling to a “sensation” to a “being in (com)
motion” that pulls the reader to the exhortative conclusion. The reader—
the receiver of the message—through the exhortative conclusion and the 
repeated use of “anata” (you) is continually drawn into the message. S/he 
is turned to directly, and exhorted to carry out this change, which in reality 
is none other than a return to a forgotten state of well-being—to an age 
where the light shines. The light is the object of remembrance. According to 
the title, however, the everlasting light is already here (ima koko ni), so the 
change is about to happen—it is very near. The everlasting light is here, but 
in the here given by the textual space, there is (a picture of) Ōkawa; thus, 
Ōkawa is the light. Ōkawa becomes, moreover, the medium of connection 
with the mythic past evoked by nostalgia, a feeling that has a precise mean-
ing in the advertisements:
The seemingly dysphoric connotation of a passion like nostalgia renders 
problematic its presence in advertising. The nostalgic theme is found in 
one layer of separation from its object of value, and recalls the time in 
which it was connected to it. In order for nostalgia to ‘enter’ the adver-
tising discourse it is necessary that the reconnection with the object be 
a reality that is at least possible.
(Melchiorri 2002, 118. My translation)
A text, an image, possesses innumera ble possible meanings, and a fun-
damental role is held by what Eco (1979) calls the “interpretative cooper-
ation” of the receiver, who will privilege a particular representation over 
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another according to his or her worldview (Semprini 1997). A straight-
forward interpretation of the “persuasive communi cation” (Trotta 2002, 117) 
promoted by Kōfuku no Kagaku in this campaign will see t he group invit-
ing readers to buy a book published by the leader. However, a more care-
ful analysis of the text shows how the goal of the advertising language is 
not just to attract new “clients” or “readers”, but also to involve them in 
the group’s project—to make them become “members”. The aim is, there-
fore, not only the sale of a product, but also the activation of a way of 
thinking, a “creating of desire” (Ferraro 1999, 82), while at the same time 
reinforcing the importance placed  by the group on Ōkawa’s publications. 
Indeed, the advertisement invites people to “read the light”, confirming 
the central practice of reading and studying leader’s writings: according 
to Shimada, the catchphrase yomeba wakaru, “if you read you will under-
stand”, was often used by Kōfuku no Kagaku representatives in response to 
questions about the group (1995, 93). In the period under consideration, 
the group was undergoing a transition towards a clearer religious identity 
and needed to legitimise its leader’s authority and to create its own tra-
dition. The campaign was organised, therefore, as a sort of advent of the 
epochal change about to occur due to the actions of a “deity” who had 
descended to earth to carry out his mission of spreading his teachings to 
as many people as possible. From this point of view, it can be deduced that 
the declaration of his identity as the Buddha and El Cantāre that Ōkawa 
would pronounce at the great Tokyo Dome event was actually already 
implicit in the advertising message used in the campaign preparatory to 
the event. From this perspective, the advertising campaign becomes the 
“annunciation” of the Birthday Festival that was presented in the adver-
tising as “the day in which the Tokyo Dome will become heaven” (sono hi 
domu tenjokai to naru).
JULY 15, 1991: THE “SACRALISATION” OF THE LEADER
The birthday celebration (goseitansai) of July 15, 1991 to celebrate Ōkawa’s 
thirty-fifth birthday with an audience of thousands of participants marked 
a fundamental passage in the group’s history. For this reason, it needs to 
be discussed closely. This was not the first public appearance of the leader 
(as previously mentioned, public lectures started already in 1987), but it 
was the first that would be instituted as a festivity that would be repeated 
every year—together with the El Cantāre Festival in December—and that is 
related to a personal event in the leader’s life: his birthday. A central element 
in the analysis of the event is the leader’s image, which, as already empha-
sised in the analysis of the advertising text, gradually increased his central 
role. Ōkawa became not only the principal reference point of the group, but 
also the figure that all members should emulate.
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The event was simultaneously a birthday party, a spectacular event to 
celebrate the group’s success, a religious ceremony for the announcement of 
Ōkawa’s true identity (shōtai) as El Cantāre and finally, a rite of passage for 
both the leader and its members into a new phase of the group’s develop-
ment. Indeed, the ceremony sanctioned the sacralisation of the leader’s body, 
through a process of transformation of the body itself, in order to arrive 
at the final announcement that would decree what Astley defined as the 
passage “from spiritual medium to the Buddha” (1995, 360). The space of 
the Tokyo Dome became the space where the rite of passage was performed 
and the image of the leader was transformed into a new role. The leader’s 
body was also turned into a spectacle to captivate the audience and became, 
paraphrasing Boni (2002), a sort of “consumer product” that was offered to 
the followers through market ing strategies.
The group also used its high-profile members to attract an audience to 
the event. Indeed, the script for the festival (also known as “Ōkawa Ryūhō 
in Tokyo Dome” or “7.15 Tokyo Dome”) was written by Kageyama Tamio, 
a novelist and member of Kōfuku no Kagaku, and presented by the famous 
actress Ogawa Tomoko, who was also a member. At the centre of the stage 
was a very large photograph of Ōkawa (Nijū Isseiki 1991, 97). The first part 
of the event was a celebration of the success attai ned by the group. After the 
announcement by Ogawa that the event would become a legend that would 
continue to be told for hundreds and thousands of years (Shūkan Gendai, 
August 3 1991, 46–49), a procession of more than 700 members represent-
ing the different branches around the country, called “shishifunjin bosatsu” 
(lion-like Bodhisattvas, Astley 1995, 361), marched on stage. Each of them 
was said to have converted over 100 peopl e (Shūkan Gendai, August 3 1991, 
46–49; Astley 1995, 361; Egawa 1991b). The march was followed by the 
announcement of membership fig ures achieved by July 7th (the actual day of 
the leader’s birthday): 1,527, 278! which provoked an eruption of thunder-
ous applause and shouts of joy from the audience. The chanting of the main 
prayer of Kōfuku no Kagaku, the Dharma of the Right Mind (shōshin hōgo), 
introduced the second part of the event, when the leader arrived to give his 
announcement. Ōkawa’s entry, recalling the stairway descent of celebrities, 
was sarcastically described in the press media, such as, for example, in the 
magazine Friday:
Afterwards, in a swirl of laser beams of a thousand colours, the stars in 
heaven were reflected on the roof of the Dome. The front of the stage 
was enveloped in smoke and in the middle of a bluish light appeared 
a plump figure. Finally the entrance on stage of the founder. Ōkawa 
slowly descended the white staircase, like the one used in Takarazuka.13
(Friday, 31, August 2, 1991, 22. My translation)
Ōkawa, dressed in a blue business suit, addressed the audience with the-
atrical postures and gestures, his tone of voice resounding and majestic. He 
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raised his arms to the sky and declared his “Proclamation of El Cantāre” 
(Eru kantāre sengen, Ōkawa 1994, 14):
Anatagata no mae ni tachitaru wa,
Ōkawa Ryūhō de atte,
Ōkawa Ryūhō de wa nai. 
Anatagata no mae ni tachi,
eien no shinri o kataru wa,
eru kantāre de aru.
Ware wa, kono chikyū no saikō no kengen wo nigiritaru mono de aru.
Ware wa, kono chikyū no hajime yori owari made
subete no kengen o aru mono de aru.
Naze naraba,
ware wa, ningen de wa naku,
hō sono mono de ari kara da.
(Ōkawa 1994, 16–17)
[The one who stands before you is Ōkawa Ryūhō, yet it is not Ōkawa Ryūhō. 
T he one who stands before you and speaks the eternal God’s Truth is El 
Cantare. It is I who possess the highest authority on earth. It is I who have all 
authority from the beginning of the earth until the end. For I am not human, 
but the Law itself] (translated in Astley 1995, 360).
Ōkawa had already professed before that he was the Buddha, in a text 
publishe d in 1989 and entitled, Budda saitan (“The Rebirth of Buddha”, 
Nijū Isseiki 1991, 98), but the declaration during the Birthday Festival was 
the first public an nouncement of his true identity as the Greatest Spirit of 
the Terrestrial Spirit Group, El Cantāre. Therefore, the spectacular event 
became a ceremony and at the same time a performance,14 concluding the 
path of what might be called the “coronation”15 of the charismatic leader. 
In another event that started in December of the same year and is called the 
El Cantāre Festival (Eru kantāresai), the coronation would actually be com-
pleted by the leader appearing on stage with a gold robe, a golden sceptre 
in his hand and a golden crown adorning his head (Astley 1995, 362).16 In 
order to claim his legitimacy as a religious leader, Ōkawa had to appeal  to 
an established and legitimised tradition. Therefore, he declared himself the 
Buddha before introducing a new original deity, one that is considered both 
a continuity with an established religious tradition and a superior stage to 
other teachings. The Buddha announced in the advertising campaign was 
now manifest, and the first proof of his authority was founded on the ful-
filment of the prophecy regarding the increase of followers. The spectacle 
emotionally connected the members (who are addressed as “angels of light”, 
hikari no tenshi) to the leader and his project. Indeed, during the Birthday 
Festival, Ōkawa also announced the plan of converting all Japanese peo-
ple to Kōfuku no Kagaku (zenkokumin kaiin ka senden, Nijū Isseiki 1991, 
99) and invested the participants with the task of being messengers of the 
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“light” (hi kari). By participating in the ceremony, the followers became part 
of the event itself and the spectacle created a strong sense of community: 
the breadth and enthusiasm of the audience became the reconfirmation of 
its fidelity to the leader. The role of participants was not only to witness the 
epochal event; they also performed a participatory and emotional role. Ōka-
wa’s proof of his capability as a “great man” (Pace 1986) was confirmed by 
the ability to attract crowds and to arouse them. His figure, now sac ralised, 
became the centre of the group’s practice. The following year, the gohonzon, 
a picture of Ōkawa with the inscriptions “Shaka Dainyorai” (“Great Buddha”) 
and “Kōfuku no Kagaku” (Astley 1995, 346), was introduced as main object 
of worship. Gohonzon refers both to the main figu re of worship (that is, El 
Cantāre) and to the main object of worship used during practice, such as, 
for example, an icon or statue symbolising one aspect of El Cantāre. One 
example of this is a photograph of the leader with a list of names below it 
indicating his previous manifestations (such as El Cantāre, Hermes, Buddha, 
La Mu, a king of the legendary continent of Mu, and Thos, a king of the 
mythical contient of Atlantis) that is also used on the altars at the centres.
Some newspapers collected testimonies of members who apparently dis-
agreed with the changes in the organisation (Hayakawa 1991b, 64–65), but 
for Kōfuku no Kagaku and its leader, the year 1991 is still considered a cru-
cial moment in the history of the group, as is demonstrated in various videos 
created by Kōfuku no Kagaku and as has been confirmed in my various 
conversations with members over the years.
So far, the event has been considered as similar to a rite of passage or 
a ceremony, but the use of the media in the event itself has not been yet 
discussed. The event did not take place in a television studio and was not 
initiated by television channels or other media enterprises. Therefore, it was 
organised outside of the mass media. However, the advertising campaign 
analysed above played a crucial role in preparing the audience for the event 
and for Ōkawa’s declaration. Furthermore, similarly to Agonshū’s events 
discussed in Chapter Three, the ceremony was broadcast live at Kōfuku no 
Kagaku branches around the country. In this way, the audience was enlarged 
to include all the members who could not physically be present in Tokyo. 
Furthermore, the event was recorded and distributed by Kōfuku no Kaga-
ku’s publishing house on videocassettes. Therefore, the lack of repeatability 
that characterises traditional ritual ceremonies has been replaced by repro-
ducibility, in which special and temporal ways of fruition are dilated. The 
video can be seen in different places from where it was performed, and 
even years later. The ritual continues to be performed every time the video 
is seen, becoming a sort of testimony for followers, who, by viewing it, are 
able to re-enact the experience of being there and being able to remember 
a defining moment in the history of their organisation. Finally, because of 
its visibility, Kōfuku no Kagaku was in the media spotlight and its activities 
were under intense scrutiny. The Birthday Festival attracted press attention, 
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and sarcastic reports about the grandeur of the event were published, along 
with criticism regarding the movement’s finances and Ōkawa’s legitimacy as 
a religious leader. It is on the consequences of this increased public attention 
that the following sections will focus.
THE KŌDANSHA FRIDAY AFFAIR: THE “DESECRATION” 
OF THE LEADER
The process of the “divination”, or making sacred of the leader’s body by 
creating a spectacle of it, could be connected to what the sociologist Erving 
Goffman, in his study of symbolic interaction (Goffman 1961), defines as 
a front stage and backstage. The front stage is the public performance, the 
spectacle staged by the leader and his powerful motivational speeches, while 
the backstage is what takes place behind the scenes. Everything that remains 
behind the performance, from rehearsals to the leader’s private life, must not 
be visible because it could damage the image of spontaneity and the leader’s 
credibility. This separation between front stage and backstage is essential 
when performing roles principally based on mystification and on an aura of 
greatness. However, the leader’s media exposure could lead to very differ-
ent outcomes. On the one hand, it can be useful to disseminate the leader’s 
teachings, increase his/her visibility and project an image of a powerful and 
large organisation. On the other hand, it could achieve the opposite effect, 
making the leader exposed to attacks and therefore weaker:
[. . .] as a spectacular celebrity ‘sold’ to his audience, the leader is more 
and more vulnerable, and his legitimisation ever more fragile. Nor does 
the construction of a politician as a media celebrity (in television and 
newspapers) signify a restoration of the aura of sanctity of a star: the 
television personality is one about whom everything is known, whose 
private life is dug up by reporters just like the wrinkles of his skin by the 
lens of the photographic and television cameras; and the same applies 
for the political leader, and naturally for his body.
(Boni 2002, 37–38. My translation.)
This undifferentiated and intimate scrutiny could cause the loss of aura of 
 the leader and the decline of his/her authority (Meyrowitz 1985, 167) from 
the moment in which s/he is scrutinised by the camera—an aura that was 
based on the  distance between him/her and the audience and that disap-
pears following the staging of the backstage region. In Ōkawa’s case, we can 
understand the backstage region as his private life, which in the early years 
of the group’s development was completely safeguarded and separate from 
his public image. However, the considerable expense incurred for the adver-
tising campaign, the extravagant Birthday Festival, as well as the (at least 
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perceived) rapid increase in followers (coupled with the leader’s announce-
ment of his plan to convert the entire nation), attracted the attention and 
criticism of the press media, in particular, the tabloids. Between the second 
half of 1991 and the beginning of 1992, a series of satirical publications 
also appeared, such as the book co-authored by Yonemoto Kazuhiro and 
Shimada Hiromi that presents a parody of Ōkawa’s reigen (Yonemoto and 
Shimada 1992; see also Yakushi’in 1991). Numerous newspapers and mag-
azines published articles attacking  or ridiculing the group. In the seco nd 
half of 1991, the magazines Friday, Shūkan Gendai and Gekkan Gendai 
published more than 40 articles over three months on Ōkawa and Kōfuku no 
Kagaku (Fukui 2004, 75). Some of the articles, using tones similar to those 
used for celebrities involved in scandals, focused their criticism principally 
on the supposedly large donations that members were required to make to 
finance the advertising campaign and the Birthday Festival, and accused 
the group of resembling a business more than a religious group (see, for 
example, Gekkan Asahi, May 1991; Sukora, May 23, 1991; Shinchō, 45, 
September 1991).
An article that appeared on August 3, 1991 in Shūkan Gendai, for example, 
reported alleged testimonies from members denouncing how local branches 
were forced to raise large sums of money to support the Birthday Festival 
or how they were asked to sell hundreds of tickets (Shūkan Gendai, 48). It 
also included the testimonies of distressed family members whose siblings 
had donated their belongings to the group. These accusations, which follow 
recurrent patterns used in critical reporting of new religions both in Japan 
and elsewhere (especially regarding large donations and worried family 
members), attacked mostly the external aspects of the organisation, such as 
its organisational structure and its finances. However, attention also turned 
to the leader himself, and it was a series of articles attacking the leader and 
his privacy that aroused a vigorous reaction by the group and led to the 
Kōdansha Friday Affair in September 1991. In particular, the most contro-
versial article was published in the weekly Friday on August 23/30, 1991 
(Hayakawa 1991a). The article aimed to expose the “other side” (uragawa) 
of the ambitious leader Ōkawa, who claimed to  be the Buddha, and of the 
greedy group that was labelled a “bubble religious group” (baboru kyōdan). 
The article reports an alleged testimony by Ishihara Tsuneji, a former officer 
of the new religion GLA, according to whom Ōkawa, when he was still a 
company employee, went to see him under a false name for a consultation 
about his obsessions:
He came to consult with me about a neurosis, saying: ‘While I was read-
ing the book Shinsōseiki [True Genesis] by Takahashi Keiko of GLA I felt 
strange. A fox entered inside me. What should I do?’ He [. . .] was in state 
of profound depression. [. . .] He also used the name Nakagawa Ichirō.
(Note: his real name is Nakagawa Takashi.) 
(Hayakawa 1991a, 80. My translation.)
Mediating the Leader’s Image 105
The profanation of the leader continued with an invasive discussion of 
his private life in order to  depict him as a person who was very ordinary, 
if not even banal, compared to his autobiographical account, in which the 
first signs of his special quality and future mission are portrayed as already 
evident during his childhood. In other articles in the following months, 
the same journalist, Hayakawa Kazuhiro, reported interviews with former 
schoolmates from high school and university who expressed their surpr ise 
that someone who was a very ordinary young man and student had become 
a religious leader (Hayakawa 1991b and 1991c).
The denigration of the leader’s mind and personality took place next, 
through an attack on hi s mental state with morbid details of his presumed 
consultations with the GLA doctor and with an invasion into emotionally 
intimate spheres, such as the memories of his childhood and adolescence. 
In reality, some articles prior to the Birthday Festival event had also made 
allegations about Ōkawa’s mental health, but the danger of these particu-
lar accusations was strongly perceived by the group since the attack was 
directed at the “divine body” of the leader, after his declaration of being the 
reincarnation of El Cantāre, in an attempt to reduce it to the level of any 
ordinary man (or worse, of a man who is not sane) and thus to desecrate it.17
Hayakawa’s article, which was later proved to be based on incorrect infor-
mation and mistaken identity, triggered a campaign of action that started in 
September 1991. On September 2, 1991, Kōfuku no Kagaku’s followers, led 
by high-profile members Kageyama Tamio and Ogawa Tomoko, held demon-
strations around Tokyo and protested in front of Kōdansha’s head office. The 
event came to be named the Kōdansha Friday Affair (Kōdansha furaidē jiken), 
referring to the tabloid Friday that was at the centre of the protest (Fukui 
2004, 75). The protest campaign consisted of demonstrations, the distribu-
tion of pamphlets and, above all, sending hund reds of faxes and telephone 
calls, blocking Kōdansha’s telephone lines and disrupting work for several 
days (Astley 1995, 370). In an interview with the Mainichi Shinbun, Ōkawa 
accused Japan of not understanding Kōfuku no Kagaku becaus e it was not 
used to the experience of revealed religions, but rather to religions based on 
texts. He appealed to the freedom of religious belief against the criticism in the 
press, and in answer to the question of why he had gotten angry with Friday in 
particular, he accused Friday’s article of reporting false information:
I have certainly never met that person [He is referring to Ishihara Tsuneji, 
the one who testified regarding Ōkawa, saying, ‘He came for a consul-
tation about neurosis’ in the Friday article that became a problem] not 
even once. Even he himself said, ‘I’ve never met Ōkawa’, and he called 
on the phone to tell me that.
(Sunday Mainichi, 1991, 182. My translation.)
The group’s action came as a surprise to the public and the media. Several 
television debates were devoted to the protest, including interviews with 
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members and other involved parties (such as, for example, Ishihara Tsuneji, 
who declared that his account had been fabricated). Kōfuku no Kagaku 
therefore received extensive media coverage. During television debates, its 
actions were described as a way of protesting that had never seen before, and 
the tabloid’s wrongdoings were recognised. However, Kōfuku no Kagaku 
tended to be portrayed as a very unusual and litigious group. In the follow-
ing months, reporting about Kōfuku no Kagaku sharply decreased; it looked 
as if Kōdansha’s experience and Kōfuku no Kagaku’s aggressive response to 
criticism had sent a tacit warning to the press media that it was safer not to 
report about this group.
Members of Kōfuku no Kagaku, including the writer Kageyama Tamio 
(in the position of director) and the actress Ogawa Tomoko (as assistant 
director), founded the National Association of the Kōdansha Friday Victims 
(Kōdansha Furaidē Zenkoku Higaisha no Kai, Numata 1995, 196–197). 
About three thousand members filed lawsuits against Kōdansha for spiri-
tual damage (seishinteki kōgai soshō, Astle y 1995, 371), claiming that the 
libellous accusations had injured their faith. The association described itself 
in this way:
The Nat ional Association of the Kōdansha Friday Victims is an associa-
tion of citizens who are victims of the distorted and defamatory articles 
by the media connected to Kōdansha, including the photographic weekly 
Friday and others. The association [. . .] has developed activities to pro-
tect faith and human rights from ‘violence of the press’.
(Kōdansha Furaidē Zenkoku Higaisha no 
Kai 1995, 204. My translation.)
The court case that followed the protest lasted for many years. The as socia-
tion published some texts concerning the Kōdansha incident,18 among which 
a significant example is given by the comic book Kibō no Kakumei (“The 
Revolution of Hope,” Kōdansha Furaidē Zenkoku Higaisha no Kai, 1995), 
from the name used by the group to describe the actions of members pro-
testing again st Kōdansha, and which I will outline below to indicate Kōfuku 
no Kagaku’s attitude towards the affair.
Kibō no Kakumei: The Revolution of Hope
The book is structured in two parts: the first contains a manga that spans 
four chapters, and the second provides the transcription of a discussion 
between the director and assistant director of the National Association of 
the Kōdansha Friday Victims and an account of the legal actions against 
Kōdansha. The text is presented as the record of the truth (Kōdansha 
Furaidē Zenkoku Higaisha no Kai, hereafter KFZHK 1995, 1) of the people 
who initiated an organisation against the “violence of the press” (genron no 
bōryoku, KFZHK 1995, 1) in order to build an ideal society based on spiritual 
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values and faith (KFZHK 1995, 1). In the introduction, reference is mad e 
to the birth of Lucifer, hell and the struggle between evil and the light of 
Buddha,  which continues to the present day and reaches as far as the third 
dimension in which we live. In this way, with the image of a city divided in 
two and contested between evil forces and heavenly ones, the theme that 
runs through the entire narrative is introduced: the eternal struggle between 
good and evil.
The ethical connotation that the struggle assumes is included in the first 
chapter, centred on the personal experience of a group member who was 
a witness at the trial. The narrative, in fact, following questions from the 
judiciary, reconstructs his conversion (from the casual reading of one of the 
leader’s books bought in a bookstore to becoming the director of a local 
branch), trying to emphasise his moral integrity (he refuses to involve his 
students in the religious group so as not to take advantage of his role as 
a teacher by influencing them, he helps parents who are in trouble and so 
on) and the depth of his faith (his proselytising activity), a virtue brusquely 
wounded by the attacks in the newspaper articles, which caused, more than 
anything else, according to his words, “damage to his spirit” (kokoro no 
higai, KFZHK 1995, 35).
In the second chapter, titled “The Evil of Our Time” (Gendai no akuma, 
KFZHK 1995, 63) appears, embodied in the Kōdansha publishing house, 
whose story is told. The reconstruction shows the demonic origin of the 
c ompany’s members, who are accused of having sold their souls to the devil 
and of having violated human rights on several occasions (KFZHK 1995, 
68–71), and it draws attention to their amorality. The proof of contact 
between evil and the group is also given by the sudden dea ths of many of the 
directors of the publishing house. The battle takes place in the third chapter, 
where the forces of evil, thanks to the press, seem to have the upper hand, 
but, from Japan, the “light of hope” (kibō no hikari, KFZHK 1995, 131), 
incarnated in El Cantāre, is radiating. The victory of good leads the members 
of the group to rise up against the evil Kōdans ha publishing house’s immo-
rality. The beginning of the dispute and the “revolution of hope” (kibō no 
kakumei, KFZHK 1995, 139) are related in the fourth chapter.
The moralising tone of the comic book is maintained in the dialogue 
between the director and assistant director, which focuses mostly on the 
defence of the “right religion” (tadashii shūkyō) destined to “renew the 
world” (yonaoshi, KFZHK 1995, 155) and on criticism of religion when it 
is used for mere appearance’s sake (for example, the Zen meditation courses 
organised by B uddhist temples for company employees are criticised as 
superficial). The proposal put forward is that of a lifestyle of faith that leads 
to expressing one’s faith even in everyday life, in working relationships or in 
conversation with acquaintances, and implementing a constant activity of 
proselytism (KFZHK 1995, 155). Through this perspective, the affronts of 
the newspaper articles are considered offences against faith and thus are the 
cause of spiritual damage.
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The conflict between Ōkawa and the publishing house expanded to 
include not only all his followers, but also all of society disturbed by the 
conflict between hope and damnation. The protest against the defamatory 
articles became then a protest against spreading immorality and the victory 
of the cause, as proof that the “age of religion” (shūkyō no jidai) has truly 
arrived (KFZHK 1995, 189). The text concludes with a detailed account of 
all the hearings of the proceedings brought in various cities of Japan and 
with th e information necessary to join the group or to receive other materi-
als regarding protests against mass media.
The Kōdansha Friday Affair emerged as a direct attack on the media’s 
power. At the same time, however, the fact that the protest against Kōdan-
sha used the media themselves for its diffusion—both with the publica-
tions released by the groups and with members’ frequent interviews in the 
press and TV appearances—shows the ambivalent relationship Kōfuku no 
Kagaku had with the media. In particular, as shown by this manga, Kōfuku 
no Kagaku used media forms to construct images of “evil” and to attack its 
enemies in a very similar way (and using similar arguments) to the ways in 
which journalists had used newspapers and magazines to criticise the group. 
The construction of the enemy and of “evil” in the group’s publications is 
also evident in its portrayal of other new religions, as will be discussed in 
the following section.
Beyond the Kōdansha Friday Affair
Kōfuku no Kagaku’s protest against Kōdansha showed the group’s ability 
to mobilise members, who gathered round their leader to safeguard his 
image, vehemently rejecting his desecration. Through activism, the group 
strengthened the commitment of some of its members and drew attention to 
the potential reactions of new religions to criticism. The protest also shows 
an interesting aspect of the relationship between media and new religions. 
Media reporting about new religions can strongly impact how a group is per-
ceived by the general public. However, how the mass media are judged by a 
religious group can strongly impact how members criticise communications 
media (Stout and Buddenbaum 1996). As illustrated in the previous sec-
tion, in Kōfuku no Kagaku’s publications and in Ōkawa’s speeches, the mass 
media became the manifestation of evil and the group’s enemy. In an article 
published in the magazine Shūkan Bunshun, the journalist Egawa Shōko, for 
example, reported on Ōkawa’s public lecture, titled Kibō no kakumei (“The 
Revolution of Hope”, see also Numata 1995, 197–98) at the Yokohama 
Arena on September 15, 1991, in which he vehemently attached Friday and 
Kōdansha and invited the members to protest agai nst the “stronghold of the 
Devil” (akuma no gajō). Egawa describes Ōkawa postures (raising his voice, 
banging his fists on the table and so on) to emphasise his confrontational 
attitude and his explicit attacks on the mass media, which cannot be for-
given for their behaviour (Egawa 1991c, 34).
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The protest, however, also owed its incisiveness to the use of the media by 
the group, and the book that started off the advertising campaig n of 1991, 
Arā no Daikeikoku (“Allah’s Great Warning”), already contained vehe-
ment attacks against the press. In the text, in fact, trust in articles’ contents 
is defined as “faith towards the mass media” (masukomi shinkō, Ōkawa 
1991a, 25) and “Baal worship” (bāru shinkō, Ōkawa 1991a, 25), and the 
newspapers are accused of being only interested in increasing their reader-
ship and o f focusing their attention exclusively on the nega tive aspects of the 
activities of politicians. In addition, the mass media are accused of altering 
their opinions to please as many people as possible and of covering topics 
with too much superficiality and lack of depth.
Following the protest against Friday for reporting defamatory accusa-
tions about the leader, Kōfuku no Kagaku was also able to strategically 
shift the conflict to other topics, in order to potentially attract the interest 
and support of non-members. Indeed, the Kōdansha Friday Affair would 
also signal the beginning of Kōfuku no Kagaku’s civil—and thus political—
activity, in particular with a major protest campaign against pornography in 
the press (Kōfuku no Kagaku Kōhōkyoku 1995). By focusing on topics that 
offended morality, such as nude images, in the counterattack against Kōdan-
sha, Kōfuku no Kagaku attemp ted to attract favourable support also from 
people who might disagree with their methods, but would recognise the rea-
sons for the protest. As mentioned in Chapters One and Two, other new reli-
gions had previously been the object of defamatory campaigns and some of 
them, such as Renmonkyō, reacted by rejecting the accusations and suing the 
relevant organs of the press. In the case of Renmonkyō, however, the group’s 
defensive reactions resulted in a loss of credibility and eventually resulted 
in the decline of the organisation. Kōfuku no Kagaku, on the contrary, used 
the protest to reinforce its image as a powerful and large organisation and to 
strengthen its missionary plan. However, although the group may have been 
able to use the protest to reinforce internal cohesion, the Kōdansha Friday 
Affair created an image of Kōfuku no Kagaku as a litigious group that tried 
to suppress free speech and discussion. As mentioned before, this resulted 
in the mass media avoiding reporting about the group, and general public 
attendance at its public events decreased (Numata 1995, 198).19
Kōfuku no Kagaku also replied to print media criticism by assuming the 
role of protector of public morals and values that the media has at times 
assumed in Japan. In the period following the Kōdansha affair, for example, 
the group initiated strong attacks toward other new religions that it accused 
of being heretical religions (jakyō), notably Aum Shinrikyō and Sōka Gak-
kai.20 The hostile attitude towards other new religions, in particular Aum 
Shinrikyō, was already present before 1991, as the two groups were often 
portrayed as rivals, but it intensified in the following years. It is beyond the 
scope of this book to discuss in detail Kōfuku no Kagaku’s debates with other 
new religions, and some aspects of the rivalry with Aum Shinrikyō have been 
discussed elsewhere (Baffelli and Reader 2011). However, it is important to 
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note that in its attack on Aum Shinrikyō, Kōfuku no Kagaku used accusa-
tions about its leader’s past and his physical appear ance that were similar to 
the defamatory reporting that inflamed the protest against Kōdansha. Once 
again, Kōfuku no Kagaku demonstrated an ambivalent relationship towards 
the media, which were seen as useful and positive (and could be also used 
to damage rival groups) when they could be used to the advantage of the 
group. As already mentioned before, the criticism towards the printed media 
during the Kōdansha Friday Affair was mainly done through publication of 
critical books. Since 1992, Kōfuku no Kagaku has been promoting several 
books that include criticism of the mass media and the press that were par-
adoxically promoted mainly via advertising in newspapers and that were 
included in magazines’ bestsellers rankings (Yamashita 1997, 68). In reality, 
therefore, the protest of Kōfuku no Kagaku towards the media, more than 
being a criticism of their persuasive power and their dangerou sness, which 
would conflict with the use that the group itself makes of these strategies, 
was an efficacious expedient to increase its own popularity, both through 
the criticism and through the responses obtained during the demonstrations, 
and also to safeguard the figure of the leader, whose integrity had been 
threatened by the attacks in the press.
This analysis of the relationship between Kōfuku no Kagaku and the mass 
media at the beginning of the 1990s has revealed how the combination of 
effective strategies linked to doctrinal changes and to communication tech-
niques offered by the mass media has determined the success obtained by 
Ōkawa and his movement. Indeed, even though the data regarding member-
ship are probably inflated,21 the sudden increase in the number of followers 
in a brief period of time and—as numerous articles testify—the great media 
interest generated by Kōfuku no Kagaku’s public events in those years are 
undeniable.
The key to this success could be ascribed to the choice of a malleable, not 
rigidly fixed doctrine that allowed the group to adapt to the requirements 
of contemporary society by proposing a path to salvation realisable in daily 
life, in relationships with friends or in the workplace. The way of present-
ing the teachings also played an important role by adapting the message to 
advertising language, emphasising the leader’s visibility and by exploiting 
mediation practices to spread his teachings.
The representation of a charismatic leader as a deity is not new in the 
context of Japanese new religions. Divine powers are at times attributed to 
founders and leaders to legitimate their authority and enhance their mes-
sages.22 Ōkawa’s distinctiveness lies rather in his mode of interacting with 
his followers and in the creation of an image of a leader that becomes cred-
ible to them through showing himself in public and through the amplifica-
tion of his message in the media. The more the message is spread, the more 
visible the leader will be and the more he will attract new followers, and 
success in membership thus becomes a validation of the leader’s prophecies 
and of his authority.
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In order to maintain authority, however, stability is needed, and so the 
leader must abandon his spontaneity, creating an image in which every 
movement and every word are controlled and measured in order to appear 
as model of perfection. The final development will be the abandonment of 
the body—the creation of an immaterial and virtual leader. Indeed, from 
1995 until 2008, Ōkawa decided to retire from the scene and communicate 
with members mainly through videos.
KŌFUKU NO KAGAKU POST-1995: THE VIRTUAL 
LEADER AND HIS RETURN
The main aim of this chapter has been to analyse Kōfuku no Kagaku’s medi-
ation practices and conflict with press media in early 1990s. However, I 
would like to provide some final comments about later developments in the 
image strategies of the group, in particular regarding the leader’s image and 
use of the Internet.
In 1994, Kōfuku no Kagaku launched a “Big Bang Project” (biggu bangu 
keikaku, Numata 1995, 201), which included a full-scale programme of mis-
sionary work and overseas expansion. In 1995, Kōfuku no Kagaku imme-
diately distanced itself from Aum Shinrikyō, p ublicly denouncing the group 
and emphasising the fact that it had previously alerted authorities regarding 
Aum’s misconduct. However, as discussed in Chapter One, new religions 
and their leaders in general came under strict scrutiny after the sarin gas 
attacks. Kōfuku no Kagaku was also still recovering from the media expo-
sure during the Kōdansha Friday Affair and had a reputation of engaging in 
aggressive activism. Therefore, the group was forced to reconsider its image 
strategies. In 1996, the group stopped holding large events at the Tokyo 
Dome, and instead, festivals started to be held at local branches (where, 
obviously, the access of external media was more controlled). Until 2008, 
Ōkawa communicated with followers mainly via his publications and videos 
that were showed during ceremonies and training meetings. The settings 
used in the videos were very similar. The leader generally appears behind a 
desk or a lectern and speaks through a microphone, the neutral background 
showing only the symbol of the group. Therefore, the direct contact with the 
members, which was essential in early stage of formation of the group, was 
replaced by his mediated image, despite his being still alive and of a young 
age. According to interviews with members I had before 2008, the main 
reason for the limited interactions between the leader and members was 
the amount of energy required for these interactions and for public perfor-
mances. However, I would suggest that the leader’s choice was also connect 
to image strategies implemented after 1995. By withdrawing from personal 
contact with members and by romanticising his own biography, Ōkawa’s 
“backstage region”, which was attacked during the Kōdansha Friday Affair, 
remained strictly under the control of the group’s leadership. Ōkawa was 
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perceived as untouchable, distant to the point where his body became 
“virtualised” (Boni 2002). In this virtualisation, the charismatic authority 
emerging from the direct contact between the leader and his followers was 
undermined, and this despite the fact that t he leader was still alive. At the 
same time, his figure became immaterial, semi-divine, only occasionally 
manifesting itself in a physical sense. The leader’s choice to reduce public 
appearances can thus be turned into an effective means of avoiding criticism 
and maintaining his authority and legitimacy as a spiritual guide. Indeed, an 
idealised image controlled by the group may weaken direct bonds; however, 
at the same time, it can lead to the creation of a more stable public image.
Kōfuku no Kagaku’s communication strategies also impacted its use of 
the Internet. The group established its Internet presence comparatively late 
and its official website appeared online only in December 2004 (although 
a website for its publishing house was already established in 1999, Stae-
mmler 2000; Baffelli 2000; 2010). Compared to its relatively aggressive use 
of other media (first and foremost the press), its use of the Internet until 
a few years ago has been  relatively modes t, both in term s of presence and 
interactivity. After 2004, however, the group has been strongly increasing 
its Internet presence with the creation of several new websites, including 
one devoted to its new political party, Kōfuku Jitsugentō (Happiness Reali-
sation Party), which was established in 2009, promotional websites for the 
group’s movies, websites devoted to specific magazines and a website for the 
radio programme Tenshi no mōningu call (“Angel’s Morning Call”) (Baffelli 
2011). Kōfuku no Kagaku has also been using new forms of communication 
such as podcasts, member-only websites, blogs, social media, such as Twitter 
and Facebook, videos on You Tube, online television and so on.
Ōkawa Ryūhō reappeared on the scene in 2008 and started performing 
public events and lectures again. Until the first half of 2009, images of the 
leader online were sparse and only a very few pictures were reproduced on 
all of Kōfuku no Kagaku’s websites. Just before the 2009 general national 
election, however, Ōkawa suddenly declared that he was the new party leader 
and that he was going to run for election. As a consequence, an increasing 
quantity of advertising materials for the party (booklets, posters, video ads) 
started to be posted on the web, in particular on the party’s official website 
and on YouTube. Furthermore, a website devoted to Ōkawa Ryūhō was 
created, which included his profile, activities and videos. Despite the sig-
nificant presence of Ōkawa on the web, however, his image is still strictly 
controlled. The leader doesn’t engage in interaction with members online, 
and his authoritative role and superiority are made clear and reinforced by 
his virtual representations.
A more recent development was mentioned during a series of conversa-
tions and interviews I conducted with Kōfuku no Kagaku representatives 
and members in July 2014. During our conversations, the members pointed 
out that when they initially joined the group, it was easier to meet the leader 
directly and, when possible, they still travel to see him at public events. 
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Apparently, the members’ need to have direct encounters with the leader 
has been considered by the organisation and Ōkawa has recently started 
to have small, informal meetings, especially with new members. This new 
development would require further investigation, but it seems to suggest 
that, despite the leader being made present to members via videos of his 
speeches and spiritual messages (which also restarted in 2009), publications 
of his writing and spiritual connections through prayers, the mediated image 
may not be sufficient and a reinforcement of direct contact with members 
may be necessary in a period in which Kōfuku no Kagaku, as with other 
new religions, may be facing the challenge of stagnant growth and an ageing 
membership.
NOTES
 1. Until 2008, in English, the group used the name “The Institute for Research in 
Human Happiness”.
 2. Accounts on Ōkawa Ryūhō and Kōfuku no Kagaku can be found in  Arita 
(1991);  Astley (1995);  Baffelli (2005;  2011);  Berthon (1991);  Fukui (1999; 
 2004);  Nijū Isseiki (1991);  Shimada (1992);  Wieczorek (2002);  Winter (2012); 
Yonemoto (1990); Yonemoto and Shimada (1992).
 3. The term “Good News” (ii shirase) is explained by the leader as equivalent to 
the Gospel in Christianity ( Ōkawa 2001a, 174).
 4. Nichiren is a thirteenth-century Japanese Buddhist monk whose teachings 
focused on the Lotus Sutra (hokkekyō in Japanese) and influenced several new 
Buddhist movements founded in the twentieth century, such as Risshō Kōseikai 
and Sōka Gakkai.
 5. In the pre-1991 version of the same text, The Laws of the Sun, Takahashi said 
to Ōkawa that he had to “teach the laws of salvation to save humankind” 
( Ōkawa 1987, 235; Ōkawa 1990c, 209). The recognition as the “rebirth of 
[the] Buddha” was modified in the post-1991 edition of the book.
 6. For example, in conversations I had with members during interviews or at 
the group’s larger gatherings, The Laws of the Sun were often mentioned by 
members as their first encounter with Ōkawa’s teachings.
 7. The cosmology of Kōfuku no Kagaku was largely influenced by the GLA’s doc-
trine. For a detailed explanation about cosmology, see F ukui (2004, 103–107); 
Ni jū Isseiki (1991); Nu mata (1995).
 8. According to explanations in Kōfuku no Kagaku’s publications and websites, 
“El” means “light” and “Cantāre” means “land or earth”. Therefore, the name 
of the deity means “the beautiful land of light, earth” (uruwashiki hikari no 
kuni, chikyū). 
 9. For a detailed explanation of the Principle of Happiness, see  Astley (1995, 
366);  Nijū Isseiki (1991, 132–140).
 10. According to the group, in 2011, Ōkawa entered the Guinness World Records as 
“the most books written in a year by an individual”, having published 52 books 
in 2010. See: http://happy-science.org/ryuho-okawa/ Accessed July 15, 2015.
 11. The same changes are noticeable in the English version of the book. The 1990 
edition uses the term “God’s Truth”, while in 1997, it changed to “Buddha’s 
Truth”. (Ōk awa 1990c, 7; Ōk awa 2001a, 11). The text has also been published 
as a manga in six volumes (one for each chapter), illustrated by Hashimoto 
Kazunori.
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 12. For a complete document, see: http://www.j-ba.or.jp/category/english/jba101019. 
Accessed July 22, 2015.
 13. Takarazuka is an all-female musical theatre in the city of Takarazuka, Hyōgo 
Prefecture, that is famous for its extravagant musical productions.
 14. In the sense derived from the Old French word, performance: “complete”, 
“carry to an end”.
 15. According to  Dayan and Katz (1992), the coronation represents the celebra-
tion of the investiture and recognition of the extraordinary charisma of the 
hero.
 16. See also the video Shinseikai kensetsu (“Establishing a New World”) with the 
recording of the event distributed by Kōfuku no Kagaku’s publishing house, 
Kōfuku no Kagaku Shuppan.
 17. Boni speaks of dethronement, “like all those ceremonies of delegitimization 
that consist of rituals of degradation ( Garfinkel 1955) and that at the time of 
their television representation (and also of their coverage through the press, 
which produces the most intimate details and particulars, taken from stills 
from the television filming) the physical details of the leader are especially 
toyed with, caught during moments of weakness, of anxiety, of tension and 
fear, on which the moral sanction of the spectators inevitably tends to be for-
mulated” ( Boni 2002, 53. My translation.).
 18. The list of texts published in the comic book Kibō no Kakumei is the follow-
ing: Kageyama Tamio, Ogawa Tomoko eds. Shūkyō no Hangeki (“Religion’s 
Counterattack”, 1993) provides details on the Friday case and the trial; Kōdan-
sha Furaidē Zenkoku Higaisha no Kai ed. Kōdansha Bōkokuron (Kōdansha 
Ruin of the Country 1994); Kōfuku no Kagaku Kōhōkyoku, Sutoppu za Hea 
Nūdo. Anata no Kodomo Ga, Abunai! (Stop Uncensored Nudes! Your Chil-
dren are in Danger! 1995) offers details on the violation by the weeklies of the 
law regarding the publication of uncensored nudes images; Kōfuku no Kagaku 
Kōhōkyoku, Genron jiyū VS shinkyō jiyū. (Freedom of Speech VS Freedom of 
Religion 1995). In addition, references to events appeared in many other texts 
published by the group, such as, for example, in Chapter 3 of the text Manga 
de Miru Kōfuku no Kagaku, which is discussed in Chapter Two of this volume.
 19. Kōfuku no Kagaku is still accusing the mass media of ignoring them nowadays. 
In particular, the failure of its political party at the parliamentary elections in 
2009 and 2010 has been attributed to media ostracism toward the group. As 
pointed out by  Reader (2000a, 156) Aum Shinrikyō also blamed the media for 
their political party’s defeat during the Lower House Elections in 1990.
 20. From 1994, several books attacking Sōka Gakkai were published, such as Einen 
no Chōsen (“The Eternal Challenge”, 1995), Sōkagakkai Bōkokuron (“Sōkaga-
kkai Ruin of The Country”, 1995), Sōkagakkai Makeinuron (“Sōkagakkai the 
Dejected Loser”, 1995) and Sōkagakkai Dorakyuraron (“Sōkagakkai-Dracula”, 
1995).
 21. The figure of 5.5 million followers indicated by the group in 1992 was also 
considered unlikely by  Astley (1995, 352).
 22. Worth mentioning, for example, is Konkō Daijin of Konkōkyō, called Ikigami, 
“living kami”, Naganuma Myōkō of Risshō Kōseikai, to her followers Ikibot-
oke, “living Buddha” and Nakayama Miki of Tenrikyō considered the “parent 
of all humanity”, Oyasama.
New Religions and Offline/
Online Interactions
Aum Shinrikyō, Hikari no Wa 
and the Internet
As discussed in Chapter One, Japanese new religions have been latecomers 
to the Internet, and the content of their websites is often limited to provid-
ing information and materials replicated from other publications, such as 
magazines and newspapers ( Baffelli 2011; Kawabata and Tamura 2007).1 
This cautious approach to new media was due to a combination of internal 
and external factors, as has already been discussed in the cases of Agonshū 
and Kōfuku no Kagaku. For example, some movements tend to be more 
conservative in exploring new media technologies at later stages of their 
development and prefer to continue using image strategies that have been 
previously successful.
Furthermore, the interactive features of the Internet require a staff able 
to engage in direct communication with members, but the leader and the 
organisation management may be less familiar with new technologies than 
younger generation of members (who, however, often don’t have the author-
ity to make decisions). Also, leaders may be used to interacting with mem-
bers face-to-face or during larger events, but less inclined to engage in online 
interactions, something that can also be rather time consuming. Regard-
ing external factors, being a relatively open-structured environment where 
potentially anybody could express their own opinion makes the Internet 
very difficult to control effectively in case of defamatory attacks toward 
the movement. F ukamizu (2011) and T amura and Tamura (2011) discuss, 
for example, how a traditional Buddhist sect, the Jōdo Shinshū Honganjiha, 
or True Pure Land Honganji, and Sōka Gakkai respectively received severe 
criticism online and attacks by other religious organisations, notably with 
regard to attacks by the new religion Shinrankai2 on the Jōdo Shinshū Bud-
dhist sect, and how they reacted to it. Online attacks, and the difficulty of 
controlling them, were certainly a matter of concern for new religions imme-
diately after 1995, and they are still a central issue for a group’s reputation 
nowadays.3
This does not mean that all new religions avoid the Internet or only use 
it to post general information. In recent years, for example, also due to 
the diffusion of the Internet and the popularity of social media in Japan,4 
several new religions have created elaborate websites, and communities of 
5
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members or groups managed directly by organisations have increased on 
social media such as Mixi and Facebook. Some movements and their leaders 
have also engaged with the interactive features offered by online platforms. 
For example, Taniguchi Masanobu (1951–), president of Seichō no Ie, writes 
his own blog5 and has been actively using social media, in particular Face-
book6 (Gia mbra 2015, 179–180) and Twitter, to promote his lectures and 
also to involve his readers by talking about his hobbies and daily life activ-
ities (such as preparing jam with his wife or watching tadpoles in the pond 
in his garden). There are also a few examples of social media created by 
new religions in order to connect members, such as, for example, Tsunagaru 
Young Buddha, a social media site created in 2008 (now discontinued) by 
Kōfuku no Kagaku and linked to the website of a magazine published by the 
group for younger members and titled Young Buddha, or PostingJoy, a social 
networking site created by Seichō no Ie and available in Japanese, English 
and Portuguese (Giam bra 2015, 180).
There are also some cases where using the Internet has become a major 
focus of activities, especially when other circumstances make it harder for 
such groups to operate or proselytise in other ways. This is the case with Aum, 
the group responsible, among other crimes, for the sarin gas attack in the 
Tokyo subway, and in particular for its splinter group Hikari no Wa, which 
remains suspect in Japan because of its former connections with Aum and 
which is under constant surveillance by the police and related authorities.7
It is these groups I will especially focus on in this chapter. The aim of this 
chapter is to investigate how online representations can potentially impact 
how religious groups and their leaders are portrayed and understood, and 
how online interactions can potentially reshape the relationship between 
leaders and members. I also argue that online representation reflects how 
leaders are represented in other media and that specific circumstances affect 
what types of media technologies new religions will employ to spread their 
teaching or attempt to improve their reputation.
In order to investigate the use of the Internet by Hikari no Wa, my collec-
tion of online materials (websites, discussions on social media, online videos 
and so on) was integrated with interviews during several visits to Japan 
between January 2009 and July 2014 with Hikari no Wa’s public relation 
representatives, its webmaster and its leader,8 Jōyū Fumihiro. The interviews 
were conducted in Japanese and took place at the group’s headquarters in 
Tokyo and lasted for one to three hours. The interviews covered three key 
areas: Internet use and Hikari no Wa (its official website, its YouTube chan-
nel and Ustream), the group’s future projects and visions (the idea of “Net 
Dōjō”, an online “training hall” to allow potential members to engage with 
the group within the privacy of their houses, which I will discuss later) and 
leader-members interactions online (via Twitter, Mixi, blogs and the devel-
opment of off kai, offline meetings).
From 2008 to 2015, I have followed Hikari no Wa’s use of the Inter-
net and interactions between members and non-members in social media 
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by following Jōyū’s Mixi and Twitter9 accounts and members’ interactions 
and discussions on Mixi. Furthermore, I have gained access to their online 
public talks and online yoga practices. Between November 2010 and Jan-
uary 2011, I also participated in a three-day pilgrimage organised by the 
group and attended seminars, meetings and public events. By focusing on 
leader-members and members-members interactions during my fieldwork 
in Japan, I gained greater insights into the effects of online interactions on 
the group’s internal relationships. In particular, I was able to follow the 
development of the Net Dōjō and the beginning of off kai (literally, offline 
meetings), meetings between Hikari no Wa’s members and users who have 
been in contact with them through Mixi or Twitter.
Before focusing on the analysis of the use of Internet by Hikari no Wa, 
however, a short introduction of Aum Shinrikyō, the most notorious Japa-
nese new religion, along with Hikari no Wa’s development as an offshoot of 
Aum, is necessary.
ASAHARA SHŌKŌ AND AUM SHINRIKYŌ10
Asahara Shōkō was born Matsumoto Chizuo on March 2, 1955 on the 
southern island of Kyushu.11 Asahara was born partially blind and he was 
sent to a special boarding school from the age of six. In 1975, after gradu-
ating from high school, he studied massage, acupuncture and moxibustion. 
In 1977, he moved to Tōkyō hoping to enter the University of Tokyo, but he 
failed the entry examination. In 1978, he married Ishii Tomoko (b. 1958)—
they were to have two sons and four daughters—and opened a Chinese med-
icine business in Funabashi in Chiba Prefecture. Between 1980 and 1984, 
Asahara for some time became a member of Agonshū.12 In 1983, Asahara 
opened a yoga school in Shibuya, Tokyo, and in 1984 founded a group 
first named Aum no Kai, then Aum Shinsen no Kai and eventually, since 
1987, Aum Shinrikyō. Aum Shinrikyō was granted the status of a religious 
corporation under the Religious Juridical Persons Law (Shūkyō Hōjin Hō) 
in August 1989. In 1986, Asahara with some of his followers travelled to 
India for religious exercises where, according to his account, he achieved 
enlightenment. The same year, he published his first book, Chōnōryoku: 
Himitsu no kaihatsuhō (“The Secret to Developing Supernatural Powers”). 
In 1987, he met the 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso (b. 1935), and reported 
that the Dalai Lama had sent him to revive Buddhism in Japan. In 1986, a 
double system of membership was introduced with lay members who took 
part in activities on a more or less regular scale and shukkesha (literally 
“person who left his/her house”, a term used in Buddhism to indicate renun-
ciants), members who had “left the world”, cutting their ties with their fam-
ilies and friends, leaving their jobs or schools and starting a communal life 
with other members (Reader 2000a, 8 ). The number of members increased 
rapidly during the first few years of the activities of the group. In 1989, 
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Aum Shinrikyō reached around 4,000 members, 380 of them shukkesha. In 
1995, the group claimed around 10,000 members in Japan (Reader 2000a, 
6 3). Among them, around 1,100 lived in communes. Many Aum Shinrikyō 
members were young, 47.5 per cent in their twenties and 75.4 per cent in 
their twenties and thirties (Shimazono 2001b , 21). The average age of the 
shukkesha was 30.1 years. Many members were very well educated, having 
graduated from high-ranking universities. Aum Shinrikyō was based on a 
rigid hierarchical structure, including ten ranks for shukkesha and, below 
them, ordinary lay members (Reader 2000a, 8 6). At the top of the hierarchy 
was Asahara himself, who was referred to as the “ultimately liberated one” 
(saishū gedatsusha, Reader 2000a, 1 0), as a “guru” and an “honourable 
teacher” (sonshi). The second rank included only five members with the title 
of “sacred grand teacher” (seitaishi): Ishii Hisako, Tomoko (Asahara’s wife), 
Ācharī (Asahara’s third daughter), Murai Hideo and Jōyū Fumihiro.
Aum Shinrikyō’s teachings combined Buddhist doctrines, yoga prac-
tices and catastrophic millenarian visions with the idea that the world was 
divided into the forces of good and evil and with the importance of strict 
ascetic practices to purify the body and eradicate bad karma.
Aum’s doctrines and practices changed over time, reflecting the shifts in 
Asahara’s teachings and problems faced by the movement when it devel-
oped from a yoga school to a movement with a more explicit religious char-
acter. Aum Shinrikyō’s doctrine13 is based on early Buddhism, Mahāyāna 
Buddhism, Tibetan Buddhism and yoga practices. Initially, the concept of 
the awakening of kuṇḍalinī, the original life energy released from the low-
est of the seven or nine cakras (chakura), as a result of intense austerities, 
yoga and meditation, was central in Aum practice, which focused on yoga 
lessons and healing experiences through yoga (Asahara 1986). Later, t he 
Hindu deity Śiva (Japanese: Shiva) became Aum Shinrikyō’s main object of 
worship, from whom Asahara claimed to be receiving messages and advice 
and of whom he eventually claimed to be a manifestation (Reader 2000a, 
66–67). Wi th the increase in numbers of its members, a more defined cos-
mology was introduced, corresponding to different levels of practices and 
types of yoga. The universe was described as a multi-dimensional structure 
including four realms, the Realm of Desire (aiyokukai), the Realm of Form 
(keijōkai), the Realm of Non-Form (hikeijōkai) and the Mahānirvāna (mahā 
nirubāna) (Asahara 1991). The Realm  of Form is also called asutoraru sekai 
(the Astral World) and it is divided into lower and upper levels, while the 
Realm of Non-Form is also called the Causal World (kōzaru sekai) and 
divided into lower, middle and upper levels (the Mahānirvāna is located 
in the upper causal world). The salvific faith system developed in Aum 
centred on the rite of Initiation (the text Initiation was published in Jap-
anese in 1987 and translated into English in 1988 with the title Supreme 
Initiation). Initiation eventually included several different rituals, but the 
most practiced of them remained the shaktipat (shakutipatto), a Hindu 
initiation practice, which was performed by both Asahara and, from 1988, 
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by high-ranking members (Reader 2000a, 72). The ai m of the shaktipat 
was to accelerate the awakening of the kuṇḍalinī through the transfer of 
power and energy from the guru (or the person who has obtained gedatsu, 
liberation) by placing his or her thumb on the forehead of the person to be 
initiated (Reader 2000a, 72; Shimazono 1995, 394).14 Fina lly, in 1989, the 
teaching of Tantra Vajirayāna (Tantora Vajirayāna) was introduced as well 
as the concept of poa. In Tibetan Buddhism, poa refers to ritual services 
performed for the recently dead, including rituals of intercessions of merit 
transfer between the living and the dead (Reader 2000a, 18). As expla ined 
by Reader, in Aum teaching, the term assumed a more sinister nuance, as 
killing for salvation:
Not only was is used in the context of intercession after death: it also 
acquired a more active dimension, signifying intercession in life to save 
people from acquiring further negative karma that would hinder them 
at death. In other words, poa came to mean not simply an act of merit 
transfer after death, but a practice of intercession beforehand in order to 
‘save’ the unworthy by ‘transforming’ their spirits so they could enter a 
higher spiritual realm. More bluntly, it was used in Aum as a metaphor 
for killing or having someone killed.
(Reader 2000a, 18)
Aum became in creasingly focused on the belief that the world was head-
ing for disaster by the end of the twentieth century and that an apocalyptic 
final confrontation between good and evil—in which Asahara and his devo-
tees would fight to defeat the forces of evil—was inevitable. To prepare for 
this coming event, they began to manufacture weapons and to engage in acts 
of violence against people they perceived as “enemies”, such as journalists 
criticising the group or lawyers supporting family members that accused the 
group of taking away their children or relatives.15 This escalating series of 
acts of violence culminated in the events of March 20, 1995, when mem-
bers of Aum Shinrikyō entered five lines of the Tōkyō subway at the time of 
the morning rush hour, each carrying a plastic bag containing the poison-
ous gas sarin and umbrellas with which to puncture the bags. The attack 
left thirteen people dead and several hundred injured. Two days later, the 
police raided Aum Shinrikyō facilities nationwide, arresting over 400 and 
questioning even more members, confiscating documents and equipment. 
In October 1995, Aum Shinrikyō lost its status as a religious corporation 
and was placed under strict surveillance. Trials against individual members 
began. In early 1996, Aum Shinrikyō was declared bankrupt while facing 
large sums of compensation to its victims. Most members left Aum Shin-
rikyō, and the group’s facilities were destroyed. Finally, on September 30, 
1999, the movement dropped the name Aum Shinrikyō. On February 27, 
2004, Asahara was sentenced to death, a sentence that was confirmed by the 
Japanese Supreme Court in 2006.
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While many of the most senior figures in Aum had been involved in its 
turn to violence, there were many devotees who were innocent of the crimes. 
While the majority of Aum members left the movement shortly after the sarin 
attack, a number remained faithful and sought to maintain the spiritual 
practices they had learned in Aum. For them, the issue of how to pursue 
their faith while demonstrating that they were not a threat to public safety 
has been a recurrent issue ever since.
AUM AFTER 1995: ALEPH AND HIKARI NO WA16
On January 18, 2000, Jōyū Fumihiro (b. 1962) and Muraoka Tatsuko 
(born 1950) announced that the organisation replacing Aum Shinrikyō was 
to be called Aleph,17 and was to be represented by Jōyū and Muraoka, not 
Asahara. They also announced changes in doctrine, stating that they would 
retain the practices of yoga and meditation but would discontinue teach-
ings considered dangerous and wanted “to start from ground zero” with the 
organisation’s structure.18 In 1999, according to the report submitted by 
Aleph in March 2000 to the Ministry of Justice, there were 23 leading mem-
bers, 570 shukkesha and 365 lay members. Asahara was not registered as 
a member and Aleph at that time owned 26 buildings. Currently, Aleph has 
ten dōjō (training centres) throughout Japan.19
In 2004, a minority group led by Jōyū Fumihiro started developing inside 
Aleph. The group was called “daihyōha” (literally, group of the representa-
tive, daihyō, representative/delegate, is the name used by members to refer to 
Jōyū). For a while, the two factions shared the same facilities but organised 
different seminars and other activities. In March 2007, Jōyū and around 200 
members left Aleph and set up a new religious organisation called Hikari no 
Wa (literally, Circle of Light; officially, The Circle of Rainbow Light).
Jōyū Fumihiro was born on December 17, 1962 in the city of Kurume 
in Fukuoka Prefecture on the southern island of Kyushu. Jōyū attended the 
private Waseda High School and then the prestigious Waseda University in 
Tokyo, where he graduated from its Faculty of Science and Technology. In 
1987, he received a master’s degree from the Waseda University Graduate 
School of Science and Engineering. In April 1987, he started working for 
the National Space Development Agency as a scientist. Jōyū first joined the 
group Aum Shinsen no Kai (later Aum Shinrikyō) during the summer of 
1986 at the age of 23 (Reader 2000a). According to his auto biographical 
account (Jōyū 2012), he was attracted to the  group because of his interest 
in paranormal phenomena, supernatural powers and yoga practice. He was 
an avid reader of magazines on “supernatural phenomena”, which gained 
some popularity in Japan from the 1970s onwards, and he became interested 
in yoga and Zen Buddhism during high school. In May 1987, he decided to 
become a shukkesha (renunciant) and to live a communal life with other 
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Aum members, and as a result, he quit his job at the National Space Devel-
opment Agency. In July 1987, he engaged in very strict ascetic training 
practices for three months during which, according to his own account, he 
underwent several mystical experiences (Jōyū 2012, 38–39). After the train-
in g, he received the sacred name of Maitreya20 and became one of Asahara’s 
most prominent disciples. In the fall of 1987, Jōyū was sent to the United 
States to open a new branch of Aum in New York, and then, in the fall of 
1993, Asahara sent Jōyū to Russia as Aum’s representative there. Jōyū did 
not return to Japan until after the sarin gas attack in March 1995, when he 
became Aum’s spokesperson. In October 1995, Jōyū was arrested on charge 
of perjury and forgery in relation to a controversial land deal in 1990 at 
Namino in Kyushu, where Aum had acquired land to set up a commune. 
He was released from prison in December 1999 and, as mentioned above, 
returned to Aum to lead the group during the transition to Aleph and, even-
tually, to found the splinter group Hikari no Wa in 2007.
Approximately one quarter of Aleph members joined Hikari no Wa, but 
some of them left afte r a few months. At the end of 2010, the group num-
bered between 35 and 40 members permanently living in the group’s facili-
ties and approximately 200 “lay members”. Further, the group claimed that 
around 200 members were based in Russia and that during the last few 
months of 2010, around 200 people approached the group and attended 
events and pilgrimages, without necessarily (or yet) joining it.21 The major-
ity of members are ex-followers of Aum and their number has been steadily 
decreasing. As of December 2014, the group is claiming that only nine peo-
ple are in charge of the centres, and that full-time members number only 
17 (in 2012, the number of members leaving in the group facilities was 
27, Jōyū 2012, 250).22 The use of the word shu kke (renunciant) to indicate 
members living communal lives (a term previously also used by Aum) has 
been discontinued in favour of the more neutral term “full-time staff” (senjū 
sutaffu). The estimated number of members, too, has decreased from 180 
(Jōyū 2012, 250) to 114 members.23 There is a formal membership system, 
but most activities and meetings are open to non-members. The group has 
also established a Public Relations Department that deals with issues related 
to requests from media, relationships with local communities and contact 
with scholars.
Initially, Hikari no Wa declared that the focus of the new group would 
not be on the worship of a specific individual or god, but rather on the 
development of the “sacred” in every individual.24 In the same document, 
the group explains that it will incorporate different sacred symbols and 
practices from different religious traditions. At the moment, the group, 
while still encouraging previous practices such as yoga and meditation, has 
publicly renounced the strict and sometimes physically dangerous ascetic 
practices stressed by Aum, and it has started to introduce practices related 
to Japanese religious traditions, such as pilgrimages to sacred places and 
122 New Religions and Offline/Online Interactions
Shinto-based rituals. Hikari no Wa’s website and printed materials present 
the group not as a religion, but as “a place for learning a new spiritual wis-
dom” (aratana seishintekina chie no manabi no ba), a “religious learning 
center” (shūkyō no gakushū sentā) and a “spirituality academy” (supirich-
uaruna akademī”).25
According to a textbook distributed to participants at Hikari no Wa’s 
summer seminar in August 2010 (Hikari no Wa 2010), religion in the twen-
tie th century has been characterised by several problems, including blind 
beliefs, fanaticism and conflict with society and among religious groups. 
Hikari no Wa proposes a “reformation of religion for the twenty-first cen-
tury” (21seki no tame no shūkyō no kakushin) that will be accomplished 
through a threefold path: rejection of blind beliefs (mōshin wo koeru) 
(Hikari no Wa 2010, 37), overcoming dualism  and the struggle between good 
and evil (zenaku nigenron to tōsō wo koeru) (Hikari no Wa 2010, 39) and 
finally, overcom ing the barrier between the religious community and soci-
ety (kyōdan to shakai no kabe wo koeru) (Hikari no Wa 2010, 41; Baffelli 
2012, 37).  More recently, the grou p has started presenting itself as a “reli-
gious philosophy” (shūkyō tetsugaku). Hikari no Wa claims that its doctrine 
introduces a new idea of faith and of the divine and that it is not necessary 
to believe in any particular faith or god in order to be saved. Members, it is 
claimed, do not believe in a transcendental being or in an absolute leader. 
Instead, the focus is on cultivating the “sacred consciousness” (shinseina 
ishiki) in each individual and in particular, the love for all people and all 
things, compassion and benevolence. God itself is seen as a symbol of the 
individual “sacred consciousness.” Special people, such as Buddha, Jesus 
and Muhammad, are external symbols of the divine. Symbols may differ, 
but the sacred consciousness is unique and remains constant. The idea of 
a “guru” or absolute leader, therefore, is rejected, and peace and equality 
among religions are advocated.
Hikari no Wa has also been introducing new practices in an attempt to 
distance itself from Aum Shinrikyō, while retaining aspects of Aum’s teach-
ing and practices that still appeal to members. Hikari no Wa’s activities and 
practices can be divided into three groups. First of all, there are training 
activities performed at the dōjō. Different training methods are used, such 
as yoga, qigong, healing techniques, Buddhist meditation and esoteric Bud-
dhist practices. A variety of objects and techniques are used during medita-
tion, such as music and sounds, incense, Buddhist images, Buddhist statues, 
ritual paraphernalia, “holy” water from sacred places (gojinzui, seizui) and 
astrology. Members are free to choose any of these practices, but they are 
discouraged from engaging in extreme asceticism. Counselling sessions 
with Jōyū and other representatives are also offered at the centres. Further-
more, Jōyū’s preaching lectures are held approximately every month, and 
intensive seminars are held three times a year (in May, August and at the 
end of the year). In 2012, a well-known Japanese therapeutic practice of 
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self-reflection called naikan (introspection) was introduced.26 New prac-
tices are introduced regularly, while previous practices are discontinued 
or modified. In the process of distancing itself from Aum, several practices 
needed to be reconsidered or abandoned, but at the same time, Hikari no 
Wa was attempting to find a new and original identity.
Hikari no Wa emerged from the ashes of Aum Shinrikyō and has tried to 
reshape and reformulate its teachings in order to make them more accept-
able, while at the same time drawing on some themes and image strate-
gies already used in Aum. Therefore, some comments about Aum’s use of 
media are required to understand Hikari no Wa’s engagement with new 
technologies.
AUM SHINRIKYŌ ON THE INTERNET
From the outset, Aum Shinrikyō showed a sophisticated use of media 
for both internal and external use. The group produced a large quantity 
of printed material (books, pamphlets, magazines, leaflets, manga and so 
on), as well as promotional videos, music recordings, radio broadcasting 
(in 1990, Aum established a weekly radio broadcast from Russia), tapes 
of Asahara’s lectures, and anime. The contents of materials produced by 
Aum were conceived differently depending on their audience (members, core 
members or the general public; see Inoue and RIRC eds. 2011, XVII).27 Aum, 
therefore, used its own forms of media to attract new members, support 
current members’ practices, impart esoteric teachings to core members and 
counteract external media representations of the group.
Asahara’s supposed supernatural powers gained the attention of some 
magazines devoted to occult-related topics, such as The Twilight Zone, and 
several members have declared that their first encounter with the group 
was through these publications (Jōyū 2012; Reader 2000a, 100–101; Wata-
nabe 2005). T he publishi ng market played an impo rtant role for the group, 
which set up its own publishing company (Oumu Shuppan) and marketed 
and distributed Asahara’s publications in bookshops (Reader 2000a, 101). 
The first three books by the lead er, Chōnōryoku: Himitsu no kaihatsuhō 
(“The Secret of Developing Supernatural Power”), Seishi o koeru (“Beyond 
Life and Death”) and Inishēshon (“Initiation”) were published in 1986, 
and in the same year, Aum’s first monthly magazine, Mahāyāna, was estab-
lished. Aum also set up an in-house production team called the Manga 
Anime Team, formed by amateur artists, that produced several manga and 
anime to be used for propagation activities (Okada 1997) and to adver-
tise other publications as wel l as goods and shops managed by the group 
(Schodt, 1996, 231). The manga and anime were based on  Asahara’s teach-
ings, and the leader played a central role in their narratives. They also 
featured stories about the experiences of young people joining the group 
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(as, for example, the three volume series Spirit Jump mentioned in Chap-
ter 2 in this volume).28
The relationship between Aum and popular culture received media and 
scholarly attention after the 1995 sarin gas attack. For some critics, the 
apocalyptic and end-of-the-world themes that appeared in several manga 
and anime produced in the 1970s and 1980s influenced Aum’s beliefs, 
and it was suggested that members became unable to distinguish between 
reality and fictional worlds (Gardner 2008). Aum had indeed consciously 
borrowed some  of the atmosphere of expectation about an apocalyptic 
scenario that might occur at the end of the century that had been cre-
ated in pop-culture works of the time. In his memoir, Jōyū Fumihiro (2012, 
37) recalls his fascination for sup ernatural powers and for the apocalyptic 
imaginary. In his opinion, some publications (such as Uchū senkan Yamato, 
“Space Battleship Yamato”) made the members familiar with particular 
topics, and possibly more prone to accepting Asahara’s ideas of the world 
(and the group itself) as threatened by evil forces and to expect upcoming 
disasters. However, the discussions about possible influences from manga 
and anime on Aum’s teachings and actions did not provide convincing argu-
ments to support such claims (Gardner 2008, 215–216). Indeed, as other 
studies have demo nstrated (Reader 2000a; Shimazono 1995) Aum’s teach-
ings and visions w ere strongly i nfluenced by existing apocalyptic concepts 
found in Christian and Buddhist texts. An interesting aspect, however, is the 
ability demonstrated by Aum to follow existing trends and ideas and to test 
new communication strategies.
Aum’s dynamic approach to media is also evident in its use of computer-based 
communications. In 1991, Aum launched its own private network, Aum 
Shinrikyō Net, and set up a discussion room on Fujitsu Nifty Serve, which 
at the time was one of the largest networks in the country (Fukamizu 1994; 
1996; Watanabe 2005, 47). According to a surve y conducted by  Fukami zu 
(1994, 66), in 1994, Aum Shinrikyō Net had 3 00 registered users and half 
of them were members of the organisation. Around 30 users declared that 
they had joined the group through the Net. However, it was also possi-
ble to access Aum Shinrikyō Net as a guest (Fukamizu 1994, 66–67), and 
thus the number of actual users wa s possibly higher. According to opinions 
expressed by the organisation and reported by Fukamizu (1994; 1996), 
there were three main aims for its esta blishment of com puter-based com-
munications: proselytism based on written texts, a possible way to join the 
group and a form of proselytism different from face-to-face interaction. 
Aum Shinrikyō Net provided access to material produced by the group, 
including videos and explanations about teachings, but, more interestingly, 
included a chat site where users could ask questions about Aum Shinrikyō 
directly to the group’s representatives and an area called Free Talk (furī 
tōku), where users could freely express their opinions and ideas (including 
negative comments and criticism against the group, as is indicated by the 
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examples provided in Fukamizu 1994, 72–73). Although the effectiveness 
of computer-b ased proselytism in attracting new members at the time was 
probably very modest, Aum Shinrikyō Net demonstrated Aum’s early inter-
est in new media for proselytism activities. Online interactions also lead 
to the creation of offline meetings, face-to-face meetings for members who 
had met on the Net (Fukamizu 1994, 82), which, although not particularly 
successful a t the time, share similarities with the ofu kai (offline meetings, 
from ofurain mītingu) meetings established years later by Hikari no Wa that 
will be discussed below.
“Aum-Internet” was also the name of the first website set up by Aum 
Shinrikyō a few years later in 1997 (Fig. 5.1), after the sarin attack and 
as Aum’s remaining devotees were trying to come to terms with what had 
happened. The website included detailed information about Aum’s teach-
ings and practices, and users could download Aum music (Fig. 5.2) and 
Asahara’s speeches as well as some of his publications, such as, for exam-
ple, the text Seishi o koeru (“Beyond Life and Death”). Compared to other 
new religions’ websites in the same period, Aum-internet.org offered a 
higher degree of interactivity and showed a deeper attention to graphic 
and content presentation. It also included an elaborate online shop selling 
books, anime, videos and so on produced by the group and a series of 
Fig. 5.1 Advertisement for Aum Shinrikyō’s website.
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Fig. 5.2 Astral music available for download on Aum Shinrikyō’s website.
Aum-related goods (elephant deity Ganesha-shaped hats, mugs, posters of 
the leader, clothes, series of photos of high-ranking members and so on; 
see Fig. 5.3).
Aum-internet.org was heavily modified in July 2000 and replaced with a 
new website, Aleph.to, while the old version was available for few months 
on a mirror site, (aum-shinrikyo.org, maintained by Russian members but 
now discontinued; Baffelli 2000, 61). The new website reflected not only the 
renaming of t he group, but also the new directions that the group intended to 
take. Although at the beginning, Aleph.to maintained graphics (for example, 
the use of pink and blue, with animations) and structures (i.e. members- and 
advanced members-only sections) that were very similar to the old website, 
the figure of Asahara was much less visible (Fig. 5.4).
From the beginning, Aleph has been very active online and has used the 
Internet to keep in contact with members and as a promotional tool. Indeed, 
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Fig. 5.3 Goods for sale on Aum Shinrikyō’s website.
the use of the website as a chief tool for communication allowed the group 
to communicate easily with other members living either in scattered com-
munes or unrecognised as lay members, and to present itself online as a 
community of Buddhist believers and yoga practitioners, to apologise for 
Aum’s earlier activities and to report compensation given to Aum victims 
while ensuring the anonymity of (lay) members.
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Fig. 5.4 Aleph’s official website.
HIKARI NO WA AND THE INTERNET
Fig. 5.5 Hikari no Wa’s official website.
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Fig. 5.6 Hikari no Wa’s Net Dōjō.
Hikari no Wa opened its official website (Fig. 5.5) in conjunction with the 
announcement of the foundation of the new group at the beginning of May 
2007. The website included detailed information about the group’s activ-
ities, practices and doctrine, and also a section called Oumu no kyōkun 
(Lessons From Aum), which contained members’ self-reflections about Aum 
Shinrikyō’s activities, including the 1995 attack and their decision not to 
leave the group after it was found guilty of several crimes.29 The website 
also included the development of a “Net Dōjō”30 (Netto dōjō, recently 
renamed “Net Classroom”, Netto kyōshitsu, Fig. 5.6) to promote specifi-
cally online religious activities, related to the idea expressed at the time by 
Jōyū Fumihiro that “the 21st century will be the place for Internet religion” 
(netto shūkyō).31 According to the group, this would allow members who 
were not comfortable attending practices and activities because they feared 
negative repercussions if they were seen entering the group’s premises to 
still participate in the group’s activities.32 Recently, a Net Shop has also 
been opened that sells CDs and DVDs produced by the group and items for 
Buddhist rituals.33 The website has been modified several times over the last 
few years, following changes in the image the group wants to transmit about 
itself; as mentioned before, between 2013 and 2014, for example, the group 
has been reformed and its now presenting itself as a “philosophy classroom” 
(tetsugaku kyōshitsu) and no longer as a religious organisation.
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In the early stages of its formation, however, online communication was 
mainly focused on conveying Hikari no Wa’s message about its new identity 
and rejection of Aum’s practices. In an interview in January 2009, Hikari no 
Wa’s representatives clearly explained to me that they considered the web-
site both as a way to promote the group and to publicly express their point 
of view concerning Aum Shinrikyō’s activities. Indeed, at that stage of their 
formation, because of economic factors and the difficult position their con-
nection with Aum had put them in, the group had no access to other media. 
Hence, it had to use the Internet to both spread its message and attract exter-
nal media interest. In contrast to the press or to far more expensive media 
such as satellite television, the Internet is easily accessible for most people 
in Japan, and online content is relatively inexpensive to produce. The fact 
that the website was created with the cooperation and input of the group’s 
members indicated the group’s awareness of the potential of the Internet to 
change the group’s perceived image and to improve the possibility of it being 
recognised as a group that was different from its predecessor.
Indeed, the image of the group presented online was initially centred on 
its desire to separate itself from Aum. Often, this image was constructed con-
sciously as the opposite to that of Aum; openness was stressed over exclusiv-
ity, and explanation privileged over secrecy, as can be seen in the inclusion of 
members’ detailed explanations of Aum Shinrikyō’s activities, which stands 
in stark contrast to Asahara’s refusal to speak about such things during his 
trial.34 Finally, the image of the leader played a central role in the negotiation 
of the group’s new identity, and these dynamics are reflected in its use of the 
Internet. Through its online presentation of Jōyū, Hikari no Wa has empha-
sised that Jōyū is accessible and human rather than distant and mysterious. 
The group has strongly and publicly rejected Asahara’s authority and during 
an interviews I conducted in 2009, stated that Jōyū is not a leader or master, 
only a more experienced member of the group.35
The desire to present Jōyū as approachable and open to dialogue has 
translated into specific ways of presenting his image online. Hikari no Wa’s 
website was initially registered under Jōyū’s name (joyus.jp) and, amongst 
other features, included Jōyū’s diary. In 2008, the diary was moved to Jōyū’s 
page on Mixi,36 that at the time was the biggest social network in Japan.37
Jōyū’s Mixi diary took the form of a personal blog, combining musings, 
memories, reflections on his religious practice and training, photographs 
and essays on religious topics. Furthering the group’s desire to appear open 
and democratic, on his website and weblog, Jōyū expressly asked his readers 
for their opinions and invited them to send him their comments by email or 
by joining his friends’ groups on Mixi. Even this process was highly personal 
and interactive; to join the group, people were required to send a message 
explaining why they wished to join. On Mixi, Jōyū immediately attracted a 
significant number of requests to be added to other users’ MyMIXI lists (sim-
ilar to friend lists on Facebook or MySpace), and in June 2009, it reached the 
1000-friends limit allowed by the service. According to the greeting messages 
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listed on Jōyū’s page, many users declared that they wanted to connect with 
him because of his celebrity status, stating that he is famous (yūmeijin) and/
or attractive (kakkōii). To foster this exchange with users, in October 2010, 
Jōyū started a blog (Fig. 5.7),38 in which he also replied to comments and 
questions that had been asked by readers on Twitter.
The group also established a YouTube channel (Hikari no Wa Dōga, 
renamed in 2014 as Hikari no Wa Movie),39 which includes videos along 
with the Jōyū’s public talks and the group’s official press conferences. How-
ever, the possibility for viewers to make comments underneath videos—
which is a leading interactive feature of YouTube —has been disabled. From 
September 2009, the group also started online live broadcasting through 
Ustream, streaming Jōyū’s Buddhist sermons (seppō) from Hikari no Wa 
centres around the country. Initially, the talks were streamed once or twice 
a month. Jōyū’s streaming videos are now freely accessible to everybody, 
but until November 2010, access was limited by a password that could be 
obtained by sending few personal details (name or nickname, gender and 
age) to the representative in charge of the Net Dōjō. In December 2010, the 
group opened a new section of the website entirely devoted to video stream-
ing and the collection of older videos from YouTube and Ustream.40 Unfor-
tunately, because the names of viewers are not visible, there is no way to 
evaluate and observe who the people are who are watching the streamed vid-
eos. The average number of online viewers was initially quite low, between 
20 and 25, but it grew during the last months of 2010 and almost doubled 
Fig. 5.7 Jōyū Fumihiro’s blog.
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by the beginning of 2011. They might be members living far away from the 
centres, or, as pointed out by the group’s representative during interviews, 
members who prefer not to be seen entering the group’s facilities. Or per-
haps, they could all be scholars or police officers who are monitoring the 
group’s activities and new developments.41 Furthermore, just because they 
are watching it, this does not mean that they are engaging with Jōyū’s talks 
and his teachings. Especially in early videos, Jōyū’s lectures were sometimes 
focused on criticising Aleph and stressing the fact that Hikari no Wa had 
rejected Asahara’ s leadership or on presenting rather didactic introductions 
to Buddhism teachings, rhetorically emphasising a clear separation between 
“good” and “evil”. This could possibly indicate his awareness that the view-
ers might not necessarily have been potential members, but also people who 
were interested in monitoring his activities and evaluating his relationship 
with Aum’s doctrines and activities. Thus, these streamed videos also served 
as opportunities for the group to publicly declare their dissociation from 
Aum and to reply to possible criticisms.
The reliance of Hikari no Wa on streaming videos and social media such 
as Mixi and, more recently, Twitter and Facebook, raises questions as to why 
the group had prohibited comments on YouTube and on the leader’s blog. 
I suggest that the answer lies in the characteristics of the specific social net-
working sites and interaction features used by the group. Indeed, despite the 
apparent openness of Jōyū’s image online, interactions with the leader are 
controlled by the group. The inbuilt interactivity of video sharing websites 
such as YouTube, where interaction is encouraged and debates are created 
by users through the comments feature, is very difficult to control for the 
group, which might find an open debate space too challenging and time 
consuming. On the contrary, Ustream is a safer information zone where 
unwanted challenges may be controlled through the use of passwords and 
registration. Similarly, interactions between Jōyū and members/users in Mixi 
were controlled through specific features. For example, anonymous com-
ments were not allowed, and one was required to explain the reasons why 
one wanted to join Jōyū’s blog or the group’s forum. Besides, a function 
called ashiato (footprints) allowed users to check who was looking at their 
profiles. The preoccupation with an uncontrolled stream of comments and 
criticisms were confirmed to me by Jōyū during an interview in November 
2010 when replying to my question about why comments were not allowed 
on his blog. Furthermore, the group’s concerns proved to be true when com-
ments were allowed for the first time live during some streamed talks at the 
end of December 2010. Some of the questions typed on the screen, indeed, 
were completely unrelated to Jōyū’s talk, and the integration of online view-
ers into the live event at the centre proved to be more difficult than expected.
Jōyū’s diary on Mixi offered users an opportunity to get in contact with a 
celebrity of sorts and it therefore attracts users seeking “a sense of connec-
tion with the ‘extraordinary’” (Chin and Hills 2008, 258). Just as fans seek 
to achieve intimacy with celebrities by commenting on their blogs (Chin and 
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Hill s 2008), Mixi users added Jōyū in their maimiku (my Mixi), or friends’ 
list. Jōyū’s confessions on the blog crea ted an image of accessible celebrity 
and increased his credibility, much in the same manner that Redmond has 
noted of larger celebrity culture:
Stars and celebrities confess—they always have invested in the revelatory 
mode of self-enunciation—but in the self-reflexive, ubiquitous, highly 
stimulated environment of 24/7 media culture today, they centrally 
rely on the confessional to authenticate, validate, humanize, resurrect, 
extend and enrich their star and celebrity identities. Stars and celebrities 
confess, and in so doing confirm their status as truthful, emotive, expe-
riential beings who—as devotional fans—we can invest in.
(2008, 109)
But at the same time, these expressions of non-self-disclosure and 
self-disclosure (Chin and Hills 2008) are filtered and controlled: the privileged 
knowledge about Jōyū’s life was based on a selection of accounts and descrip-
tions aimed at constructing an image of an “anti-Asahara”.  Jōyū carefully main-
tains his image as a (relatively) young, handsome and approachable teacher, 
but also as someone who is very serious about his training and discipline.
One of the primary aims of social media is to connect people and facili-
tate communication between users. According to Takahashi (2008), because 
of its specific characteristics, Mixi is a public space that is “nonetheless per-
ceived as private” (Takah ashi 2008, 24) and people tend to “trust it” and 
create “intimate” communities to reinforce real social relationships. There-
fo re, it offered Hikari no Wa a very useful tool to publicly announce to the 
general public its reformed identity. Online popularity is established through 
social media and “depends upon a connection to one’s audience rather than 
an enforced separation from them” (Senft 2008, 26). From this point of 
view, Jōyū’s use of social media represents an adaptation of the traditional 
leader-members inte raction to the new media and an attempt to recreate an 
at least perceived proximity between leader and members. It is possible to 
speculate that social media also offered an opportunity to ex-Aum mem-
bers (most of whom had lived in Aum’s communes) to test the response 
of the public sphere to their return to the everyday world. In an interview, 
Hikari no Wa’s webmaster mentioned that Jōyū himself liked Mixi because 
he didn’t have many opportunities to become friends with “ordinary people” 
(ippan no kata) and to communicate with them.
Hikari no Wa gradually shifted from a one-to-many communication style, 
which still characterises its official website, to an increasing engagement with 
many-to-many communication, which, according to Castells (2001), rep-
resents the main characteristic of the Internet. Instead of integrating the users’ 
participation into the official w ebsite, the “interaction zone”—defined by Hel-
land (2005) as an area on websites that provides not just information, but a 
space where the information provided “can be lived” (Hella nd 2005, 13)—has 
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been located on different sites’ (initially Mixi and more recently, Twitter) privi-
lege networked interactions. It fo llows that these interactive features also serve 
as opportunities for Jōyū to promote a new idea of a religious authority, a 
transparent image of a leader who is no longer untouchable, but who now 
interacts with members, or fans, online, “sharing his or her life in more unfil-
tered manner” (Burns 2009, 50). This accessibility provides an example of a 
very different approach compared to Kōfuku no Kagaku’s leader, Ōkawa, and 
his d ecision to limit direct contact and public exposure from the second half 
of the 1990s to 2008, as discussed in Chapter Four.
A further development in this interaction was the establishment in 2010 
of off kai (offline meetings). The off kai are usually held at public halls and 
create a neutral space where interested (or simply curious) people can meet 
and talk with Jōyū and Hikari no Wa members. During the meetings, partic-
ipants have declared that they prefer to meet the group outside its facilities, 
because they still do not feel comfortable visiting the centres because of the 
“dangerous” image linked to the group or because, especially in Tokyo, they 
don’t want to be stopped and questioned by the police officers who stand 
outside HIkari no Wa’s headquarters.
On December 23, 2010, I participated in an off kai meeting in Tokyo. 
Around 20 external members participated. Female participants were slightly 
more numerous than males and the age range was around 35 plus. The 
meeting was held in a rented room at a public hall in central Tokyo and the 
room was booked under the name of the member in charge of Hikari no 
Wa’s Tokyo centre as Xsan no kai (X = the family name of the Tokyo repre-
sentative). Participants introduced themselves in small groups, disclosing the 
nicknames they used on Mixi and their real names. This was followed by a 
30-minute demonstration of Qigong exercises lead by a Hikari no Wa staff 
member. After a short talk by Jōyū, he invited participants to ask him any 
questions. The questions asked ranged from the existence of UFOs, to the 
idea of direct ascension (asenshon) to Heaven, to how to achieve happiness. 
Jōyū replied at length to each question, using them as prompts to talk about 
Hikari no Wa’s teaching and to criticise apocalyptic thought and competi-
tive society, and to attack Aum and Aleph. Finally, he provided some details 
about Hikari no Wa practices (yoga, Qigong, pilgrimage, meditation) and 
ritual objects, and presented recently released meditation CDs. Participants 
then were divided into small groups (of six or seven members each) with at 
least one full staff member for each group. I was assigned to a group with 
seven participants, including two non-members, two full staff members, a 
long-term member who used to be a member of Aum (but never lived in an 
Aum commune) and a young member who had joined Hikari no Wa in May 
2010. The two external members asked numerous detailed questions, mainly 
about the structure of the organisation (membership, yearly activities, fees 
for participating in activities). They also showed curiosity about why mem-
bers joined Aum in the first place, and why they left and joined Hikari no 
Wa. Both external participants approached the group via Mixi. They both 
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declared that they had some interest in religion, but they were very critical 
about Aum and supernatural experiences. One of them had also read the 
testimonies of ex-members published on Hikari no Wa’s website and he was 
particularly intrigued by in the life history of one of the members in charge 
of Hikari no Wa. It appeared clear that the main aim of attending the meet-
ing was to satisfy their curiosity about Aum and Jōyū. The two full-time 
members in their replies stressed the idea that Hikari no Wa was now free 
from Asahara and they attempted to present their activities as transparent. 
The two external members were repeatedly invited to visit the centre and to 
attend seminars at the centre. In a room next door, participants could have a 
one-to-one conversation with Jōyū or have a trial of Hikari no Wa’s healing 
and meditation techniques.
Off kai seemed to provide Hikari no Wa members with an opportunity to 
present themselves to a larger public and to demonstrate that this was a safe, 
and perhaps even “boring”,42 group. For participants, the off kai was a way 
to satiate their curiosity about Aum Shinrikyō (an interest mainly based on 
media reporting about the group and on their memory of the sarin gas attack) 
in the safe and anonymous environment provided by the a public hall.
Offline/Online Interactions and Religious Authority
The first issue to be considered in discussing these offline/online interactions 
is that the online communications of Hikari no Wa cannot be fully under-
stood without considering the specific historical background of Aum-related 
groups and representations of their leaders. The Internet is not some place 
“other”, but needs to be understood in its relationship with other media 
and offline activities (Baffelli et al. 2011). Indeed, it is important to note 
here that Hikari no Wa represents an exception in the use of the Internet 
by religious group s in Japan, due to the specific situation of the group and 
its relationship to Aum. Many Japanese perceive Jōyū and Hikari no Wa 
still to be linked to Aum, and the fear associated with the group has made 
it very difficult for Hikari no Wa to maintain any form of public visibility. 
As a consequence, the web offers an important tool to the group to spread 
its teachings, claim its new path and engage in dialogue and discussion with 
members and other users.
Similarly, to understand Jōyū as an online “celebrity”, one needs to be 
aware of the history of the group and the role played by Jōyū as spokesperson 
of the group before and after 1995. In particular, immediately after the sarin 
gas attack in March and until the arrest of Asahara in May, as spokesperson 
of the group, Jōyū, together with other members, such as Murai Hideo and 
Aoyama Yoshinobu, frequently appeared on popular television talk shows, 
to the point that he and other members were said to have become more well-
known in Japan than most politicians (Gardner 2001, 139). They were often 
compared to TV “idols” or TV personalities known as talento, and Jōyū 
in particular was portrayed as exceptio nally able in talking with reporters, 
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and he “even succeeded on occasion in getting reporters to laugh along with 
him at his jokes” (Gardner 2001, 140). For his ability to reply to journalists’ 
questions and criticism he was nicknamed “aa ieba, jōyū”, a wordplay based 
on the simi lar sound of the last two words of the idiom aa ieba kō iu, mean-
ing “to have a comeback for every remark”, and his last name (kō iu—jōyū). 
Similar to a popular actor or singer, Jōyū became popular especially among 
young women (called “Jōyū girls”), who founded a Jōyū fan club.43
The interaction between Jōyū and users online also raises some important 
issues related to religious authority. The question of authority on the Internet 
has been the subject of previous theoretical discussion. For example, Campbell 
(2007; 2010) distinguishes between “multiple layers of authority” (2007, 2)—
hierarchy, structure, ideology and texts—that might be affected  differently by 
t he Internet, and also points out the power of religious institutions and com-
munities to shape the way the Internet is used. Baffelli, Reader and Staemmler 
(2011) have discussed through different case studies how religious authority 
is discussed and challenged on the “Japanese Internet” and in a  religious con-
text “in which hierarchy, structures, rituals and practices tend to be greater 
sources of offline authority than are doctrines, religious texts and their inter-
pretations” (Baffelli et al. 2011, 30). As pointed out by other researchers, the 
Internet can potentially challenge the “plausibility structure”—the social (or 
soci ocultural) base that a system, in this case, a system of meaning or beliefs, 
needs for its continuing existence—of a religious group (Barker 2005, 74; 
Berger and Luckmann 1966) and the role and perception of authority, espe-
cially charismatic authority. Charismatic authority, as discusse d in Chapter 
Two, is defined as arising from the perceived extraordinary characteristics 
of a leader (in this case, a religious leader) and developing out of a relation-
ship between a leader and followers. According to this definition, charismatic 
authority heavily depends on this relationship and on the recognition and 
legitimation of authority by members.
On the one hand, although the Internet can offer the potential to chal-
lenge the strong vertical authority structures of many new religions, the 
official webpages of most groups more often than not merely reflect the 
offline structure of the group and, in general, offer low levels of interactiv-
ity, focusing instead on the one-sided dissemination of information and on 
advertising a group’s activities, publications and other products. That being 
said, a close reading and analysis of such websites is still a valuable part of 
the study of the use of the Internet by religious institutions and can help us to 
understand how religious groups present themselves, both to their members 
and the wider public.
On the other hand, social media are creating new spaces in which to relo-
cate authority and assert alternative ways of interaction between a group’s 
leader(s) and its membership, an interaction based on a virtual proximity 
and the sense of intimacy created by a leader’s diary or other online forms 
of personal disclosure. Social media have allowed Jōyū to present his group 
to the larger public by blurring the boundaries between the public and the 
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private and creating the feeling of a quasi-private conversation with the 
leader in a public space. At the same time, the nature of Mixi has allowed 
Hikari no Wa to control visitors and comments, limiting critical attacks, 
especially during the fragile early stage of its separation from Aleph. Differ-
ently from many other weblog platforms, on Mixi, anonymous comments 
from non-registered members are not allowed. This means that negative 
comments, which are common in other forums (see Tamura and Tamura 
2011), were less frequent and Hikari no Wa could also control its share 
of Mixi’s content by refusing or revoking users’ registration. In  this case, 
an efficient use of social media, demonstrated also by the ability to move 
to different platforms when Mixi decreased its popularity with Japanese 
users, can be seen as a means to strengthen authority, reinforcing the official 
images of a leader who is open to dialogue and criticism, while all the while 
maintaining careful control of his/her self-disclosures and interactions with 
members/users. A further observation regarding religious authority online 
arises when we consider the fact that in online interactions, the boundaries 
between religion and entertainment can potentially become increasingly 
blurred. Jōyū became a Mixi celebrity, but the idea of a “celebrity-leader” 
is not created online, but replicated by his offline image as a talento, which, 
as mentioned earlier, was created by television in the late 1990s, confirm-
ing that online representations of religious leaders should be understood 
not as opposed to, but rather complementary to, their representations 
in other media.
Despite Zaleski’s prediction that the Internet will favour religious organ-
isations that “lack a complex hierarchy” (1997, 111), Hikari no Wa’s exam-
ple shows that online engagement by a (charismatic) leader might reinforce 
his/her claim of authority (and also a claim of rejection of a previous type of 
authority) and offer the possibility of reaching a wider audience. Hikari no 
Wa’s case, however, has also demonstrated that strongly controlled online 
interactions may not necessarily attract new members (Hikari no Wa is now 
a very small group). However, they do provide support to a movement that 
otherwise has difficulty gaining access to other media44 to enhance its visi-
bility and to attempt to extend its message to the public sphere.
NOTES
 1. Studies on religion and the Internet developed in late 1990s. The first study 
investigated online practices and their effects on traditional religious practices 
and religious identities ( Beckerlegge 2001;  Cobb 1998;  Davis 1998;  Dawson 
2000;  Dawson and Hennerby 1999;  Larsen 2001;  O’Leary 1996; O ’Leary 
and Brasher 1996; Za leski 1997). Dawson and Hennerby conducted one of 
the earliest surveys on new religious movements on the Internet and included 
two Japanese groups (D awson and Hennebry 1999: 22-3). The Journal of 
Computer-Mediated Communication devoted three Special Issues to religion on 
the Internet in 1998 and 2007 (one of the two Special Issues in 2007 included 
several articles on Japanese religions online). Further studies have developed 
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conceptual frames to analyse religion online (He lland 2000) and for defining 
cyber-religion (Br asher 2001; Hø jsggard 2005). Other studies addressed spe-
cific topics, such as online religious communities (Be rger and Douglas 2009; 
Ca mpbell 2005; Da wson 2004) and religious authority online (Baffelli, Reader, 
and St aemmler 2011; Ba rker 2005; Bu sch 2011; Ca mpbell 2005; 20 07; 20 10; 
Ch eong et al. eds. 2012; Ch eong, Huang, and Poon 2011). In the last few years, 
a news term, digital religion, has emerged in a number of publications and 
conferences to describe the mediation practices of religion online (Ca mpbell 
ed. 2013; Ch eong et al. eds. 2012; Ho over and Enchaibi 2012). For different 
waves in research on the Internet and religion, see Ca mpbell 2011. Regarding 
the Japanese context, earlier studies on Japanese religion online include Ik e-
gami and Nakamaki (1996); In oue ed. (2003); Ku rosaki ed. (2000); Ta mura 
(1998); To sa (1998). In 1998, a research project named the Archive for Religion 
Information was set up at the Institute for Japanese Culture and Classics at 
Kokugakuin University. In the following years, other projects were supported 
by the Japanese Association for the Study of Religion and Society, such as “Jōhō 
Jidai to Shūkyō” (Information Age and Religion, 1996–98, led by Nakamaki 
Hirochika, http://jasrs.org/projects/information-age.html) and “Intānetto to 
Shūkyō” (Internet and Religion, 1998–2001, led by Tamura Takanori, http://
jasrs.org/projects/jasrs-cmc/index.html). These were followed by the project 
on “Shūkyō Comyunikēshon” (Religious Communication) in 2001, renamed 
“Shūkyō to Jōhō Gijutsu” (Religion and Information Technology) in 2011. In 
1999, the project “Cyber Religion Self-Representation and Self-Understanding 
of Religious Communities on the Japanese Internet—The WWW as a Source 
for Japanese Studies” was established at Tübingen University (Germany) and 
led by Klaus Antoni, Birgit Staemmler and Petra Kienle.
 2. Shinrankai emerged out of the Honganji sect in 1958 and was founded by 
 Takamori Kentetsu (born 1929), a former Honganji priest. Until the 1990s, 
Shinrankai openly attacked Honganji’s doctrine and practices and organised 
protests against the sect (I noue 2005). Although now the group seems more 
focused on propagation activities, it also uses the Internet to continue its crit-
icism of Honganji (F ukamizu 2011).
 3. In a recent conversation with the webmaster of one of the largest Japanese new 
religions, it was mentioned that the main request from the group was to do 
online damage control because of numerous critical websites or defamatory 
discussions on social media.
 4. Japan has one of the highest rates of Internet penetration in the world. In 2014, 
86.03 per cent of Japanese population had access to the Internet. See: http://www.
internetlivestats.com/internet-users-by-country/. The number of users almost 
doubled between 2000–2004 (http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/
japan/). According to recent survey, most users access social media both on 
mobile phones and desktops. The most popular social media are Line, Goo-
gle+, Facebook and Twitter. See: http://www.soumu.go.jp/iicp/chousakenkyu/
data/research/survey/telecom/2014/h25mediariyou_1sokuhou.pdf. All websites 
accessed July 23, 2015.
 5. http://masanobutaniguchi.cocolog-nifty.com/monologue2/2015/07/post-
4eb7.html. Accessed July 17, 2015.
 6. The Facebook account is public: https://www.facebook.com/Seichonoie.Pres-
ident; his Twitter account is: https://twitter.com/seicho_no_ie. Both accessed 
July 17, 2015.
 7. Aum splinter groups are monitored under two new laws introduced in 1999, 
the Victims’ Compensation Law (Higaisha kyūsaihō) and the Organisational 
Control Law (dantai kiseihō). Under the laws, inspections are regularly carried 
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out at the groups’ facilities and the groups are required to submit lists of their 
membership and assets every three months (Wi lkinson 2009, 98). The surveil-
lance is revised every three years and it was extended in 2003, 2006, 2009, 
2012 and 2015.
 8. Although Hikari no Wa members do not refer to Jōyū as a “leader”, but rather 
as a daihyō (“representative”), he is de facto in charge of the group. Therefore, 
for convenience’s sake, I refer to him as such in this chapter.
 9. https://twitter.com/joyu_fumihiro. Accessed July 18, 2015.
 10. This section is based on Baffelli and  Staemmler (2011).
 11. My account of Asahara’s life is based on R eader (1996 and 2 000, 32–60), 
Sh imazono (2001b) and Wa tanabe (1996).
 12. The exact length of his membership is not clear. While Agonshū tries to down-
play its influence on Asahara, the fact that he is said to have completed a 1000-
day religious exercise indicates that he was a member for at least three years 
( Shimazono 2001b, 23).
 13. Aum Shinrikyō’s doctrine and publications have been extensively investigated 
by several scholars. See, for example, F ujita (2008); I noue and RIRC eds. 
(2011); R eader (2000a), S himazono (1995; 1 997b; 2001b).
 14. A video of Asahara performing the Shaktipat initiation during a TV show 
is available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7AkTLeBFXoQ. Accessed 
July 18, 2015.
 15. For further discussions on Aum’s turn to violence, see R eader (2000); S hima-
zono (1995; 2 001b).
 16. This section is a slightly modified version of my overview of Hikari no Wa for 
the World Religions and Spirituality Project: http://www.wrs.vcu.edu/profiles/
HikariNoWa.htm. Accessed July 17, 2015; and based on Baffelli (2012).
 17. Since 2008, Aleph usually refers to itself as “Aleph” in Roman letters. From 
2000 to 2003, the Japanese transcription officially used was Arefu and, from 
2003 to 2008, Arēfu. The name Aleph was chosen as the group’s name because 
it implies a new beginning, the creation of something “new”: http://www.
aleph.to/aleph/qa-01.html#01 Accessed July 17, 2015.
 18. Jōyū Fumihiro’s “Outlook on the Aum-Related Incidents” was published on 
the English version of Aleph’s public relations’ website at http://english.aleph.
to/pr/01.html. Accessed July 17, 2015.
 19. http://www.aleph.to/exercise/. Accessed July 17, 2015.
 20. Members who were able to achieve higher levels in the hierarchical structure 
were assigned holy names (hōri nēmu), which usually originated from San-
skrit terms.
 21. Personal communications and interviews with group representatives, Novem-
ber 2010–January 2011.
 22. See: http://www.joyu.jp/hikarinowa/overview/. Accessed July 17, 2105.
 23. See: http://www.joyu.jp/hikarinowa/overview/. Accessed July 17, 2105.
 24. See: http://www.joyus.jp/hikarinowa/overview/05/0006.html. Accessed July 18, 
2015.
 25. See: http://www.joyus.jp/hikarinowa/overview/00_1/0030.html. Accessed July 23, 
2015.
 26. On naikan, see  Ozawa de Silva (2006);  Shimazono (2015).
 27. For a detailed account of the material produced by Aum, see  Inoue and RIRC 
eds. 2011.
 28. For other examples of Aum manga, see  Schodt (1996);  Thomas (2012, 134–137).
 29. See: http://hikarinowa.net/kyokun/. Accessed July 18, 2015.
 30. http://net-dojo.hikarinowa.net/home.html. Accessed July 18, 2015. Dōjō is 
common Japanese term for “training hall” or “meditation hall”.
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 31. The idea of netto shūkyō was expressed by the leader both in an interview with 
the author (November 2010) and in a blog entry on December 2, 2010 (now 
deleted).
 32. Interview with a representative of the PR office and the webmaster, January 
2009.
 33. http://hikarinowa.shop-pro.jp/. Accessed July 18, 2015
 34. Although several Aum members have confessed their crimes during trials, Asa-
hara has been uncommunicative in court and with his lawyers and has never 
admitted responsibility for the crimes.
 35. Interview with a representative of the PR office and the webmaster, January 
2009.
 36. The news of Jōyū starting to use Mixi was reported in several newspapers and 
online magazines. See, for example: http://news.livedoor.com/article/detail/
3070482/. Accessed July 18, 2015.
 37. Mixi was launched in 2004 by Kasahara Kenji, initially as a job search and 
recruiting site. Quickly converted to an invitation-only social networking site, 
by June 2009, it had around 24 million members, up from 19 million only a 
year earlier. According to a joint survey carried out by Internet.com and Goo 
(2008), at the time, 86 per cent of social media users in Japan were using Mixi.
 38. http://ameblo.jp/joyufumihiro/. Accessed July 18, 2015.
 39. https://www.youtube.com/user/HIKARINOWAMOVIE. Accessed July 18, 
2015.
 40. http://hikarinowa.net/tv/. Accessed July 18, 2015.
 41. As noted earlier, Hikari no Wa remains under surveillance by the authorities, 
and is subject to legal scrutiny by the security services.
 42. A representative of the group’s Public Relations Department mentioned to me 
on several occasions that they didn’t mind being seeing as a “boring” group, 
as this could make people feel safer in approaching them.
 43. A Jōyū fan club homepage was created before his release from prison in 1999, 
but it is no longer available online. See  Wudunn (1995).
 44. Since 2007, Jōyū has published two books and has been interviewed by several 
magazines, but in general terms, the movement has not had the balanced pub-
lic media access it seeks in order to advance its claims of being a respectable 
and safe movement.
 Conclusions
Mediation Practices and Reception
The case studies presented in the previous chapters have shown how medi-
ation practices employed by new religions at the beginning of their forma-
tion could impact both the success of a movement and the branding of its 
image in the public sphere. They also discussed how media reporting could 
impact a group’s image and examined different strategies employed by new 
religions to respond to criticism. The complex and dualistic relationship 
between media and new religions is a crucial issue and, as the examples I 
provided have demonstrated, needs to be understood in the wider context of 
a group’s history and of the perception of religion in contemporary societies. 
There are also a number of other topics that could be explored in future 
research in these areas, including comparative studies between Japan and 
other contexts or between new religions and established religious organisa-
tions. Emerging research projects have also starting evaluating whether the 
impact of a more recent traumatic event, the March 2011 triple disasters, 
will have any long-lasting impact on representations of religion in the Japa-
nese mass media and on religious organisations’ use of media, in particular 
the Internet (Eno moto 2012; Fujiyama 2011a; 201 1b; McL aughlin 2016).
There is also another critical issue that has been largely overlooked in 
the study of new religions and media in Japan, namely audience response. 
Increases in membership or in interest in a group may indicate a success in 
media strategies, while interviews with members may provide some indica-
tions about how publications and videos are used in their daily practices. As 
mentioned in other chapters, many testimonies of new religions’ members 
have claimed they converted after reading leaders’ publications, and refer-
ences to specific publications are often used in dialogues between members. 
However, to date, very few studies have been done on external audience 
reception of texts produced by new religions, that is, how readers, view-
ers and online users appropriate, understand and use materials produced 
by religious organisations. As noted by Plate (2006), there may be signifi-
cant differences between a group’s intentions, the formal evaluation of texts 
by consumers, media experts or scholars, and the ways texts are received. 
Analysing such issues presents several methodological challenges. For exam-
ple, it is sometimes difficult to have access to places where these texts are 
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discussed. Some discussions on new religions’ manga and anime, for exam-
ple, are available on official websites or social networking site groups cre-
ated by the religious movement concerned. However, these comments tend 
to lack objectivity and they are monitored and filtered by the organisations 
that have set them up. In Chapter Five, I argued that the Internet, with its 
ability to allow all sorts of people to post things without being fully iden-
tified, provides mechanisms for the construction of new forms of religious 
authority. However, it also allows scope for challenging and undermining 
such authority. The analysis of Hikari no Wa’s use of the Internet also indi-
cated that, differently from other media such as the press, individual users’ 
participation and contributions to the distribution of online content and to 
the reshaping of leader-member relationships plays a central role.
The ways in which media and religion are related to each other are not 
stable or predicable because they also depend on audience uses and inter-
pretations. The relationship can indeed be influenced by external forces too, 
for example, in contexts in which people make use of the open access and 
anonymity provided by the Internet to ridicule religious groups.
To illustrate this aspect, I would like to conclude this book with a discus-
sion of the reappropriation of Aum Shinrikyō’s anime films on video sharing 
websites, in particular looking at the period when the online presence of 
Aum’s splinter group Hikari no Wa increased, around 2008. In particular, I 
will focus on videos on video sharing websites such as YouTube and Niko 
Niko Dōga that parody the anime videos or songs that Aum Shinrikyō once 
produced and distributed among members and used for proselytism. In 
Japan, exposés of new religious groups and the open ridicule of their leaders 
in online communities or forums (Tamura and  Tamura 2011) as well as criti-
cism of new religions in the printed press (Dorman 2005 ; Morioka 199 4) are 
not uncommon, as was discussed in Chapter One. In the case of online paro-
dies of Aum, however, the videos not only make difficult-to-access materials 
accessible, but also seem to turn what was once a source of fear into a source 
of both amusement and pointed religious criticism.
VIDEOS
Among the several user-generated video sharing websites available, I have 
focused my research on videos uploaded to the most popular services in 
Japan,1 YouTube and Niko Niko Dōga. YouTube, founded by Chad Hurley, 
Steve Chen and Jawed Karim, was launched in 2005 (Burgess et  al. 2009, I). 
The website offers users a very simple, integrated interface, which allows 
users to upload and share videos, to link to other users as “friends” and to 
embed videos in other websites (such as blogs or other social networking 
services). Niko Niko Dōga (literally: Smiley Video), launched in 2006 and 
managed by Niwango, is one of the most popular video sharing websites 
in Japan (Hamasaki et al. 2008). The website presents features similar to 
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YouTube, with some important differences. Only registered users can watch 
videos (registration is free). The main reason for Niko Niko Dōga’s popular-
ity is the possibility of overlaying comments directly onto videos, synced to a 
specific time. This creates a sense of “dialogue” between the videos and the 
viewers, who can express their opinions on, feelings about and reactions to 
a specific segment or image. According to Niko Niko Pedia,2 almost half of 
Niko Niko Dōga’s users are in their twenties (46 per cent), with an increas-
ing number of teens (30 per cent). Videos posted on Niko Niko Dōga are, for 
the most part, user-generated. A particularly striking type of video created 
on Niko Niko are MAD movies (maddo mūbī, also known as Myūjikku 
anime dōga, Anime Music Video), a term referring to fan-made videos, often 
mixing together different animation (anime) images and soundtracks. MAD 
movies are frequently related to the dōjin culture, a term usually translated 
as “club” or “coterie” and referring to group of people sharing similar inter-
ests. The word is also used to refer to self-published works, including, for 
example, dōjinshi (amateur manga),3 anime, novels and video games.
The videos I am focusing on here were collected during a three-month 
search period, during June–August 2008. To provide an example, the fol-
lowing figures refer to the number of videos available online on August 15, 
2008. The search was carried out on the two websites (YouTube and Niko 
Niko Dōga) using as keywords the names of the three groups associated 
with Aum—Aum Shinrikyō, Aleph, Hikari no Wa—and the names of the 
two leaders—Asahara Shōkō and Jōyū Fumihiro. All words were entered in 
Japanese only. The search found a total of 247 videos (55 for Aum Shinrikyō, 
23 for Aleph, 141 for Hikari no Wa, 21 for Asahara Shōkō and seven for 
Jōyū Fumihiro) for YouTube and 29 videos (23 for Aum Shinrikyō, five for 
Asahara Shōkō and one for Jōyū Fumihiro) for Niko Niko Dōga. Taxonom-
ically, these videos were divided into five categories:
a. TV/movies: videos from TV news, TV shows, TV documentaries, 
movies;
b. Groups’ materials: videos, animated movies from DVDs and videocas-
settes produced by the groups for internal use or for proselytism;
c. Groups’ online videos: videos created by the groups to be diffused 
online;
d. Mashups: amateur videos created by users using groups’ videos, songs 
or images;
e. Unrelated: videos not related to the groups.
As shown in Table 6.1, on YouTube, for the keyword Aum Shinrikyō, 
30 videos fell into category a (news/movie) and 16 videos fell into category 
d (mashups), while only five videos were from material produced by the 
group. Videos from category a included TV news, interviews and documen-
taries related to the sarin gas attack, the history of the group before 1995 
and the official press conferences held by members at the time of significant 
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Aum Shinrikyō (55) 30 5 0 16 4
Aleph (23) 8 2 13 0
Hikari no Wa (141) 0 0 141 0 0
Asahara Shōkō (21) 13 0 0 3 5
Jōyū Fumihiro (7) 0 0 7 0 0














Aum Shinrikyō (23) 4 3 0 16 0
Aleph (0) 0 0 0 0 0
Hikari no Wa (0) 0 0 0 0 0
Asahara Shōkō (5) 0 0 0 5 0
Jōyū Fumihiro (1) 0 0 0 1 0
events, such the sarin gas attack in 1995, the restructuring in 2000 and the 
split in 2007. For Asahara Shōkō, 13 videos were from category a and three 
were from category d. For the keyword Aleph, most videos (13) fell into 
category c, and they were actually videos of the press conferences held by 
Hikari’s no Wa representatives after the split in 2007. For Hikari no Wa and 
Jōyū Fumihiro, all videos came under category c, as they were videos created 
by the group for its own YouTube channel.
Significantly, almost all the videos related to the keywords Aum Shinrikyō 
and Asahara Shōkō on Niko Niko Dōga were amateur videos; in particular, 
they were parodies targeting the image of the ex-leader (see Table 6.2).
The results of the search showed that there were significant differences 
in how the two leaders were represented on video sharing websites. Fur-
thermore, it showed that Asahara and Aum were targeted by parody videos 
created and uploaded by users, while videos for the new group Hikari no 
Wa and its leader were exclusively represented by the group’s own material.
Video sharing websites are particularly unstable objects of study (B ur-
gess et al. 2009, 6). Their dynamics change in very short periods of time 
and the diversity and constant flows of their contents make the selection of 
material very difficult. These videos are produced fast and consumed fast; 
they quickly disappear, and then reappear in a different (or identical) form 
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in the same place (or in a different one), posted by someone else who found 
them (or received them). The videos considered in this study are produced 
by amateurs and diffused exclusively online and exchanged within small 
groups, but with the potential of reaching a wider audience. Authorship 
is often undeclared, so it is difficult to assess if the people creating these 
videos are ex-members or have any relation with the religious group. It is 
also difficult to locate the original videos. They might have been created 
from tape recording a TV programme on Aum, or they might be part of 
ex-members’ private collections. It is even more difficult, if not impossible, 
to gauge the variety of available material and how it has been selected 
by users. As I will discuss later, for example, the majority of parody vid-
eos related to Asahara uses only one animation produced by the group. 
The original is replicated in many copies and reused to produce parodies, 
which are then copied and pasted on different video sharing websites or 
discussion forums, creating the impression of a wider variety of material. 
Finally, searching for the videos could present further challenges. Searching 
through tags and keywords does not guarantee, indeed, that we will reach 
all the material available on a certain topic (Bu rgess et al. 2009), because 
the videos could have been listed with tags and keywords not including, 
for example, the name of the group or the leader. However, despite these 
methodological challenges and the difficulties in keeping pace with rapid 
developments and changes in video sharing websites, I believe it is import-
ant to consider those media products as examples of how religion is repre-
sented and consumed online.
ASAHARA ON VIDEO: PARODY
In order to investigate how Asahara is represented on video sharing websites, 
I have decided to focus on videos from category d, amateur videos created 
and uploaded by users. The importance of these videos is not only related to 
their numbers—almost all videos on Niko Niko Dōga concerning Asahara 
and Aum Shinrikyō come into this category and they were the second largest 
group on YouTube—but also on the fact that those videos have been created 
specifically to be uploaded and shared online. In fact, many videos include 
in their titles or descriptions the indication MAD, or Anime MAD, explicitly 
indicating a link between the videos and the amateur movies created by 
anime fans and diffused through video sharing websites. Using techniques 
common to the style of parody (reiteration, inversion, exaggeration), these 
parodies reiterate elements from the original text in order to depart from 
the original, adding new elements and relying “upon intertextual references 
to other aspects of popular culture, including movies, TV shows, and other 
ads to create new meanings” (Tryo n 2008, 210). The videos can be divided 
into three subcategories.
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Example 1: Aum Anime and Non-Aum Background Music
In these videos, an original anime of Aum is presented with different back-
ground music to create a humorous effect, not unlike that created in the 
American context by a popular user-generated video that turned Mel Gib-
son’s film The Passion of the Christ into a Benny Hill-style farce with a sim-
ple change of music and some judicious fast-motion effects.4 For example, 
in the video called Zankokuna sonshi no tēze (“A Cruel Guru’s Thesis”), the 
soundtrack of the popular anime Neon Genesis Evangelion—whose original 
title is Zankokuna tenshi no tēze (“A Cruel Angel’s Thesis”)—is substituted 
in place of the opening song of an anime produced by Aum.
Example 2: Aum Music as the Background for Non-Aum Anime
In these videos, popular anime images are mixed with Aum’s songs, espe-
cially if originally sung by the leader. This is the case, for example, with a 
video called [Asahara Shōkō] Suzumiya Haruhi no sonshi māchi [fuitara 
poa] (“Suzumiya Haruki [Asahara Shōkō]’s March [If You Laugh, You’ll 
Be Killed]”), in which the opening images of the anime Suzumiya Haruhi, 
based on a series of “light novels” (laito noberu, a type of young adult novel 
published in Japan) published from 2003, are mixed with a song created by 
the group, sonshi māchi (“Guru’s March”), sonshi being a term used by Aum 
members to refer to Asahara. The final idiomatic expression (fuitara poa) is 
repeated in other video titles and can be approximately translated as “if you 
laugh, you’ll be killed”. Playing with the meaning of the saying, “Fuitara, 
make” (“If you laugh, you lose”), the idiom sarcastically refers to poa, a reli-
gious practice performed by Aum and representing the most violent expres-
sion of the group’s interpretation of Buddhist teachings. Originally referring 
to the Buddhist practice of performing rituals for the dead to help them in 
the passage to the next spiritual realm, the concept of poa, as discussed in 
Chapter Five, was widened in Aum doctrine to justify killing as a means of 
leading a non-believer’s spirit to salvation (Reader 2000a, 14 5–146).
Example 3: Two or More Aum Media
In these videos, two or more media products of the group are mixed together 
to create a ridiculous effect, such as, for example, in the video Aum Shin-
rikyō sonshi songumedorē warattara poa (“Aum Shinrikyō Guru Songs Mel-
ody ‘If You Laugh, You’ll Be Killed’”), which mixes together images of Aum 
anime and the already-mentioned “Guru’s March”.
Parody and the Leader’s Image
The interpretation of these videos presents some difficulties. Indeed, many 
of these parody videos are copied and pasted between YouTube and Niko 
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Niko Dōga, and this complicates the assessment of where and when (and by 
whom) the first mashup was created.
Furthermore, linguistic and specific intertextual references make these 
videos difficult to decode for a non-Japanese audience. Indeed, as Umberto 
Eco claims in the introduction to the English translation of Diario Minimo 
(Misreadings), “Parody, like all comic writing, is linked to space and time” 
(Eco 1993, 2). The pot ential of parody heavily depends on the recognition 
and interpretation of allusions and references to other genres and texts (Gray 
2006). The inabi lity of properly decoding the parodic text can result in mis-
understanding, especially in a space such as the Internet, where these texts 
are potentially accessible to everyone. This is the case, for example, with a 
video called Aum Shinrikyō Anime. The anime was a new copy of a widely 
reproduced parody video, posted on Niko Niko Dōga with the title Poaemon 
and on YouTube as Anime MAD Aum Shinrikyō x Doraemon. In the video, 
images of the anime Chōetsu Sekai (“Transcendental World”, produced by 
Aum) are mixed with the theme song of Doraemon, one of the most popular 
anime series in Japan, which was created in 1969. The video was also reposted 
with a title Aum Shinrikyō Anime and with the following description:
Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth), now known as Aleph, founded by Shoko 
Asahara, is a Japanese religious cult obsessed with the apocalypse. The 
previously obscure group became infamous in 1995 when some of its 
members released deadly sarin nerve gas into the Tokyo subway system, 
killing twelve people and sending more than 5,000 others to hospitals.5
As a result, the vast majority of the over 300 comments underneath the video 
(many of them in English) focused on discussing, criticising and attacking 
the group for its violence, or introducing more formal comments on religion 
and violence. The fact that the user(s) who copied and pasted the video—as 
well as the majority of commentators—missed the parody offers an interest-
ing example of how easily parody can be misunderstood on the Internet, as 
pointed out by Mikula:
Cyberspace as a medium paradoxically limits parody’s political potential, 
by making it more accessible to ‘uninitiated’ audiences lacking the cultural 
knowledge, experience or skills which would make decoding possible.
(Mikula 2003, 173)
If the p ower of pluritextuality is lost, the parody is lost.
Indeed, to understand parodies of Asahara, one not only needs Japanese 
language expertise, but also has to be able to understand the specific refer-
ences to other media, animated movies in particular, and to the group itself. 
The focus on ridiculing Asahara’s “superpowers”, for example, is an element 
often recurring in documentaries and other media portrayals of Aum.
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If one looks closely at the material used in the parodies, one will notice 
that the video most used in parodies is a reproduction of the anime Chōetsu 
Sekai (“Transcendental World”), a series of short episodes produced in 1991 
by the Manga Anime Team of Aum Shinrikyō. After the sarin gas attack, the 
anime was widely discussed in print media and television and was claimed 
to contain subliminal messages, one of the accusations used by the media 
to construct an image of Aum and its leader as the “personification of evil” 
(Reader 2000a, 34) and as a  manipulator. The main aim of these parodies is 
to degrade (Bakhtin 1984) the leader. T he (once) untouchable leader becomes 
a defenceless figure, whose “uncrowning” (Bakhtin 1984) is grounded i n the 
pleasure of associating his image with unusual and unexpected animation 
characters and songs. Parody can challenge the way we think about author-
ity (Burgess et. al 2009) becaus e it performs an act of “implicit criticism” 
(Dentith 2000, 16). Video sh aring website users appropriate a niche product 
and transform it into a mass product that is mass replicated and mass repro-
duced. And the “mechanical reproduction”, borrowing Benjamin’s defini-
tion, destroys the “aura” of the leader, no more seen as an object of fear, but 
as an object of ridicule (Benjamin 1970). Parody can b e therapeutic, helping 
us to distance ourselves from a recent traumatic experience. It can, how-
ever, be at the same time both disruptive and conservative. The ridiculing 
of Asahara, for example, reiterates and preserves the negative image of the 
Fig. 6.1 Images of the anime Chōetsu Sekai (“Transcendental World”).
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leader as found in print media, without challenging the representations of 
the leader as an “evil” man.
Users and Reception
From a creator’s point of view, the mashup videos related to Asahara not only 
focus on parodying the leader, but also they do it demonstrating fan loyalties 
to a specific genre (Burns 2009, 75), namely the a mateur MAD movies. An 
important question remains why Aum’s anime and songs (which were consid-
ered “dangerous” material) have been used for these pleasure-seeking activi-
ties. From a genre point of view, the low quality of animated movies by Aum 
could be one of the reasons. The use of low-quality productions is linked, 
for example, to the pleasure that B movie fans take in watching low-quality 
productions and the unintentional humour they create (Voci 2010, 106). Yet 
unlike ha rmless B movies, the materials used in these videos were produced 
by a group that is still seen in the media and by public opinion in Japan as 
an evil group par excellence. Furthermore, if we consider the statistics related 
to the average age of Niko Niko Dōga users, who are the creators of many 
of these videos, their average age is between the late teens and early 20s. 
It is possible to infer that many of them are aware of the Aum Affair, but 
have only vague memories of the 1995 events, recollections that are likely 
to be mainly mediated by the sensationalist accounts found in the main-
stream media. More precisely, in order to understand the use and perception 
of these parodies, we need to take into account that the appropriation of 
Aum’s material can be perceived in different ways, especially by people who 
clearly remember the shock that the sarin gas attack and associated events 
provoked in Japan. This mode of similarity can be traced to the so-called 
“Hitler meme” or “Hitler finds out”, a video meme started in 2006. In these 
videos, new ironic subtitles are added to the dramatic scene of Hitler’s fall 
from power from the German movie Downfall by Oliver Hirschbiegel. Com-
ments and reactions to these videos include both strong disapproval of using 
material related to serious topics such as the Holocaust and World War Two, 
and enthusiastic comments praising the videos as funny and clever. While an 
in-depth analysis of viewers’ comments on Aum videos is beyond the scope of 
this study, it is clear that although the majority of them reiterate the ridiculing 
of Asahara and his “supernatural ability”, some express their disapproval 
for making fun of this grave and sensitive topic. For some viewers, also, their 
comments offer an opportunity to relate and share their experiences of the 
sarin gas attack and their feelings. Several comments claim, “We will never 
forget that accident”, but also express surprise at being able, now, to laugh 
when watching the parodic videos, thereby confirming the double nature of 
parody itself, which entertains, but can also be a place to exorcise ghosts:
This contradictory reaction is not, however, just a matter of personal 
taste. Its roots lie in the bi-directionality of the legitimacy of parody 
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itself. The presupposition of both a law and its transgression bifurcates 
the impulse of parody: it can be normative and conservative, or it can 
be provocative and revolutionary.
(Hutcheon 1985, 76)
If we compare  Asahara’s representations on video sharing websites to 
Jōyū Fumihiro’s self-representations online discussed in Chapter 5, it follows 
that online representations of the two leaders seem to be characterised by 
continuity, with the online mirroring offline humour and offline celebrity 
being reproduced in cyberspace. Indeed, Jōyū was already a celebrity before 
starting to use social networking services, and Asahara was an object of 
parody in print media before becoming the target of online video parodies. 
In the press and television, for example, Asahara has always, since 1995, 
been portrayed as the main evil villain of the Aum Affair, while Jōyū, despite 
the criticism he received for his engagement with the group and his public 
denial of Aum’s involvement in crimes at the beginning, was portrayed as 
good looking, intelligent and even somehow acceptable.
Moreover, parodic representations of religious groups have been common 
in Japanese history. In the Edo period, for example, illustrated novels called 
kibyōshi were used for satirical portraits of preachers (Kern 2006), while 
previously, the fa mous handscroll Chōjū giga (Cartoons of Birds and Beasts) 
by the Tendai Bishop Toba (1053–1140) (Repp 2006), using anthropomor-
phic ani mals, presented a satirical representation of the clergy and religious 
rituals. Similarly, Aum Shinrikyō was the object of ridicule not only online. 
As discussed by Gardner (2002) in his analysis of sen ryū (satiric verse form 
of 7–5–7 syllables) concerning Aum Shinrikyō and published in major Jap-
anese newspapers, “humour has been a central part of the effort to make 
sense of Aum within Japan” (Gardner 2002, 37). The figure of the leader, in 
particular, and his claimed abilities (to levitate, for example) as well as the 
state-like structure started by the group in 1994 were often used as subjects 
for sarcastic and humorous attacks:
The amount of humour related to Aum is not difficult to account for. 
Given the general contours of Japanese common sense at the time, Aum 
and what its members did were unexpected, incongruous, unbelievable, 
horrifying and—let it be said—just plain strange and weird. While a per-
ception of tragic incongruity quite naturally dominated the understanding 
of Aum’s attack on the subway and the subsequent death and injuries, cer-
tain aspects of Aum, such as founder Asahara Shōkō’s claim to be able to 
levitate, struck many as humorous and laughable. The implausible beliefs, 
hypocrisy, and obvious lies of Aum members gave rise to laughter and 
became the subject of various forms of ridicule, satire and parody.
(Gardner 2002, 37)
This raises a question of what can be considered “new” in the leaders’ 
representations on video sharing websites. The main difference is that the 
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users’ role in social networking services and in the “‘Do-It-Yourself’ (DIY) 
movement” (Jenkins 2003, 287) of online video sharing websites is much 
more active than in  print media or television, with the user (consumer) being 
engaged in “re-presenting the contents and adding an interpretation” (Burns 
2009, 75). As explained by Mikula, “cyber space has radically redefined the 
nature of the narrative, with the hypertextual blurring of the author-reader 
relationship” (Mikula 2003, 171). In the translation from medi a to media 
(from printed media to the Internet) and from leader to leader (from Asa-
hara to Jōyū), the opportunities offered by digital media for people to share 
their creations with others (Hargittai & Walejko 2008, 239) have created 
new ways for materials related to the religious groups and the leader to 
circulate. The ability of users to “participate in the archiving, annotation, 
transformation, and circulation of media content” (Jenkins 2003, 286) make 
more controversial mate rial (for example, the anime portrayed as “danger-
ous”) widely available.
In the case of Aum, it seems that the user-generated content can poten-
tially have the power to de-sacralise religious authority, by mocking the 
charismatic leader, for example. However, the challenge might be limited to 
online contexts. As previously discussed, the ridiculing of Asahara online 
does not seem to affect the image, widely diffused by print media or televi-
sion, of him being a malevolent perpetrator of evil.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In Chapter One, I showed how Araki, a young Aum devotee who suddenly 
became the group’s public relations representative after its top members 
were arrested in 1995, amidst the trauma of the post-sarin attack period, 
asked the director Mori to film their everyday activities and thereby help 
them present themselves to the wider public and show that they were not 
just a strange and dangerous group. The power of such mediated images 
can, in such terms, create new images of a religious movement (although, 
as discussed in Chapters One and Two, Mori’s attempt to challenge main-
stream representations of Aum has not been successful in Japan)—but 
images can, as has been demonstrated throughout this book, also be used to 
create other pictures and meanings. In contrast to the realistic documentary 
shot by Mori, the parodic videos uploaded by users on video sharing web-
sites such as Niko Niko Dōga demonstrate an alternative power of contem-
porary media in the hands not of documentary makers, but unnamed online 
enthusiasts, who are able to use the medium of the Internet to develop new 
modes of looking at such groups. Rather than producing something that 
seeks to make sense of and provide a realistic account of a contemporary 
group, these videos do something quite different: they make fun of a group 
(admittedly, one associated with terrible deeds). As such, they demonstrate 
another power of contemporary media: that of ridicule, a theme that may 
well become increasingly prevalent in future media depictions of religion, 
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especially in online contexts, and one that will need to be taken into consid-
eration in future studies of the links between religion and the media.
In this book, I have investigated how mediated practices can impact the 
shaping of the identity of a religious organisation at early stage of its for-
mation and its practices. The control of the outputs, or media texts, is cen-
tral to the new religions-media relationship and, as illustrated by the case 
studies discussed in previous chapters, this relationship is often ambiguous 
and dualistic. The final example I have used, that of the parodic reappro-
priation of Aum’s videos online, suggests the potential for the Internet to 
reshape media-religion discourses in the future and to offer new challenges 
to religious groups, exposing them not just to the potential hostility of the 
mass media or rival religious organisations, but to far less controllable and 
identifiable groups, such as online individual users. It also indicates, via the 
differing representations of Asahara and Jōyū, how one cannot see the online 
context as offering just one mode of representation but a multiplicity thereof, 
while also offering scope for increased interactive engagements between reli-
gious groups and audiences, in hostile, parodic and other ways. Responding 
to these challenges requires a reshaping of the image and communication 
strategies of religious groups, but also increases possibilities for a more visi-
ble presence of religious organisations’ voices in the public sphere.
NOTES
1. See: http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/JP. Accessed July 18, 2015.
2. http://dic.nicovideo.jp/. Accessed July 18, 2015.
3. Schodt translates amateur manga created by fans as “fanzine[s]” ( Schodt 
1996, 37).
4. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-gTy2UlHWII. Accessed July 18, 2015.
5. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IVnscHsPfR4. Accessed July 18, 2015.
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